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The question of freedom has been a present and constant concern since the 
inception of the occidental philosophical tradition. Yet after a certain point the manner in 
which this question is to be asked has been canonized and sedimented: do humans (subject) 
have the capacity (predicate) for free and spontaneous action? 
The third antinomy of Kant's Critique ifPure Reason, I argue, demonstrates the 
necessary failure, the perpetual aporia, of continuing to discuss whether humans conceived of 
as subjects possess the predicate freedom. I argue that if we do not want to fall either into 
the Third Antinomy, we must steer away from thinking of freedom as a predicate of a 
subject and reconfigure it as an experience or a comportment. 
Following suggestions from Jean-Luc Nancy's The Inoperative Communiry, Being Singular 
Plural, and The Experience ifFreedom, my dissertation argues that re-thinking of freedom as an 
experience simultaneously requires a re-thinking of identity, in terms of ecstasy, ek-stases, or 
ex-position, and accordingly a re-thinking of the activity of thinking itself. Nancy cites 
v 
Schelling and Heidegger as the thinkers who have made an attempt to think about ecstasy 
seriously as a fundamental ontological fact about the constitution of things. 
This reconfiguration of the constitution of things as either parts of organic structures 
(Schelling) or beings in a world (Heidegger), demands that we recognize how our identities are 
perpetually being constituted in all of our acts of relating with the world. We are constituted 
and constituting by our engagement with the things that environ us, and this environing is 
active and alive. If this is accepted as an ontological fact, this requires that we reconsider what 
it would mean to think, as all of our engagements with the world would be creative-both of 
ourselves and ofwhat it is that we encounter. This would also mean that the meaningfulness 
of all things is wildly contingent, in fact necessarily, so. Accordingly, I defend that freedom, as 
the experience of possibility through our awareness of this contingency due to the lack of an 
origin, emerges for us in the experience of thinking. 
VI 
CURRICULUM VITAE 
NAME OF AUTHOR: Adam C. Arola 
PLACE OF BIRTH: Hancock, MI 
DATE OF BIRTH: February 23, 1981 
GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED: 
University of Oregon
 
University of Michigan
 
DEGREES AWARDED: 
Doctor of Philosophy, 2008, University of Oregon 
Master of Arts in Philosophy, 2006, University of Oregon 
Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, 2002, University of Michigan 
AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: 
Post-Kantian Continental Philosophy
 
History of Philosophy
 
Indigenous Philosophy
 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE: 
Adjunct Professor, University of Oregon, 2008 
Graduate Teaching Fellow, University of Oregon, 2002-2008 
Vll 
GRANTS, AWARDS AND HONORS: 
Graduate Teaching Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2002-2008 
George Rebec Prize, University of Oregon, 2005 
Paideia Prize for Teaching Excellence, University of Oregon, 2004 
Graduate Research Award, University of Oregon, 2005 
Fighting Fellowship, University of Oregon, 2002 
Scholar Recognition Award, University of Michigan, 1998-2002 
PUBLICATIONS: 
Arala, Adam. 2007. "'A Larger Scheme of Life': Deloria on Essence and Science (in 
Dialogue with Continental Philosophy)," Americans Indian in Philosopf?y Newsletterfrom 
the American PhilosophicalAssociatz'on. 
Arala, Adam. 2007. "Under the Aspect of Eternity: Thinking Freedom in Spinoza's Ethics," 
T6picos: revista de filosofia. 
Arola, Adam. 2008. "The Advent of an Opening: Schelling's Image of the Human in 
Nature (and Vice Versa)" In The Barbarian Principle: Merleau-Pon!YJ Schelling, and the 
Question ofNature, edited by Pat Burke, Elizabeth Sikes, and Jason Wirth. Albany: 
SUNY Press. ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION. 
Arola, Adam. 2008. "Taking on the Tradition: Sovereignty and Self-Identity." In Philosopf?y 
andAboriginal Rights: A Critical Dialogue, edited by Lorraine Mayer. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION. 
Schelling, F.W.J. 2008. "Timaeus: A Platonic Essay." Trans. Adam Arala, Jena Jolissaint, 
Peter Warnek, Epoche: A Journalfor the History ofPhilosopf?y. 
Arala, Adam. 2009. "The Tyranny of Authenticity: Critical Theory, Rebellion, and Right 
Life," Journal ofSpeculative Philosopf?y, ACCEPTED FOR PUBLICATION. 
Vlll 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
First and foremost, I need to thank my family. Without my wife Anne, my sister 
Kristin, my brother (in-law) Jeff, my mother Jill, and my father Burt, I would have long ago 
fallen into a bad kind of ecstasy from which I would never have returned to the insistence 
that makes me the person and the philosopher that I strive to be. Their support (emotional, 
moral, fiscal) has made this life of schofe possible. Also, I must thank all my grandparents: 
Michael, Viola, Elvie, Gerard, Myrtle, Burt, and Bernie, all of whom in their presence or 
absence taught me that the matter is, truly, to live well. Second, I need to thank the faculty 
at the University of Oregon. Without Peter Warnek's insistence on the need to suffer for 
philosophy, I would have inevitably undertaken a much 'easier' dissertation project-thank 
you for that. Without John Lysaker's constant open door, constant encouragement, and 
constant provocation, I never would have finished this project. Without Scott Pratt's 
goading, I never would have entered into the discourse of indigenous philosophy that is now 
so near and dear to me. And without the rest of the department, I would have been too 
comfortable resting on my laurels-thank you all for making me learn to speak broadly. 
Further thanks are owed to Stacy Keltner at Kennesaw State College, Fred Peters in the 
Residential College at the University of Michigan, Jeffrey Bernstein at Holy Cross, Jason 
Wirth at Seattle University, and Laurie Whitt at Utah Valley State College, all ofwhom have 
been my long distance teachers and supporters. Thank you to the undergraduate and 
graduate students at Oregon who make me explain what it is that I am up to, particularly 
(but in no particular order), Sarah Lachance-Adams, Carolyn Culbertson, Miles Hentrup, 
Michael Brown, Max Goins, Brent Crouch, Jena Jolissaint, John Kaag, Grant Silva, Jose 
IX 
Mendoza, Chris Emmick, Evan Haney, Chris Ruth, and everyone else I am forgetting right 
now. Special thanks are owed to Melissa Shew, without whom this project would truly never 
have been completed; it was my good fortune to share an office with someone who loves 
philosophy as much as I do for 4 years. 
x 
To my grandfather Gerard Barrette, Oren Krum,]ason Wicklund, and Sean Pettibone, who 
all taught me in different ways that the only gods and masters are those that we create-and 
serve-so long as we stop thinking. 
Xl 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Chapter Page 
I.	 A SORT OF INTRODUCTION . 1
 
Section I: The History of the Concept of Freedom . 4
 
Section II: History's Ecstasies . 17
 
Section III: Thinking of Freedom . 29
 
Section IV: Chapter Breakdown . 38
 
II. THE ECSTASY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE DESTRUCTION 
42
OF ORIGINS .
 
Section I: Why We Must Stand Aside (Ourselves) . 43
 
Section II: Time and Identity .. 53
 
Section III: Thinking Outside Ourselves .. 57
 
Section IV: Moving to the Middle Voice . 70
 
III. THE FREEDOM OF THE CLEARING: THINKING IN THE 
78
BEGINNING(S) ..
 
Section I: Das Denken der Lichtung . 80
 
Section II: The Freedom of the Abgrund .. 94
 
Section III: Ereignis and Gelassenheit .. 108
 
IV. SCHELLING'S THINKING OF THE DISSEMBLING SUBJECT OF 
121
FREEDOM .
 
Section I: Unprethinkability and Unpredictability . 123
 
Section II: Schelling's Eternal Past .. 136
 
Section III: A Tangent: There Are Three Kinds of People . 141
 
Section IV: Will and Onto-Theology: Heidegger's Critique of Schelling .. 147
 
Section V: The Dissembling Subject of Freedom .. 153
 
V.	 DECISION, THINKING, AND FREEDOM .. 164
 
Section I: The Rotary Motion of the Drives .. 166
 
Section II: Differentiating the Indifferent: Decision . 173
 
XlI 
Chapter	 Page 
Section III: The Ecstatic Emergence of the Human .. 181
 
Section IV: Schelling's Philosophizing: The Experience of Freedom .. 191
 
Section V: The Silence of Science and the Possibility for EviL . 206
 
VI.	 FREEDOM AND THE GREAT HEALTH .. 209
 
Section 1: Human Freedom and Evil .. 212
 
Section II: Evil, Error, and Conceptual Clotting .. 222
 
Section III: Evil and the Force of Selfhood . 229
 
Section IV: The Experience of Freedom and the Great Health .. 235
 
APPENDIX: CITATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS	 .. 248
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY	 . 250
 
1 
CHAPTER I 
A SORT OF INTRODUCTION 
If there is a sense of reality, and no one will doubt that it has its justification for 
existing, then there must also be something we can call a sense of possibility. 
Whoever has it does not say, for instance: Here this or that has happened, will 
happen, must happen; but he invents: Here this or that might, could, or ought to 
happen. If he is told that something is the way it is, he will think: Well, it could 
probably just as well be otherwise. So the sense of possibility could be defined 
outright as the ability to conceive of everything there might be just as well, and to 
attach no more importance to what is than to what is not. The consequences of so 
creative a disposition can be remarkable, and may, regrettably, often make what 
people admire seem wrong, and what is taboo permissible, or, also, make both a 
matter of indifference. Such possibilists are said to inhabit a more delicate medium, 
a hazy medium of mist, fantasy, daydreams, and the subjunctive mood. Children 
who show this tendency are dealt with firmly and warned that such persons are 
cranks, dreamers, weaklings, know-it-alls, or troublemakers. 
Robert Musil 
The Man ff7ithoutQualities) Vol. 1 
The objective of this dissertation, stated in short, is to establish what a manner of 
philosophizing would look like that brings the sense of possibility that Musil describes above 
to the forefront of philosophical activity. In his Tarrying With the Negative, Zizek argues that, 
"philosophy begins the moment we do not simply accept what exists as given ('It's like thad', 
'Law is Law!', etc.), but raise the question of how is what we encounter as actual also 
possible" (Zizek, 1993: 2).1 Following Zizek, my contention is that this pursuit of the 
1 The majority of the citations in this dissertation are made in accordance with the Chicago Manual of Style, 
though there are a few notable exceptions. All ofmy citations of Schelling (with the exception of texts that 
have not made the collected works yet) are made according to the pagination of his collected works in German. 
All of my citations from Heidegger, insofar as possible, are made according to the number and page of the 
Gesamtausgabe edition in question-see the appendix. I have also followed standard citation conventions 
regarding references to Stephanus numbers in Greek texts, to book, proposition, etc. in Spinoza's Ethics, and to 
2 
conditions of possibility of any set of actual circumstances should, or rather, must always be 
undergirded and guided by a sense that what is actual could be otherwise than it is. Thus I 
share one of Charles Scott's hypotheses from his The Lives ifThings. He writes: 
My hypothesis is that when people are predisposed to experience events and are 
relieved of a quest for definitive origins that explain why something occurs and that 
define its meaning from the beginning, they are more able to pay attention to the 
often astonishing happenings around them, happenings that never quite fit their 
duplications in meanings and values. In that sensibility, "nature" [or as I will say, 
"essence"-AA] fades in its unifying traditional powers, and we begin to find 
alternative manners of differential expression and recognition before the occurrences 
of our lives that happen physically and indifferently to the meanings by which we 
recognize them. (Scott, 2002: 45) 
By the end of this project I will reformulate and implicitly disagree with certain aspects of 
Scott's assertion, particularly the idea that occurrences of our lives are fundamentally 
indifferent to us; yet for now, his provocative assertion that ceasing to seek out fundamental, 
interpretive principles can free us up to cultivate a different kind of sensibility, or bearing, 
towards experience will serve as a guide-one that I will elaborate as we proceed. 
As is indicated by the title of this project, I believe that such a redetermination of the 
act of philosophizing requires that we rethink our understandings of three central terms 
(even if central only in their exorbitancy from that center, particularly in the standard way in 
which ecstasy is understood) from the history of philosophy: 1) freedom, 2) ecstasy, and 3) 
thinking. To that end, my task in this introduction to the body of my dissertation is to 
quickly delineate-potentially, all-too-quickly-some standard ways in which these terms 
have been understood so as to show how traditional concepts of freedom lead to 
philosophical conundrums that can only be overcome via a certain understanding of ecstasy. 
references to the original German pagination of the A and B edition of Kant's Cn'tique ofPure Reason, Hegel is 
cited according the Suhrkamp edition Werke; Nietzsche according to the Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 
3 
Yet the understanding of ecstasy for which I will advocate here is not a non-discursive 
ecstasy that amounts to the self-immolation of a human subject into some divine 
beyond-as it would seem to be in Plotinus and the Pseudo-Dionysius-but rather a sense 
of ecstasy that could just as well be termed a dialogical ontology, an ontology of reciprocal 
determination, which is thereby no onto-logy at all, but rather an account of the spacing(s) 
and deferrals that makes identity both possible and actual. It is from this restructured 
conception of ecstasy that maintains the identity of that which is ecstatic, that we will have 
to rethink what it means to think. Put simply, thinking for me is not the tarrying of a subject 
with an object from which it is of an entirely different kind and thus it is neither 
representational in the anti-realist sense of the term, nor does it grasp prefabricated, 
meaningful wholes. Rather, thinking is, in accord with the very dialogical structure of things, 
an always-creative conversation between myself and the other things of the world in which I 
find myself. 
The brief explanations just given regarding the ways in which I will employ the terms 
freedom, ecstasy, and thinking are all-too-cursory. Accordingly, permit me, first, to go into 
greater depth in an attempt to elaborate on these terms' histories in attempt to 
argumentatively vindicate the manner in which I will use them in this project. After having 
discussed these key terms, I will then give a brief methodology regarding the presentation of 
my project in hopes of making the case that I, at least in part, practice what I preach by 
enacting the kind of thinking I advocate for in the very unfolding of my project. I then give 
a brief account of these terms' function in terms of Heidegger's understanding of Stimmung, 
and finally, I will provide sketch of the chapters that are to follow. 
4 
Section I
 
The History of the Concept of Freedom
 
Stating a widely held view in the history of philosophy, Aquinas holds that free 
choice can only be said to exist in those that "have within themselves the principle of their 
motion or operation" (Aquinas, 1965: 121). For Aquinas, humans can be said to have free 
choice insofar as they have reason, as "the root of all liberty ... is found in reason. Hence, 
according as something is related to reason, it is related to free choice" (Aquinas, 1965: 124). 
For this reason he concludes that freedom cannot be a question of character or habit, but 
rather free choice is a potency, "the power ofwill or reason" (Aquinas, 1965: 128). Here 
freedom has already been made into a capacity which we possess, and which we exhibit in 
our making judgments about things. For Aquinas, we can go wrong-and thus have the 
capacity for evil-because our knowledge is always discursive and thereby mediated. 
In making freedom a capacity or faculty that we have, we thus run into the 
traditional problem that such a conception of freedom leads to: are we free to choose what 
we like, or are all of our actions determined, or pre-destined, by God or the mechanistic 
movements of the natural order of things? Aquinas, of course, following Boethius spends a 
great deal of time attempting to reconcile the possibility, nay, necessity of human freedom 
with divine providence. Writing in the wake of (or rather mid-stream in) this dispute, 
Erasmus writes: "By free choice in this place we mean a power of the human will by which a 
man can apply himself to the things which lead to eternal salvation, or turn away from them" 
(Rupp, 1969: 47). Erasmus, echoing Aquinas, asserts that humanity was not only endowed 
with reason, but also with will. This will is that which can lead to either good or evil. Our 
propensities towards evil and sin are "vestiges of original sin" which crop up in all 
5 
descendents ofAdam (Rupp, 1969: 49). The necessity of the possession of this will for 
Erasmus is that it enables us to explain the possibility, and accompanying rationality, of 
God's judgment. He writes, "If the power to distinguish good and evil and the will of God 
had been hidden from men, it could not be imputed to them if they made the wrong choice" 
(Rupp, 1969: 50). If humanity were not imbued with such freedom, a god who hands out 
punishment would be an entirely incomprehensible and irrational deity, and as Boethius says 
in responding to Philosophy, "the author of all good must be made responsible for all 
human vice since the entire order of human events depends on providence and nothing on 
man's intention." In his response to Philosophy's assertion that providence and freedom 
can be reconciled, Boethius continues drawing conclusions that would hold ifhumans do not 
have the faculty of freedom: "there is no use in hoping or praying for anything, for what is 
the point in hope or prayer when everything that man desires is determined by an unalterable 
process" (Boethius, 1962: 107)? 
The positions Erasmus and Boethius put forward are exemplary of an extremely 
common understanding of freedom throughout the entire history of philosophy. Though 
the punishment may not be being doled out by God, the fact that we hold one another 
responsible is seen as a primary argument for the necessity of assuming the freedom of the 
human. Given the fact that we engage the world via what he terms "evaluative concepts," 
Isaiah Berlin writes, "To say that you might as well morally blame a table as an ignorant 
barbarian or an incurable addict is not an ethical proposition, but one which emphasizes the 
conceptual truth that this kind of praise and blame makes sense only among persons capable 
of free choice." Thus looking back to Erasmus, the basic position is the following: if we do 
not want to consider God to be unreasonable, and potentially mad, we must assume that the 
6 
fact that he holds people accountable testifies to bis knowledge of the human as being 
capable of doing otherwise-as it seems like the creator of the universe would be on top of 
that sort of thing. Berlin goes on, "This is what Kant appeals to; it is this fact that puzzled 
the early Stoics;2 before them freedom of choice seems to have been taken for granted; it is 
presupposed equally in Aristotle's discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts and in the 
thinking of unphilosophical persons of the day" (Berlin, 2002: 16). 
The evidence for freedom of choice thus lies in the fact that we do hold people 
accountable for actions. However, this viewpoint fundamentally conflicts with the basic 
scientific understanding of modem philosophy. We hold people responsible for things, but 
ifwe are actually rational creatures, we understand that to do so is a contradiction in terms. 
It is in Kant's transition from the First to the Second Critique that we can experience this 
contradiction in terms most radically. Thus we must consider how Kant, the great 
resurrector of causation and the thinker of duty and responsibility, can be one person. 
Even though Hume was thought to have destroyed the possibility of us thinking of 
causation as anything more than constant conjunction without necessary connection (Hume, 
1993: 51), Kant rehabilitates cause by turning to the categories of the understanding and the 
status of time as the pure form of apriori internal intuition. The very fact that we are able to 
assemble the sensible manifold of experience into a coherent order at all demonstrates that 
even someone like Hume had to grant the necessity of the time as a condition for the 
possibility of experience. Bernard Freydberg writes: 
2 One could consider Lucretius to be an example of this, as even if he is not historically called a member of the 
Stoa, his thinking certainly exhibits stoic residue. In Book Two of On the Nature ofThings, he wonders how "if 
every motion is always linked/and a new one always arises from an old one in sure succession" something can 
break this chain of causation. His conclusion-without getting into his argument regarding the clinamen, or the 
swerve that lies at the origin of things-is free will: "For doubtless one's own will provides for each a 
beginning/of these things, and from it motions streams through the limbs" (Lucretius, 2003: 37-38). 
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The key to Kant's argument is that in order for Bume to claim that only "constant 
conjunction plus belief" could withstand philosophical scrutiny, Bume had to 
presuppose a necessary, law-bound time order in order to discern constant 
conjunctions at all. Thus, Bume tacitly presupposed the transcendental-logical pure 
concept of causality in order to be able to offer his skeptical arguments. (Freydberg, 
2005: 10) 
Freydberg illuminates that Bume's skepticism was an epistemological skepticism, not an 
actual argument that instants of causal connection do not occur. Rather it is the case that we 
cannot actually know these connections or make them intelligible. Kant's retort is to say that 
since we experience constant conjunction, and since we experience time, we do know, and 
always already have made these connections intelligible-at the very least in an isolated 
moment of occurrence-through the category of causality. Elaborating this point more 
fully, Adorno writes, "whereas Bume would say that causality is merely suijective, Kant would 
reply, indeed, it is merely subjective, but this supposedly subjective element is the necessary 
precondition without which oijectiviry cannot come into being" (Adorno, 2001: 91). It is thus 
the Copernican turn itself that enables us to account for causation and to have a kind of 
knowing about it-if all of our experience is necessarily determined by the pure form of 
intuition, which is time, we know that causal connection reconceived of as the condition of 
experiencing the sequentiality of things in time, is an object of knowledge. Kant explains, 
"That all that occurs has a cause cannot at all be concluded from the concept of what occurs 
as such; moreover, the fundamental principle shows, rather, how we can arrive at a 
determinate concept of experience ofwhat occurs in the first place" (Kant, 1998: 
A301/B357). The nail has been driven home on a certain aspect of Bume's critique, but at 
what price? 
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Causality has thus been resurrected. To be determined is to follow something. This 
must be taken quite literally. It is not necessarily the case that something must 'follow out' 
of something else to be considered caused or determined. All that must be the case we 
experience time and the category of causality thereby comes along as part of a package deal. 
And here begins the bite. In the Critique ofPure Reasoll, Kant famously defines freedom as 
"the unconditioned causality of the cause in appearance" (Kant, 1998: A419 /B447). 
Freedom as the unconditioned causality of a cause means that in order for something to be 
free it must be a cause which has nothing prior to it, nothing which determines it in being 
the cause that it is, it must be absolute spontaneity. Kant himself elucidates the most 
serious problem with this conception of freedom in relationship to thinking human freedom 
when he writes, "everything in a sequence of events stands under rules to the point that 
nothing ever happens without being preceded by something that it always follows" (Kant, 
1998: Al13). In instantiating a rule of nature, Kant shows that insofar as things are 
perceived, to use Spinoza's language, sub specie durationis, they are necessarily determined. As 
humans, and accordingly, as necessarily finite beings whose inner sense is fundamentally 
determined by time-though of course, time is nothing without the subject (Kant, 1998: 
A35/B51)-it seems impossible that we should ever be able to think ourselves as free. 
Nevertheless, Kant obviously plays a central role in the history of the thinking of 
freedom. Freedom reasserts itself in the Critique ofPure Reason as a transcendental idea. Kant 
defines the transcendental idea as follows: "A concept from notions that exceed the 
possibility of experience is an zdea, or a concept of reason" (Kant, 1998: A320/B377). This 
means that freedom is something that reason can take as an object, but which cannot be 
experienced and brought under a concept by the understanding. John Sallis explains, while 
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still using Kant's other name for transcendental ideas-concepts of reason-that these 
concepts or ideas are intended to bring us away from the realm of the conditioned, wherein 
the concepts we encounter always apply to objects of experience (which by definition-as 
we shall see-are always conditioned by virtue of the fact that they participate in the 
phenomenal realm) back towards the unconditioned. Concepts of reason, "extend beyond 
anything that could be given" and hence they cannot be generated via an observation of the 
sensible manifold nor can they ever be applied to the objects of the sensible manifold (Sallis, 
1980: 55). The difficulty here is that while transcendental ideas are naturally occurring via 
inference, ifwe misapply them and take their subjective necessity-which we shall have to 
return to in moment-to be objective existence, and in turn think that we can apply them to 
the sensible manifold, we are led to the problem of the antinomies. To make the 
aforementioned mistake is to fall into the trap of transcendental illusion, which is what the 
entire Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique oJPure Reason is dedicated to simultaneously 
acknowledging and avoiding. 
Let us now take a look at these subjective necessities and their relation to objective 
existences, as they appear in the latter half of the Critique ofPure Reason. In the introduction 
to the Transcendental Dialectic, Kant is already presaging the turn to the Critique ofPractical 
Reason when he explains that the task in struggling with this opposition is "to level and make 
solid the ground for those majestic moral structures, in which can be found all kinds of mole 
burrows that were left by reason grabbing vainly, but quite confidently, for treasures, and 
that make the building insecure" (Kant, 1998: A319/B376). Those mole burrows that shake 
the stability of the ground of metaphysics and the moral philosophy to follow are created by 
people who attempt to present the existence of freedom as a phenomenal fact-so what 
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exactly does Kant have in mind with the reconfiguration of freedom as a transcendental 
idea?3 He wants us to get beyond the point of asking about the reality of freedom as an 
object of existence, as has already been said, but he also wants to acknowledge that our 
possession of freedom is a live issue for us. Freedom as a transcendental idea has no 
corollary in our realm of experience and it cannot have an experiential corollary in nature, as 
"there is a universal law of the very possibility of all experience that all that occurs must have 
a cause" (Kant, 1998: A533 /B561). Nevertheless, insofar as we are led to think of things in 
terms of their beginnings, we are forced to create the idea of spontaneity. It is this idea, with 
no object, that "is the basis of the practical concept of freedom .. .Freedom in the practical 
meaning of the term is the independence of intention from coercion by impulses of 
sensibility" (Kant, 1998: A534/B562). 
For Kant, we need a practical concept of freedom in order to be able to say that 
something else than what happened ought to have occurred. Kant thus makes a famous, yet 
not unprecedented move4 in an attempt to resurrect freedom in the way in which he has 
already resurrected causation. If the problem of freedom is the problem of time, and 
3 The irony here, as pointed out by John Sallis, is that the occurrence of transcendental illusion that causes 
these problems are generated by the same Reason that in the beginning of the first Critique is to do the same 
mole-tunneling but that time for the purpose of securing the ground of any future of metaphysics. Sallis writes, 
" the fissure of critical reason is now unmistakable: in its opening move toward restoring the ground it cannot 
but plant itself on that very ground-that is, the bedrock to which it would tunnel down is identical with the 
ground that that bedrock would support and make firm, the ground tunneled out by the history of 
metaphysics" (Sallis, 1987: 16) 
4r say that this is not unprecedented due to the Fourth and Fifth books of Spinoza's Ethics, wherein freedom is 
resurrected via the turn towards the reconfiguration of the subject as part and parcel of the manifestation of 
substance. Here the time sequentiality which defines reason, the second kind of knowing, for Spinoza is 
undermined as the hen kaipan is asserted. Within time, there is only bondage, sub specie aeternitas, freedom 
emerges in an entirely reconfigured manner. Kant is not quite this radical, as he wants to preserve the subject 
as apart from the rest of the world in a very real way, and here, r think, he follows in line with the traditional 
parsing out of body and soul-the latter ofwhich, by not belonging to the realm of appearances, stays outside 
of time, and thus remains free. Here, there is a close connection between Kant, and a stoic like Epictetus in his 
Enchiridion, and Boethius in the Consolations. 
11 
phenomenal appearances is the realm of time determinations, what about the mysterious 
noumenal realm which is not bound by the apriori forms of intuition, precisely because we 
do not and cannot perceive it? Kant asserts that certain effects thus "can be thus be seen as 
free with regard to its intelligible cause, and yet with regard to appearances be considered 
simultaneously as a consequence according to the necessity of nature" (Kant, 1995: 
A537/B565). To save the freedom of the human Kant must posit a simultaneously 
empirical and intelligible, a simultaneously phenomenal and noumenal subject. The 
noumenal aspect of this subject though cannot be something which acts, as if that were the 
case then the action would have to be something which occurred in time effecting other 
things occurring in time and we are back to our initial problem. Rather, the noumenal aspect 
of the subject is the subject's character, out which actions follow by necessity, but which on 
its own terms has nothing preceding it as it exceeds the bounds of temporal determinations. 
Kant believes he is able to demonstrate that we think about ourselves, and must 
think about ourselves in two ways. First, we are able to take ourselves as objects of thought, 
this reduplication that is apperception-which we must always remember cannot be 
experienced and brought under a concept, much like the transcendental ideas-is 
demonstration of the fact that we are simultaneously phenomenal and noumenal. 
Apperception serves as the unconditioned grounding function, hence Sallis writes, "It is 
original: It is not dependent on sensibility, receptivity, and so is (again) prior to the empirical 
order" (Sallis, 1980: 69). The fact that it is unconditioned and grounding means that it is 
fundamentally inaccessible empirically and cannot be brought under a concept, otherwise it 
would it become phenomenal and hence no longer be unconditioned. Yet we still have 
access to it, as the 'I think' can accompany all of our presentations-it is just a different kind 
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of access. Second, and this point has already been made, we hold each other responsible for 
our deeds regardless ofwhat we think may have proceeded them or caused them. We would 
be mad in much the same way that God would have to be mad in holding people responsible 
for things that he had predetermined ifwe held people who were not capable of doing 
otherwise responsible for their deeds. 
This problem is only entrenched further in Kant's Critz'que ofPractical Reason wherein 
the definition of freedom offered in the Critique ofPure Reason still holds. Here, he writes, "if 
one wants to attribute freedom to a being whose existence is determined in time, its 
existence, including its actions, cannot be extricated from the law of natural necessity of all 
events in its existence, including also its actions" (Kant, 2003: 129). Given the 
aforementioned desire to hold people accountable for the things that they do, Kant believes 
that we must be able to instantiate freedom, since our desire to hold people accountable 
hinges upon this. Not only do we hold others accountable for their actions, but we also 
experience guilt for things which we have done in the past. Though we may try to convince 
ourselves that we were fully determined in our actions that things transpired by way of 
natural necessity and that we are innocent, we cannot get away from the "the marvelous 
faculty in us called conscience." Kant explains that no matter how much we pitch ourselves 
a story about how necessitated and determined we were with regards to past actions, an 
individual "cannot bring the accuser in him to silence when he is conscious that at the time 
when he committed the wrong he was in his sense, i.e., his freedom was employed" (Kant, 
2003: 133). 
In the second Critz'que, Kant then turns and points out yet again that we believe that 
there is an atemporal, i.e., noumenal dimension to the human which is where the free causal 
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ground for all of our otherwise determinate action lies, that we must accept on the basis on 
rational faith. We thus make a return to a notion of character which is determinate for who 
we are. Thus an evil person, who has been evil and vicious since they were a little child is 
held responsible not for individual actions, per se, but rather for the "freely assumed evil and 
unchangeable principles" which serve as the grounds for all of their actions and maxims. 
These principles which we somehow or other assume, adopt, or choose outside of all time 
assert themselves in our individual acts, and accordingly we can see to the core of the person 
in question via their acts. Hence what is being indicted, is not, as I have said, the particular 
action, but rather, the principle which grounds that action and all other actions which the 
person in question undertakes. 
This thematic is made even more explicit, and simultaneously radicalized, in Kant's 
Religion Within the Limits ifMere Reason, where this question of character, or in Kant's 
language, the question of the adoption of a ground which then determines which maxims we 
select, is most explicitly engaged. Here, he writes, "Thus, when we say: man is by nature 
good, or, man is by nature evil, this only means as much as that there is in him a first ground 
(inscrutable to us) of the adoption of good maxims or of evil (antinomian [gesetzwidrige~) 
maxims" (Kant, 1995: 31). We see the same question being raised here as that which was 
brought up in the second Critique, however, in this case, the question is displaced from the 
language of the critical project and thus appears outside of the phenomenal-noumenal 
distinction-and this seems to be a crucial moment, one which could potentially be taken as 
an acknowledgement of the failure of attempting to reconcile the conflict of practical 
freedom and natural necessity. The moment of freedom, of tme freedom as that which has 
not cause prior to itself is that by which we adopt our disposition or "the first [ers~ 
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subjective ground of the adoption of maxims" (Kant, 1995: 36). I say that this is the 
moment of true freedom because it is not a choice which selects from a list of possible 
options, but is rather the seemingly arbitrary inaugurating moment of the human. This is 
explained by Alenka Zupancic as Kant's solution to the problem of freedom. She writes, 
"Kant's solution to this problem is that one has to recognize the propensity to evil in the 
very subjective ground of freedom. The ground itself has to be considered an act of 
freedom. In this inaugural act, I can choose myself as evil" (Zupancic, 2000: 88). A 'choice' 
by definition is never truly free given the Kantian definition-this is a claim we will return to 
in full in Chapter V-as this implies that there is a decision to be made between two or more 
things which necessarily precede the act. If this were the case, and we had not inclinations, 
we would end up a deadlock comparable to that of the famous example of Buridan's ass, 
incapable of choosing between the two equidistant haystacks. Thus there is no choice 
between options that are weighed, but rather an act, which precedes all possibilities of 
choice-and it is for this act that we hold people responsible. 
Another reason why this is the only tenable account of freedom for Kant in the 
Religion text is precisely the same reason that Fichte posits the priority of the Tathandlung in 
the Wissenscheiftslehre (Fichte, 1982: 97). The problem with speaking about a primary 
character without speaking about an act which founds it is that such a character presents 
itself as a fact. Any fact, a Tatsache, at least for Fichte and presumably for Kant as well, 
seems to necessitate an anterior activity which caused or posited that fact. Thus if we want 
true freedom, i.e., true spontaneity we need to look prior to this fact (Tatsache) of character 
and find the act (TathandluniJ which posited it. Hence Jean Grondin explains, "If one wants 
to be truly rigorous in philosophy, it is necessary to genetically deduce all facts from an 
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original activity, that is from a Tathandlung. A deed and not a fact must thus play the role of 
an original principle in philosophy" (Grondin, 1995: 207). Kant himself saw the necessity of 
this, and the movement to an unconscious, originary act of self-determination is the 
evidence of this in the &ligion text. 
Kant reinforces the notion of the act outside of all time that founds our character in 
his investigation of evil. Here, he explains that if we want to account for the evil acts of an 
individual by tracing them back in time, i.e. the their beginning in time, we end up in a 
regress as lengthy as the span of our lives until we reach the point of having to posit "the 
propensity of evil (as a natural ground)"-Kant calls such propensity innate (Kant, 1995: 
57). But the freedom of this positing outside of all time is a strange way of thinking 
freedom, especially insofar as the motivation for the inquiry in the first place was to fmd the 
space wherein we can predicate freedom of the human. Here we end up telling people that 
they are good and evil based upon a decision that they made outside of all time-they freely 
chose their character, though they do not know it, and that is what they are responsible for. 
Their deeds are like tree branches which bring us back to the trunk and eventually the 
roots-and it is these roots, buried deep under ground that we want to investigate and, in 
turn, judge. This is an issue to which I believe Schelling (mirroring Aristode) offers an 
interesting answer, which we shall see in Chapter VI. 
Now at this point one must make a decision, a decision which I have already made in 
beginning to write this dissertation. If, like me, and quite obviously like Heidegger (and I 
will argue like Schelling as well-though this may be a tendentious claim in some reader's 
eyes) you find this final solution rather unsatisfactory we ought to consider what the 
unspoken assumptions that led to this conclusion and contradiction was in the first place. I 
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claim that the problem with Kant's account of freedom and the reason that he ends up 
having to go through such treacherous-and brilliant-machinations to save freedom, 
which we may want to argue he does not do in the end in a compelling manner, is precisely 
because of the way in which he conceives of freedom, and in turn the very paradigm of 
explanation. For Kant, just like Aquinas, from the beginning, freedom is the predicate of the 
subject. The question of freedom is thus, to reiterate: does the human being possess the 
predicate 'free', which means, does the human have the ability to act spontaneously? What 
Kant has demonstrated for all philosophers who will follow in his wake is exactly what must 
happen to us if we are to attempt to think of freedom as the predicate of a subject acting in a 
world that is somehow foreign and other to it. We will end up saying, "well, things precede 
us, and insofar as we are beings who take on habits and inclinations, if someone were to 
view my life sub specie aeternitas, they would be able to predict every decision that I will make 
when presented with a choice. But, I feel guilty when I do bad things, and I want to hold 
people accountable for the rotten things that they do, so how do I put these two thoughts 
together?" In the end, I believe that Kant went as far as anyone ever will on this question 
insofar as we interpret freedom as a predicate of a subject. Ifwe do not want to fall either 
into the Third Antinomy or into the opposition of the phenomenal and noumenal realm or 
into the distinction between pure and practical reason, we must rethink freedom all 
together-scrapping its status as a predicate of a subject, and as I will go on to argue, 
reconfiguring it as an experience. 
Yet this is not the whole story. Kant's difficulties in articulating a coherent view 
regarding freedom are in large part due to the ontological commitments his thinking 
necessarily assumes, that is the static distinction between subject and object. The solution to 
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this, as I have suggested, is to move beyond this distinction and to focus in upon conception 
of how things hold together that privileges a certain conception of ecstasy. As Beiser 
explains, "The dilemma of knowledge versus faith," and accordingly the idea that freedom 
can only be preserved in a supernatural, mental realm that we must accept via rational faith 
as a regulative condition of morality, "tacidy presupposes that mechanism is only the form 
of explanation or knowledge" (Beiser, 1987: 128). Schelling's Natutphilosophie, for example, 
overcomes the mechanical physics of Descartes and Newton. It supplants mechanistic, 
linear causality as the univocal form of explanation for, as Beiser says, "the organic theory 
[that] explained a phenomenon in holistic terms by seeing all events as part of a wider 
whole" (Beiser, 2003: 83). 
One of the tasks of this project is thus to show how this conception of the organic 
and the ecstatic relate to one another so as to force us to reconfigure our sense of 
explanation. We will require a new sense of explanation, of interaction, that will in turn 
require a new way of thinking about freedom. Yet, prior to articulating what this sense of 
ecstasy is-a task that is continually taken up and repeated throughout the course of the 
body of my dissertation-I will lay out some of the predominant interpretations of ecstasy as 
it relates to human experience as this theme crops up in the history of philosophy. 
Section II
 
History's Ecstasies
 
While it would certainly be a foolhardy endeavor to attempt to present a total history 
of the manner(s) in which ecstasy has been conceived of in the history of philosophy-as 
these manners are certainly more multifarious and multivalent than the account I am about 
to give would lead one to believe-I believe that some of the basic tendencies of interpreting 
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ecstasy can be sketched out with some succinctness. In general, I think it is fair to say that 
ecstasy, as a phenomenon worthy of conceptualization, would be taken to belong to the 
domain of theology-or at the very least a psychology of religion. Even after having 
composed an extensive tract that deals in large part with re-thinking ecstasy, when I hear the 
word I most often think ofBernini's Ecsta!J ifSt. Teresa; so following William James-and it 
is from his Vaneties ifRdigious Experience that I am quoting this text-let us turn St. Teresa's 
own words in describing this ecstasy-the kind of ecstasy that I am attempting to 
differentiate my project from; she says: 
In the orison of union the soul is fully awake as regards God, but wholly asleep as 
regards things of this world and in respect of herself. During the short time the 
union lasts, she is as it were deprived of every feeling, and even if she would, she 
could not think of any single thing. Thus she needs employ no artifice in order to 
arrest the use of her understanding: it remains so stricken with inactivity that she 
neither knows what she loves, nor in what manner she loves, nor what she wills. In 
short she is utterly dead to the things of the world and lives solely in God. Games, 
1999: 445). 
James refers to such a state as "ecstasies" of the kind that describe and potentially define 
mysticism Games, 1999: 450). What is crucial to note about St. Teresa's description of her 
ecstasies is that they are marked, as James explains, by an extreme passivity-passivity so 
extreme that it is hard to even articulate how the one who is ecstatic is even still present as 
one who could say'!'. The description of such a state could certainly take numerous forms, 
but of primary concern to us is that this extreme passivity-in some way or another; 
requiring no artifice as St. Teresa says (though others will disagree with her)-leads to a 
breakdown of the distinction between the self and God. Assuming that the God into which 
one loses oneself has a kind of permanence and incorruptible character, the moment of 
ecstasy would have to be precisely a loss of self into some whole greater than the self. James 
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explains, "this overcoming of all the usual barriers between the individual and the Absolute 
is the great mystic achievement. In mystic states we both become one with the Absolute and 
we become aware of our oneness" Games, 1999: 457). 
Philosophical discourse, however, often has a hard time taking such claims seriously 
as a kind of knowledge because of their emphasis upon immediate-and thereby 
incommunicable-knowledge. Accordingly, labeling a philosopher as a mystic-and thus a 
thinker who privileges ecstasy-has historically served as an indictment of certain thinkers 
projects as non-philosophical. For example, in the "Art-Religion" section of the 
Phenomenology ifSpirit, Hegel explains that "the mystical is not concealment of a mystery, or 
unknowing, but rather what it consists in is that the self knows itself to be one with the 
essence, and this is thus revealed. Only the self is revealed to itself, or what is revealed is so 
only in the immediate certainty of its revelation." (Hegel, 1988: 471). Yet, as we know from 
the beginnings of Hegel's Phenomenology, immediate self-revelation in and as itself is no 
knowledge at all; as no knowledge is available to us in strict and simple immediacy-insofar 
as the movement from sense certainty to perception is a negation of simple immediacy as 
such. Our knowing always requires mediation, insofar as mediation is an attribute of 
language, and without naming something, it cannot be known. Hegel explains, "what is 
called the inexpressible is nothing other than the untrue, the irrational, the merely opined" 
(Hegel, 1988: 78). My task in laying out a short history of thinkers for whom ecstasy played 
a central role is to enquire to what extent their understanding of the mystical, or of ecstasy, 
in fact leads to a kind of knowledge that portends to immediacy, and thereby, to a lack of 
discursivity, as I hope to show by the end of this project that both Heidegger and Schelling 
understand ecstasy in a way that displaces the question of the immediate and is thoroughly 
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discursive. Ecstasy gets reconfigured in Schelling's later writings, particularly in his Erlanger 
Lectures, showing, contra Kenneth R. Westphal, that while Schelling stays committed to a 
"non-conceptual account of knowledge," this does not mean that he maintains a 
"nondiscursive" account as well (Westphal, 2000: 285). 
Prior to Heidegger and Schelling, there is a rich legacy of thinkers in the history of 
Western philosophy whose philosophical endeavors culminate in a desire to unify oneself 
with God-or that which is epekeina tes ousias, as I think it is fair to say that most of the 
thinkers I will mention are attempting to interpret Socrates' statement from book VII of the 
Republic regarding the status of the good (plato, 1993: 509b/189)-through self-effacement 
in the face of the absolute. Though there are certainly numerous instances of mystical 
tendencies prior to him, Philo presents some of the more starkly presented passages 
regarding ecstasy and knowledge. For him, insofar as the task of philosophy-or theology, 
the distinction is of no matter to him-is to know God, we must realize that we cannot 
attain this knowledge in the full and robust sense in which it is possessed by the prophets of 
the Old Testament so long as our reason continues to be at work. He explains, "For what 
reasoning is in us, the sun is in the world, for both are bearers of light, one sending forth to 
the whole world a sensible light, the other bestowing on ourselves the intelligible rays of 
apprehension." Insofar as our reasoning is how we illuminate the world to ourselves, 
epistemically speaking, it also serves as the ground of our identity; he continues, "as long as 
the mind still casts its light all about us, pouring as it were a noonday radiance into the entire 
soul, we are self-contained, not possessed. But when it comes to its setting, naturally ecstasy 
and divine possession and madness fall on us. For when the divine light shines, the human 
light sets" (philo, 1981: 154). At this moment of inspiration, ecstasy, or possession, it is 
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impossible for the self to still be present; the immediacy of the divine is too much, as the 
mortal and the immortal cannot both be present at once. There is a kind of 
incommunicability to this immediacy of experience that renders it necessary for prophets to 
speak in allegory so as to communicate the truths of divinity to us in language. Accordingly, 
even if a thinker like Philo thinks prophets are able to communicate some taste of the divine, 
it is always a mimesis-to that end, it may be expressible, but not as it is in itself: it requires a 
veiling. 
It is interesting to note, that in the case of Philo-as is probably the case in many 
other, similar authors-this account of the divine and human light serves to show the limits 
of human knowledge. As Hadot suggests, Philo "speaks of the 'limits of knowledge,' and 
advises human beings to know themselves instead of imagining that they know the origin of 
the world" (Hadot, 2006: 139). This would be to say, speaking for Philo, that humans 
should not seek to become prophets through the forceful application of the human intellect; 
such a vocation can only be dispensed to humans by God. It is for this reason, amongst 
others that are too complex and off-topic to go into here, that Hegel explains that after 
skepticism has eradicated the possibility of our finding criteria for knowing in the material 
world, the next step is try to find this objective criteria elsewhere, in its permanence. This is 
spirit (Geis~. "The affirmative result of skeptical philosophy" for Hegel is that "everything 
else except spirit is merely finite and dissolving" (Werke 19, 414). Accordingly, for a thinker 
like Philo, "the main issue is to know God." But this knowing, as has been said is problematic 
as given the manner in which Philo describes divinity, "God can only be intuited through the 
eye of the soul, through the horasis. He calls this rapture, ecstasy (VerzuckuniJ, God's 
influence" (Werke 19, 421). But given God's nature, to reiterate, as "nothing other than 
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being; accordingly the soul cannot know what he is but rather only that he is, i.e., precisely 
only as being" (Werke 19, 422). Philo's description of the prophetic state, the closest we can 
come to God, is a potentially even more extreme formulation of the ecstasy as described by 
St. Teresa. The subject is not only passively present, but is actually extinguished-at least on 
a cognitive leveL 
Plotinus takes up this question in a slightly different way, as, in a sense, he thinks that 
while we may not be able to intellectually arrive at union with the One, we can cultivate a 
certain kind of ethical comportment that would facilitate our arriving at this union. Plotinus 
is explicit that our coming to know the one cannot take place under the force of our own 
will-rather, like St. Teresa, he privileges the need for "simplifying and giving oneself over." 
Plotinus is plain: the intention of the end of the Enneads is "not to disclose to the uninitiated; 
since that Good is not disclosable, it prohibits the declaration of the divine to another who 
has not also himself had the good fortune to see" (Plotinus, 1988: VII/341). He goes on to 
explain that one who has 'seen' it, does not really see it, as in this moment of seeing, seer and 
seen are united into one. Yet in this unification, the one who sees is eradicated, as it were, to 
the extent that "he himself was not there ... he was carried away or possessed by a god, in a 
quiet solitude and a state of calm... having become a kind of rest." All of this language is 
for Plotinus-as it was for Philo-insufficient in a certain way. Plotinus makes it quite 
plain-at least on the level of the presentation of his text-that he can, or better, must give 
an image of this unification. He focuses on the image-he says these are mere mimemata-of 
the unification of a person with the One as an entrance into a sanctuary, having left behind 
the statues of the outer shrine (which in this case stand in for the ideas qua the highest 
available objects of contemplation). Plotinus says that this is only possible through 
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something other than the standard philosophical manner of contemplating, theama, and says, 
"But that other, perhaps, was not a contemplation but another kind of seeing (to de isos en ou 
theama) alia alios tropos tou idein), a being outside of oneself (ekstasis) and simplifying and giving 
oneself over and pressing towards contact and rest and a sustained thought leading to 
adaptation, if one is going to contemplate what is in the sanctuary" (plotinus, 1988: 
VII/343). Two things of note present themselves regarding these thoughts in relation to the 
project I am undertaking here: first, just as in the case of Philo before him, and St. Teresa 
afterwards, this state of ekstasis is one in which the integrity of the subject is decimated, only 
to be given back to them after the leave the sanctuary. Second, even the translator of this 
text, A.H. Armstrong, goes to lengths in a footnote regarding this passage to critique anyone 
who would want to translate ekstasis here as ecstasy. He explains, "there is no good reason 
for describing the mystical union according to Plotinus as an 'ecstasy.' It gives a very 
misleading impression of this austere and quiet mysticism." This is telling; while mysticism 
in itself may be philosophically suspect; it can be salvageable on a theological level so long as 
it is not ecstatic revelry. I take this as an insight into a fairly standard 
attitude-avoidance-to taking up ecstasy as a philosophical theme. 
Hegel presages Armstrong's concern when it comes to describing Plotinus' 
employment of the language of ecstasy. He explains, "Partially in these names, that he also 
calls ecstasy (Ekstase), and partially in the matter itself, the ground is found to call Plotinus a 
fanatic (Schwcirmer)." While for Hegel there is not sufficient ground to call Plotinus a 
Schwarmer, he does offer an insightful explanation ofwhat this would mean for him. He 
explains: 
24 
Since this name brings to mind nothing other than the condition which we call that 
into which the crazy Indians, Brahmans, monks and nuns displace (versetzen) 
themselves so as to bring themselves into pure withdrawal into themselves, seeking 
to efface all representations and seeing of reality; this is, in part, to be a constant 
condition, but in part in this fixed vision into emptiness, where there would now 
appear as light or as darkness, there is to be no movement, no distinction, and, as 
such, no thought. (Werke 19, 443) 
While, in Hegel's eyes, Plotinus does not fall into this absolute Schwiirmerei, he does share 
with Philo the contention that God is absolute being and is, as such, unknowable. "All 
predicates as such, for example, being, substance, do not accord with it; since they express 
some kind of determinateness. It does not sense itself, does not think itself, it is not 
conscious of itself; since in all of these lies a distinction" (Werke 19, 447). Distinction means 
separability, separability means placement, placement means corporeality, and corporeality 
leads to the possibility of decay-accordingly, nothing of this sort can be attributed to God 
qua the One. Yet for Hegel, as has already been said, this implies that God cannot be 
thought-and thus the state of ecstasy in which one comes to some kind of knowledge of 
God is one that is pointedly non-philosophica1.5 
5 I would also like to mention another thinker from the medieval era who trades heavily in the language of 
ecstasy-maybe the most heavily of any thinker who was taken so seriously for so long-Dionysius the 
Areopagite, or the Pseudo-Dionysius. The Pseudo-Dionysius encourages his readers, in The lvJystical Theology, to 
pass on to the "naked truth" of the super-essential Good or One by taking the "plunge into the Darkness 
where truly dwells, as saith the Scripture, that One Which is beyond all things" (Dionysius, 1977: 193). It is 
only by doing so, by-passing all kinds of human ratiocination, that one can enable oneself to encounter, 
His incomprehensible presence.. .it breaks forth, even from the things that are beheld and from those 
that behold them, and plunges the true initiate unto the Darkness of Unknowing wherein he 
renounces all apprehensions of his understanding and is enwrapped in that which is wholly intangible 
and invisible, belonging wholly to Him that is beyond all things and to none else (whether himself or 
another), and being through the passive stillness of all his reasoning powers united by his highest 
faculty to Him that is wholly Unknowable, of whom thus by a rejection of all knowledge he possesses 
a knowledge that exceeds his understanding. (Dionysius, 1977: 194). 
With the Pseudo-Dionysius, we see the same rejection of the idea that one could attain any kind of full and 
robust knowledge of God through normal human concepts. Rather, we must first give up all of our standard 
modes of understanding so as to unite ourselves with that which is unknowable as such. The Pseudo­
Dionysius' account of this union, however, is notably more subtle-while certainly not being more 
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While I would hope that I have made my reasons clear for discussing these 
thinkers-and there are many others who I could have focused in that I have excluded, 
including Scotus Eriugena, Nicholas of eusa, and Giordano Bruno, all of whom I cite if for 
no other reason than that Schelling seems to think highly of them-permit me to reiterate 
with Hegel's assistance, why it is that I have chosen to layout these canonical ways in which 
ecstasy has been understood in the history of philosophy. As the reader will have noted, in 
all of the cases described above, so long as human cognition strives towards an absolute that 
is beyond all being, beyond all predication and distinction, we run into a problem. While we 
may be able to layout a path that would cultivate an ethos in people that would prepare 
them to be thrown into a rapturous state by God, it seems either to be impossible that we 
could arrive at such an encounter via rational thought-so long as such thought is 
discursive-or, at best, if we could arrive at such an encounter under our own motive force, 
we would not be able to describe such an encounter, as our experience of it-so long as it is 
full and complete-would require the immolation of the distinction between knower and 
known. Otherwise, there would be an encounter between myself as thing with the One as 
thing, but this would transform the nature of the One as beyond being into a being, and thus 
the encounter would be tainted. For this reason, as Hegel has already pointed out for us, 
complex-than either Plotinus or Proclus. For him, since the one is in itself defined positively as the super­
essential and negatively as the Unknowable-presumably the most Unknowable-we must comport ourselves 
towards it in a manner that accords with its essence so as to come into communion with it. Only so long as we 
are willing to debase ourselves into the cloud of unknowing-as it will so famously be called in later medieval 
theology-will we be able to know the Unknowable. By giving up on knowledge, we are granted something 
higher than what we relinquish, yet it is not because the object (which can never be an object, of course) 
accommodates itself to us in an act of grace as it were, but rather because we accommodate ourselves to it. 
Thus the Pseudo-Dionysius enables, in a manner of speaking, human action to lead to the ecstasy that is the 
"stillness of all [our] reasoning powers" in our self-effaced union with the One. Nevertheless, the knowledge 
attained in such a state remains thoroughly incommunicable, thoroughly non-conceptual, and more importantly 
for the stakes of this project, thoroughly non-discursive; as it would seem that in this identity, all difference of 
the parts to be unified, is, in fact, effaced. 
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Philo and Plotinus refer to God as pure being, absolute being-but being beyond beings, 
being beyond ousia, beyond substantiality, beyond beingness (Schiirmann, 2003: 147).6 
As is well-known, Hegel begins his Science ifLogic by discussing pure being. For the 
sake of brevity, I will have to leap over certain steps of his argument, though I do not believe 
that in doing so I am leaving out anything essential. In this text, Hegel focuses on the nature 
of cognition, or knowing, as such, but of course, we cannot talk about knowing without 
speaking of what is known in that knowing. And in Hegel's Logic, insofar as it is taken as a 
work of ontology, what is being described is the movement of knowing in which objects are 
neither considered as strictly identical to thought, nor exclusively existent and coherent 
outside their being taken up by the understanding. To the extent that the objective of the 
Logic is to begin with "what ispresent" by "setting aside all reflection, all opinions, that one 
otherwise has," and thereby to treat of immediacy as "it is only simple immediary that is 
present." Hegel explains: 
The simple immediacy is itself a reflective expression and is based upon the 
distinction from what is mediated. In its true expression this simple immediacy is 
therebypure being. Just as pure knowing should be called nothing other than knowing 
as such, wholly abstract, so should pure being be called nothing less than being in 
general; being, and nothing else, without any further determination and fullness. 
(Werke 5, 68) 
Yet such a thought of pure being, pure knowing, or, as he says, immediacy as such, is 
nothing but the beginning of cognition of which we can say nothing to the extent that it is 
6 I refer here to Reiner Schiirmann's intensely difficult and provocative reading of Plotinus in his Broken 
Hegemonies. While, I am not entirely convinced by his reading here wherein Plotinus presages Heidegger by 
articulating what he calls "the full ontological difference," his reading not only made me rethink many 
presuppositions I held about Neo-Platonism in general but actually made me go and read substantial sections 
of Plotinus' Enneads again. I can ask little more of an author. Schiirmann holds that these three terms in 
Plotinus are "beings, substance, one," and that these terms are reframed by a "fourth century disciple" as 
"beings, beingness, to-be. In these descriptions," Schiirmann continues, "the third term is to be understood as 
a verb: uniting, being, then following Heidegger, coming-to-presence, phenomenaliifng, seff-manifesting' (Schiirmann, 
2003: 147). 
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purely immediate and simple-and not yet determinate. Yet, as Hegel says, what is left for 
us, "is thus only to see what we have in this representation [of a mere beginning as such]" 
(Werke 5, 73). He answers: "It is still nothing, and it is to become something. 'The beginning 
is not the pure nothing, but rather a nothing from which something ought to emerge." For 
this reason he says, "being is thus also already contained in the beginning." Yet more 
importantly, not only are both being and nothing contained in the beginning of cognition 
qua immediacy, but "they are present as distinguished." For the nothingness can only be 
known as nothing to that extent that it is not yet something, the something which it is to 
become. For this reason, the idea of pure being is itself always already only able to be 
thought to that extent that it is already inmtrated by, if not even infused with, that which it is 
different from. Accordingly, any philosophical position that stakes itself on an engagement 
with pure immediacy and claims to know this immediary is always already perverting this 
immediacy with the mediation contained in any instance of knowing, to the extent that our 
knowing hinges upon determinations of predication that enable us to distinguish one thing 
from another. 'This is why Hegel says, in the first chapter of the Science ojLogic: 
[Being] is pure indeterminacy and empty. - There is nothing in it to be intuited, if 
intuition can be spoken of here; or it is only this pure, empty intuition it self. 'There 
is just as little in it to be thought, or it is precisely merely this empty thinking. Being, 
the undetermined immediacy is, in fact, nothing and neither more nor less than 
nothing. (Werke 5, 82) 
Hegel goes on, immediately afterwards, to articulate how nothing is thereby also the same 
thing as pure being by inverting the argument just presented-both formal and empty. 'This 
dialectical interplay prompts him to move onwards and discuss the becoming that is 
implicitly contained (as has already been mentioned) in the pure beginning as such. 
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While Hegel is of course quick to note that both immediacy and mediation are 
always present in our thinking about things, the idea of a pure immediacy is a dead end from 
an epistemic perspective-as such knowing would be, by definition, empty and 
incommunicable, and potentially, and by the same line of argumentation, not actually 
thinkable at all, insofar as thought is always discursive and thereby any thinking of pure 
being negates itself in its performance. 
Is it not the case then that all the accounts of ecstasy I have just provided would fall 
into this trap? Superficially, I seem forced to answer yes, and for the moment, that is the 
answer I intend to stick with. The question is whether or not any account of ecstasy 
whatsoever leads to this same conclusion. Presumably an account of ecstasy that would not 
fall prey to the force ofHegel's thinking would have to either purport to be immediate while 
at the same time communicable, or would have to not be immediate and would thus have to 
be discursive. One question I intend this dissertation to answer is whether or not Schelling 
and Heidegger offer us a way of thinking about ecstasy that does not lead into these 
quandaries, particularly in light of the fact that Hegel critiques Schelling for maintaining a 
conception of immediate knowledge of the unity in indifference of the absolute in his 
understanding of intellectual intuition (Werke 20,437). My answer to this question is an 
emphatic yes. I argue for this by showing that for Heidegger and Schelling the basic 
constitutions of things, including the absolute, are always determined lila negativa by what 
they are not (as in Schelling's conception of the organic and in Heidegger's understanding of 
Vetweisungsganzheit, or referential totality) and are also always inprocess. 
To that end I aim to show that a robust philosophical sense of ecstasy implies equal 
emphasis upon the stasis as it does upon the ek-by which I mean to say, ecstasy is not for 
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Heidegger or Schelling a peculiar moment in our thinking but is rather a basic fact about the 
way in which things are constituted; in other words, something is what it is (static), only by 
being outside of itself (ec). If this is taken seriously, than any conception of freedom that we 
would want to ascribe to the subject would have to be complicated, as any idea of freedom 
as autonomy would become immediately unintelligible as the autos is thereby thrown into 
question. Rather, as I will argue, freedom needs to be reconsidered as both a way of 
describing-or better, naming-the basic constitution of things and also a way of describing a 
particular kind of comportment or bearing that I am referring to in this project as thinking. 
Section III
 
Thinking of Freedom
 
Throughout the course of this dissertation, I speak extensively of thinking. I do not, 
just to be clear-as the title of this project should indicate-rigidly distinguish philosophy 
and thinking in the manner that Heidegger does. Thus, I will often speak about 
philosophizing and thinking synonymously, with the exception ofwhen I establish how and 
why Heidegger rejects philosophy as onto-theological. Nevertheless, even in Heidegger's 
engagements with onto-theology, I believe he engages in a kind of thinking that is 
fundamental and constitutive of Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy, that is transcendental 
thinking. Yet Heidegger and Schelling differ in their application of transcendental inquiry 
from someone like Kant for whom, as Gasche explains-with some help from Dieter 
Henrich-"transcendental philosophy not only thematizes the forms and categories that 
make objective knowledge possible but also makes the transcendental subject 'not merely a 
logical condition of possible self-consciousness, but that which real consciousness knows to 
be the subject of all possible real consciousness.'" My suggestion, following Gasche, is that 
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both Schelling and Heidegger think transcendentally insofar as transcendental thinking 
reflects on the a priori conditions of knowledge, yet both them also "reflect on the ground 
proper of philosophy, and thus ~t] become[s] the medium of the self-reflection of 
philosophy" (Gasche, 1986: 15). Accordingly, Schelling and Heidegger will refuse to 
recognize the constitutive function of the transcendental subject (or of any other 'name for 
being' as Heidegger will say, or 'supreme principle' as Schelling will call it) without question. 
Their continued inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of experience, and the 
conditions of possibility ofwhat is actual-as Zizek said-will lead both them to cast aside 
any hierarchical sense of grounding. Thus, I show that for both thinkers the pursuit of 
transcendental grounds leads to the rejection of precisely these kinds of principles in 
Heidegger's thinking of Ereignis and Schelling's thinking of the absolute as eternal freedom. 
Methodologically speaking, I have written this dissertation in manner that attempts 
to follow Heidegger and Schelling in these inquiries. Accordingly, the writing and 
presentation will continually move towards something that resembles an origin point, a solid 
foundation, only to have that foundation disappear upon our arrival at that point. To that 
end, my employment of the language of ecstatic thinking in this project is an attempt to 
name both the process by which one comes to realize the lack of grounds, while at the same 
time naming the philosophical bearing one must have so as to not rest satiated at any 
particular name of being. Here ecstasy, just like freedom, serve as the name of both the end 
of this process of inquiry and as the bearing one must accept so as engage in it. Only a 
manner of thinking that pursues grounds can lead us to an awareness of groundlessness of 
things, and only at this moment do we arrive at the realization of the creative role we play in 
engaging the world in an interactive and dialogical manner. 
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Thinking then can neither approach objects as if they were strictly opposed to 
objects, nor can it merely be about the process of critique, naively conceived. Rather it must 
think towards origins transcendentally so as to move past the question of origins, and move 
towards a conception of the world that more adequately accords to its actual character: that 
is, it is an ecstatic organic whole of which we are a part. 
In order for us to understand how Heidegger and Schelling reconfigure the question 
of freedom into a question of a description of an experience, both of an ethos and of the 
matter that is to be experienced or encountered in philosophy, we must attend to four basic 
claims. First, both of these thinkers radically reconfigure our conception of origins and 
grounds. Second, Heidegger and Schelling both reject any static conception of the subject 
that has an eternal essence. Third, for both of these thinkers, and though more clearly for 
Heidegger, the way of existing of the human is reconceived as an unfolding that must be 
understood as an attunement, disposition, or ethos, that shows itself only through the way in 
which we disclose the world; thus collapsing the dichotomy between activity and passivity. 
And fourth, both thinkers believe that philosophy, as thinking, is both characterized and 
made possible by a particular kind of comportment or attunement, i.e., wonder. 
To the first point: as I show throughout the duration of the next four chapters, 
neither Heidegger nor Schelling abide an ontology that maintains a solid, univocal point of 
origin. In lieu of such a point, the affirmation of which is indicative of what Heidegger calls 
the first beginning of philosophy in metaphysics, Heidegger and Schelling maintain that 
being itself is a free giving. This can either be understood as generosity of being that is 
without a giver, which is one way to describe Heidegger's thinking of Ereignis, or as he has it 
near the end of his writings, lassen anwesen, or letting presence (GAlS, 364), or eternal 
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freedom, i.e., Seinskiinnen, which is Schelling's way of naming the absolute in his Erlanger 
Lectures. In both cases, the subject of the giving of being dissembles in the giving. This goes 
some way to eliminate the concern of how a subject could be free in the face of mechanistic 
necessity, as necessary following out from an original, univocal point is not accepted 
ontologically, for reasons I explain in Chapter II, for either Heidegger or Schelling. 
However, to say that we then have a free subject is not yet enough. 
Heidegger and Schelling both think of the self as something that does not have a 
persistent essence, rather it is an unfolding, that is only able to be what it is insofar as it is 
ecstatic into the world in which it exists. Heidegger first exhibits this most clearly in his 
thinking of Verweisungsganzheit, or referential totality, with which he intends to show that any 
singular entity is only meaningful as what it is insofar as it relates to the whole, the world, in 
which it finds its meaning (Heidegger, 1963: 70). Heidegger clearly intends this to apply 
primarily to entities that do not have the character of Dasein, however, in Heidegger's 
assertion that, "Dasein brings its there of its home along with, if it is lacking this it is not 
only not factically, rather it is not the being of this essence. Dasein is its disclosedness" 
(Heidegger, 1963: 133), I believe we see that this structure of ecstatic reference, and thus the 
need identity has for difference, applies to human life as well. 
For Schelling, the ecstatic character of the human can be seen in his understanding 
of predication. As we shall see in Chapters V and VI, the structure of the absolute, in which 
the absolute only is in the constancy of becoming-unfolding, expressively through 
predications (1/7, 342)-is repeated in human life. In fact, this structure of predication is 
repeated throughout all life, insofar as all life is defined by reciprocal determination, the play 
of activity and passivity, or contraction and expansion for Schelling, as we shall see in 
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Chapter V through an investigation of his Naturphilosophie (I/3, 6). Only because of this 
repetition is the human able to engage the eternal beginning thoughtfully, as for Schelling, 
like is known by like (I/7, 338). 
Given these radical reconfigurations of the status of the self, the subject, and identity 
in relationship to the world, the problem of freedom must be rethought. It no longer makes 
sense to attempt to ascribe either autonomous, free agency or a lack thereof in the face of 
mechanistically determined nature to Heidegger's Dasein or Schelling's dissembling subject. 
The requisite oppositions and presuppositions of such a distinction are eradicated in 
Heidegger and Schelling from the very beginning: the distinction between subject and object 
is collapsed and the solid, onto-theological point of origin is eradicated in lieu of a thinking 
of the free giving of being which maintains itself as pure, abyssal, possibility. 
In light of this abyss of possibility that is being, freedom will be reconfigured in a 
twofold manner: my claim, in short, is that for both Heidegger and Schelling, freedom is-as 
I have said-both the manner and matter for thinking. It is the matter for thinking insofar 
as both thinkers strive to think at the limits of conceptuality and the limits of experience; this 
limit point is Heidegger's Ereignis, which will be discussed in Chapter III, and Schelling's 
Unvordenklichkeit des 5ryns, the unprethinkability of being, which we will explore in Chapter 
N-VI. Freedom is the manner for thinking insofar both of these thinkers place great stock 
in what Heidegger calls Bqindlichkeit, or our Stimmung, i.e., how we find ourselves, or, our 
attunement; and I argue that there is an attunement that could be called either a free 
attunement, or an attunement that leads us to an experience of freedom. 
For Heidegger, insofar as entities are only disclosed to us through our meaningful 
engagements with them, and all such engagements entail purposive engagement with a 
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referential totality, Hans Ruin explains, "to have a world, to have access to beings, is to be 
disposed in a certain manner, to be in a certain mood." As Ruin goes on to explain, Dasein 
"can never not be in one of its moods," the world is always disclosed to us, given to us, 
through the way in which we attend to it, knowingly or unknowingly (Ruin, 2000: 152). Let 
us look at two longer quotes from Heidegger so as to clarify what is at stake in the idea of 
Stimmung for Heidegger. He writes: 
An attunement is a way ... in the sense of a melody that does not merely hover over 
the so-called proper being at hand of humans, but that sets the tone for such a being, 
i.e., attunes and determines the manner and how of their being ... [Attunement] is 
... the fundamental manner in which Dasein is as Dasein ... [It] is not-is never-simply a 
consequence or side-effect of our thinking, doing, and letting. It is-to put it 
crudely-the presuppositions for such things, the "medium" within which they first 
happen. (GA29, 101) 
In another lecture course written nearly ten years after the above quote, he writes: 
A deep-rooted and very old habit of experience and speech stipulates that we 
interpret feeling and attunements [GejUhle und Stimmungen]-as well as willing and 
thinking-in a psychological-anthropological sense as occurrences and processes 
within an organism ... This also means that we are "subjects," present at hand, who 
are displaced into this or that attunement by "getting" them. In truth, however, it is 
the attunement that displaces us, namely into this or that understanding or disclosure 
of the world, into such and such a resolve or occlusion of one's seff, a self which is 
essentiallY a being-in-the-world. (GA45, 161) 
As Bret Davis explains, "A fundamental attunement is a comportment 'prior to' the 
determination of any subject, object, or intentional relation between them" (Davis, 2007: 7). 
As Davis goes on to elaborate, when we speak of attunement as fundamental, or as a 
Grundstimmung, we are talking about an attunement, "first opens (one) up (to) a world, prior 
to the determination of 'who' is opened up to 'what''' (Davis, 2007: 8). Davis' point is to 
show that when we speak of a distinction between subject and object, for example, we must 
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acknowledge that the world in which this distinction abides ontologically is alreacfyfounded in a 
particular attunement. 
Take a trite example of an ontic sense of attunement as I understand it from Being 
and Time: if I am sitting on the bus, when in a very good mood, after having received 
notification that I have a job interview, and I encounter a young couple engaging in amorous 
activity a few rows ahead of me, I will think to myself, 'that's so nice, they're young and in 
love.' Now, if the same couple were in front of me the next day after I popped a bike tire on 
the way to school, received bad teaching evaluations, and discovered that my top choice for 
employment was not going to call me for an interview, I may think, 'Those fools! Don't 
they know how terrible, unfair, and merciless the world is?' A more robust example of an 
attunement that may actually get us closer to the sense an attunement that would be 
fundamental would be the following: imagine the difference in the way in which an 
untouched segment of hardwood forest is seen by a camper as opposed to by a logger. The 
former is likely to experience the forest in terms of its beauty, its naturalness-as an escape 
from civilization; whereas the logger is likely to see board feet of lumber. Taking our cue 
from this second example-as it is not so incidental as the former-I claim that attunement 
amounts to an ethos, which means as much as to say, a character, which is quite consonant 
with the account given in Kant. However, from Heidegger and Schelling's perspective, 
Kant's error is to say that this character has some kind of existence or persistence outside of 
our engagement with the world. As we shall see, for both Heidegger and Schelling, given 
their emphasis upon ecstasy, we are alwqys engaging the world. Thus our ethos is always 
active: rather than being an eternal character, "ethos means bearing [Haltung]," the way that 
we carry ourselves in and towards the world that we are amidst and that environs us (GA19, 
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178). The question for this project is as follows: given that Heidegger insists, "attunement has 
alwqys) and in every case) disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole) andfirst makespossible our being directed 
towards af!Ything' (Heidegger, 1963: 137), what kind of attunement is the proper attunement 
for philosophy; or rather, what affect does our attunement have on attempting to think 
being in its most "profound meaning" as "Lassen" (GAlS, 363)? 
In attending to the question of the origins of philosophy, Ruin explains, "Philosophy 
has its origin not in an act of reason, but in a certain emotional displacement vis-a-vis being 
as such, in wonder that it is" (Ruin, 2000: 155). Ruin's assertion that philosophy begins in 
wonder is of course nothing new. In the Metapf?ysics, Aristotle famously asserts, "for by way 
ofwondering, people both now and at first began to philosophize" (982b15), and in Plato's 
Theaetetus, we not only find the famous story of Thales falling into the well due to his wonder 
at all that surrounds him (174b), we also find constant descriptions and proclamations of 
wonder throughout the dialogue from the mouth of both Socrates and Theaetetus as they 
exhibit a proper philosophical ethos. 
In Schelling's writing, this ethos is made manifest in his discussion of those who have 
the 'feeling of freedom,' which inspires all those who have experienced to make all things 
into its analog through dialogical engagement with the presencing of things. It is further 
made manifest in his demands that we debase ourselves before beings so as to not 
overdetermine how they presence to us; this will be covered thorougWy in Chapter VI. In 
Heidegger this ethos is made manifest in his assertion of Gelassenheit, or releasement, as 
"openness to the mystery," which amounts to the maintenance of a questioning stance in the 
face of the abyssal character of presencing (Heidegger, 1959: 23f). 
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Thus, for both Heidegger and Schelling, the abyssal character of being can only 
properly be encountered insofar as one bears oneself towards the world with an attunement 
that is proper to this abyssal character of being. The experience of freedom thus means that 
we both carry ourselves in a stance of what Schelling calls 'free thinking' or what Heidegger 
calls Gelassenheit, so that we can experience the free giving of being. As Sallis puts it, 
"freedom is indeed a kind of freedom for. . jor the very openness that lets [things] come forth 
manifestly and bindingly in the open" (Sallis, 2002: 8). But as Sallis explains, this is not 
something that one, for Heidegger, can simply will. Rather, "determined from aletheia, 
freedom as letting-be-the essence of freedom-proves to be exposure and ek-sistence" 
(Sallis, 2002: 10). The question is, however, how and where this freedom as letting-be 
surfaces. I would like to simultaneous ask and suggest with Sallis whether or not it emerges 
in questioning. He writes, "The question is whether the beginning of philosophy-every 
beginning of philosophy, every enactment of philosophical beginning-is not, in precisely 
this sense, a matter of free thinking" (Sallis, 2002: 12). 
Freedom is thus both the manner and matter of thinking for Schelling and 
Heidegger: a matter and manner for thinking that brings about an experience of 
displacement-a displacement that is possible only insofar as we are already displaced, 
ecstatic-an experience we can hold onto insofar as we encounter things in their question­
worthiness. Here we then become persons of possibility, opening ourselves up to the 
possibility of being by coming to the question of self-knowledge anew, recognizing that we 
are ourselves only insofar as we are actively in relation to what environs us. 
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Section IV
 
Chapter Breakdown
 
In Chapter II of this project, I offer an account of what I conceive of as Heidegger's 
phenomenology. My objective is to show that Heidegger's phenomenological project differs 
from Hussed's project-at least on Heidegger's account-in large part due to his emphasis 
upon the both temporally and spatially ecstatic character of both Dasein and all other 
entities. This ecstatic character of Dasein forces us to reconsider the status of the 
phenomenologist in his project, while at the same time forcing us to rethink what exactly is 
being attended to in his phenomenological engagements. I argue that given Heidegger's 
insistence upon the referential constitution of all things, he eradicates the possibility of us 
ever finding a secure basis, an absolute ground that would secure the identities or meanings 
of things. Thus, Heidegger's phenomenology brings us to the abyssal character of being. 
Chapter III picks up this thought, and attempts to offer a reading of Heidegger's 
later writings in light of my account of his phenomenological project. I will elucidate and 
defend that freedom as the realization of the lack of necessity of any particular epochal 
determination of being, as the experience of possibility through contingency, is what 
emerges for us in the experience of thinking the clearing. To get at this point with sufficient 
poignancy it will be necessary to think through quite carefully the role that history plays for 
Heidegger in relationship to what he calls words for being and the first beginning of 
philosophy as metaphysics. Then I explore the relationship between the lack of a word for 
being and the thinkability of the clearing in some detail in order to ask whether or not the 
clearing, insofar as it is precisely that which escapes and grants the possibility of thinking 
things which are extant, is only thinkable under the name Ereignis-which is not a new name 
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for being-via Gelassenheit thought of as a particular kind of comportment, that which is 
proper to thinking, when all our other words break. Here we will encounter intimations of 
what Heidegger calls "the other beginning," the experience that we have in the face of the 
abyssal character of things insofar as we do not attempt to stop-gap this abyss with a new 
principle or name for being, either wonder or terror. 
My objective in Chapter IV is to make a case for the claim that Schelling holds open 
the other beginning and does not respond to the confrontation with the abyss with the 
erection of new principles. I make my case taking our starting point in Heidegger's reading 
ofH6lderlin and the relationship between philosophy and poetry, insofar as the task of these 
two domains is to say being-which for later Heidegger can only mean Ereignis--and name 
the holy. I will lay the stakes of Schelling's questioning of "eternal freedom" via Heidegger's 
reading of H6lderlin's language of the holy, insofar as both of "eternal freedom" and "the 
holy," in some sense, name nature as that which is eternally past. I will then layout a 
rigorous reading of what the eternal past means for Schelling. In order to do so I will deal 
with a number of Schelling's texts from his middle period, particularly the Ages ofthe World, 
the Initia Philosophiae Universae (which I will refer to as the Erlanger Lectures), and the 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence ofHuman Freedom and Matters Connected Therewith (which 
I will refer to as the Freedom essay). My claim will be that nature and this eternal past are 
ways that Schelling names freedom. I will show that freedom serves a double role in 
Schelling's corpus: it indicates the matter and manner of thinking. In doing so I attend to 
Heidegger's critique of Schelling in his lectures on the Freedom essay in order to show that 
Heidegger overdetermines Schelling's understanding of the absolute, turning it, unjustly into 
a new onto-theological principle. Instead I show that the absolute qua subject is a subject 
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that dissembles, it is only expression, and Schelling thus turns the absolute into something 
that sounds an awful lot more like the free giving of being rather than a giver that is 
complete in advance. 
Chapter V continues the task set out in Chapter IV, by showing how Schelling makes 
freedom the manner of thinking, insofar as the absolute qua eternal freedom is the matter to 
be thought. I show how this becomes clear through multiple moments in his corpus 
including his thinking of decision in Ages 0/the World, his understanding of the organic in his 
Naturphilosophie writings, and most importantly his insistence upon what he calls alternately 
knowing not-knowing, Socratic ignorance, and Gelassenheit in his Erlanger Lectures. I show 
that Schelling's understanding of the unfolding of being gives him the ability to account for 
why human thinking, as a reflection of God's unfolding, must give up on being able to 
capture being in concepts in advance if it is to actually be able to think being in its 
movement. 
Given that the movement of being is groundless, the way in which human thinking 
attends to it is as underdetermined as the presencing of being itself. Thus in Chapter VI, I 
show how Schelling's thinking of the underdetermined character of being leads him to his 
account of the possibility for good and evil. I argue that this experience of evil-as the 
experience of the nihilation of the generosity of being-whether via environmental 
degradation, genocide, or even in the case of Schelling, the existence of the nation­
state-can be explicitly brought to bear upon Schelling's rejection of conceptual 
categorization in lieu of a thinking that "accompanies and witnesses" the movement of being 
step-by-step. It is our ability to either embrace or deny this play that I will attend to in the 
final chapter. This leads to two final philosophical concerns: first, what is the measure of 
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evil for Schelling giving the groundlessness of being, and second, how can we ever engage 
the world discursively and not lapse into evil on Schelling's account? Here I will attempt to 
show that the experience of freedom is something that is not a side effect of the will to truth, 
but rather the further goal of thinking for Heidegger and Schelling beyond establishing the 
truth of things. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE ECSTASY OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE DESTRUCTION OF
 
ORIGINS
 
In the introduction I briefly articulated the role ofBefindlichkeit or Stimmung in 
Heidegger's Being and Time. In light of the work done in the intro, the work of this chapter 
will be twofold. First, I hope to establish an understanding of the function of ecstasy-or 
ek-stases/ ek-sistence-in Heidegger's work, with particular focus on the Letter on 
'Humanism". Second, I connect this "rigorous strain of thinking" ecstasy in Heidegger to the 
phenomenological demands made in Being and Time and elsewhere in Heidegger's early 
writings, particularly The Basic Problems rfPhenomenology. I claim that the phenomenological 
demand in Heidegger never goes away-and that given Heidegger's emphasis upon In-der-
Welt-Sein and the temporal ecstasies in Being and Time his conception of phenomenology takes 
us far away from a subject-centered model of reflection that seems to dominate in Husserl's 
conception of phenomenology, at least in Heidegger's reading and critique thereof, as it 
presents itself in this lecture course form the late 1920s, which relies fundamentally upon the 
priority of immediate intuition. 
I hope to show, with Walter Brogan, that, "Heidegger overcomes the modern 
concept of isolated subjectivity and provides a basis for understanding the fundamentally 
communal and relational character of Dasein." Not only do I agree with Brogan that 
Heidegger articulates a conception of identity that is relational and ecstatic, but that this 
conception is retrieved through "his philosophical destruction of the modern, transcendental 
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subject" (Brogan, 2005: 151). Here, I will argue against the view of Dreyfus who holds that, 
"Heidegger seeks to show that the shared public world is the only world there is or can be" 
(Dreyfus, 1991: 301). Such a view, it seems to me would miss the fact that Heidegger's 
thinking has always already in its very inception attempted to push behind the back of what 
is given to us in the shared public world, thought naively. 
I will argue in the next chapter that this task is continued in his later works, but here 
I will attempt to lay the ground work for thinking phenomenologically in light of a 
fundamental engagement with things that present themselves as an occurrence, rather than 
as entities which are to be bracketed and encountered eidetically. Only once a move is made 
towards thinking essence verbally does the possibility of thinking an arche or an Ut;grund truly 
begin to get called into question-and I believe that Heidegger's phenomenological 
demands, from the very beginning, require us to think beings as they west, not in their Wesen, 
insofar as this latter term is understood as an eternal character. 
Section I
 
Why We Must Stand Aside (Ourselves)
 
In the Letter on "Humanism" Heidegger writes, "Ek-sistence can only be said of the 
essence of the human, meaning, only of the human way "to be"; for the human alone, 
insofar as we experience it, is admitted to the sending of ek-sistence" (GA9, 324). Why does 
Heidegger parse ek-sistence with a hyphen? Heidegger explains that what is at issue in this 
reconfigured sense of ek-sistence, is precisely that the essence of the human is to stand out. 
Etymologically, we see that both stasis and sistere in their respectively Greek and Latin 
origins, are location words. They both name solidity, consistency, and having a place. When 
we couple either of these terms together with the Greek prefix, ek, which denotes the 
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exterior, the outside, potentially even a moving away from, we end up with a term which in 
itself seems to present a contradiction. We have standing and consistency on the one hand, 
and on the other we have movement away, flux, the outside. Hence when we encounter ek­
sistence, or ek-stasis, we must simultaneously hear both inside and outside-we must hear a 
standing which stands in virtue of its flux, and as its flux. We must hear a consistency 
which is only insofar as it is an ecstasy. 
How does ek-stasis apply to humans? This ecstatic character of the human does not 
just mean that the human stands out from the rest of the beings who are alive, insofar as 
they are Da-sein, but they stand out from them, the rest of all beings who are living, 
precisely by standing outside of themselves, and being themselves only insofar as they are 
outside themselves. Let us dig deeper to get an understanding of Heidegger's point, which is 
an ontological claim about the basic constitution of the human. He writes, "the human 
essentially occurs [west] in such a way that humans are the "there" [das ''Va'], meaning, the 
clearing of being. This "being" of the Da, and only it, has the fundamental trait of ek­
sistence, meaning, of an ecstatic inherence in the truth of being" (GA9, 325). In a discussion 
of the Da as it functions in Being and Time, John Sallis writes, "That Being-in is constituent of 
the Being of Dasein means: Dasein is always its "there", Dasein is its disclosedness, Dasein 
is a clearing. Later another synonym will be added: Dasein is its truth" (Sallis, 1995: 120). 
This whole litany of "synonyms"-disclosedness, clearing, truth, and others which will 
encounter sooner than later-is something which we must think through quite carefully if 
we are to begin to think the way in which Da-sein is ecstatic, and the way in which thinking 
can be seen as a name for a freeing movement. These thoughts, contained in this brief 
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assertion from the Letter on {{Humanism", are what we will have to struggle with, in various 
mutations, for the rest of this chapter. 
In order to clarify this point, however, we must make a foray into Heidegger's 
critique of the conception of the human as the rational animal, and the accompanying 
conception of thinking as representational activity of the human subject. Heidegger writes, 
"the human as the ek-sistent counterthrow of being is more than animal rationale as this 
human is clearly less related to the human that conceives of itself in terms of subjectivity" 
(GA9, 342). The rational animal and a notion of individuated subjectivity are brought into 
intimate relationship in his text, and it is the notion of thinking that Heidegger sees as 
accompanying the human qua subject that we must elucidate in order to call it into question. 
This notion of the monistic, isolated, subject is central to an understanding not only of the 
way in which Heidegger re-thinks thinking, but also, for why an entirely new way of thinking 
freedom must emerge in his text. 
If I were an isolated monad, if the way in which I encounter the world were from the 
perspective of an absolutely individuated '1', then I must have a particular way of engaging 
that world which stands outside of me. To think about this world which stands over and 
against me means to understand that world as something fundamentally other than me, and 
insofar as I am subject, this means that this world is an object: the Gegenstand which literally 
'stands against' me. This language points to the interpretative violence that is at stake when 
humans are conceived of as isolated subjects. I must encounter that which stands against 
me, the objectivity of things, and bring it under concepts-grasp it so as to be able to 
represent it to myself-so that it becomes thinkable for me. Why must I engage in this 
process of bringing this world under conceptual determination? Wby must Ire-present 
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things? The reason is that insofar as the world is not like me, or I do not belong to the 
world, or the materiality of the world of sensuous experience is not like my thoughts, I have 
to make the world accommodate itself to me. For Heidegger, in Age 0/the World Picture, the 
implication of such thinking is that the world, as pure object, is essentially dead matter, the 
hufe which my mind trans-forms (morphe) into something which I am able to think. "But 
when humanity becomes the first and proper subiectum, this means that humanity becomes 
the being upon which all beings in their manner of being and their truth are grounded" 
(GAS, 88). The conception of the human as 'that-which-underlies', the Ifypokeimenon, of all 
beings brings us into the epoch wherein thinking is fundamentally constructing the world in 
which we live-hence our thoughts as representational are instances of our minds forming 
the matter of experience, which is nothing, i.e. formless matter and hence unencounterable, 
on its own terms. 
Yet this manner of thinking about the world leads to logical contradictions. In The 
Inoperative Community, Jean-Luc Nancy articulates the untenability of such a conception of the 
human; whether we want to speak of an absolute whole or of an absolute individual, we find 
ourselves in a circumstance that reduces everything to the same in such a way as to eliminate 
the differentiation which is essential to thought. Thinking this through in terms of the 
absolute, insofar as it is something that we conceive of as an absolutely closed system, and 
therefore an analog of the modern subject as Ifypokeimenon, Nancy writes, "The absolute must 
be the absolute of its own absoluteness or not be at all. In other words: to be absolutely 
alone, it is not enough that I be so; I must be absolutely alone being alone-and this is of 
course contradictory. The logic of the absolute violates the absolute" (Nancy, 1991: 4). The 
claim is that if something is to be fundamentally alone, absolutely alone, it must be the only 
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thing in the world which is alone, and hence the only thing in the world-otherwise there 
would be a whole world of other isolated entities. Here we are left asking with Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, "How could there be several absolutes" (Merleau-Ponty, 2006: 435)? 
Merleau-Ponty, like Nancy after him, believes that it does not make sense to posit something 
as being alone unless there is something from which that first entity can distinguish itself. 
Thus even being alone requires that there is something which we separate ourselves 
from-some solution, some mixture, which we pull ourselves away from. This pulling away 
from the solution, the mixture, is precisely what the ab-solute is. At issue here is precisely 
what it means to be, to exist. Ifwe want to conceive of ourselves as isolated monads or as 
subsumed entirely within some greater collectivity, we arrive at a logical contradiction-there 
is no thing, no entity, without distinction from that which it is not, and hence nothing 
without differentiation. 
In light of his analysis of the ab-solute, Nancy explains that there is no fundamental 
difference between such a notion of absolute individuation or absolute totality, as both of 
them attempt to think outside of all relation, which insofar as we are willing to accept the 
tradition handed down to us from Socrates in the Theaetetus, cannot occurring except 
through an originary difference-dianoesthai is dialegesthat~ thinking-through is fundamentally a 
dialogue. Only in light of differentiation-the play of light and shadow can we have a world. 
The identity of myself as a self same entity occurs after this original rupture. For Nancy this 
is the primacy of ecstasy. He writes, "[singularity] is not enclosed in a form ... but is what it 
is ... only through its extension, through the areality that above all extroverts it in its very 
being-whatever the degree or the desire of its "egoism"-and that makes it exist only by 
exposing it to an outside" (Nancy, 1991: 29). This sense of extroversion, the way in which all 
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things that are fundamentally expose themselves to their outside-and only constitute 
themselves in this exposure-is the sense of ecstasy that Nancy thinks we have to push 
ourselves towards ifwe are to arrive at a manner of thinking and engaging the world which is 
not self-contradictory. Ifwe want to think the fundamentally 'in-common' character of all 
things, we must return, or arrive at for the first time, a rich and complex sense of ecstasy. 
Merleau-Ponty drives this point home even further when he discusses the problem 
of other selves. He argues that, "the plurality of consciousness is impossible if I have an 
absolute consciousness of myself' (Merleau-Ponty, 2006: 434) because otherwise there 
would never need to be an opening through which we would have access to something other 
than us, i.e., we would never need to learn anything. All things, potentially including 
anything that there is which we might want to call external, would be a product of the self as 
qypokeimenon. We would not only be in full possession of ourselves, but also in full 
possession of the world. Here, questions would not emerge, answers would not be required, 
and foreignness would be a foreign thought. Merleau-Ponty goes on to say that, "it is 
ultimately with God that the cogito brings me into coincidence" (Merleau-Ponty, 2006: 434). 
One need only think of Spinoza's argument from the appendix to book I of his Ethics to 
appreciate the point being made here. Spinoza writes, "if God acts for the sake of an end, 
he necessarily wants something which he lacks", and a being who lacks something, strictly 
speaking, cannot be God-and certainly cannot be the absolute (Spinoza, 1994: 112). If you 
desire something, than it is clearly the case that something exists which is not already part of 
you-and thus you must posit yourself as being in a solution with other things.7 
7 This, however, is only half of the consequence the cogito and its relationship to the generation of the self as 
God, at least in the way in which Merleau-Ponty, Nancy, and Heidegger receive it; the other consequence is 
ethical. As Enrique Dussel explains with regards to the European encounter with the Americas, "Europe has 
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Prior to moving forward to our discussion of ecstasy, permit me to quote John 
Russon as a manner of recapitulating and presaging where we our headed. Explaining that 
that "how the object exists is reflective of the interpretive demands of the subject," and that 
"the subject is already subordinated to the demands of the object," Russon writes: 
Human reality is this situation, this event of meaning, this happening of a subject­
object pair. In identifying the subject-object pair as the human reality, we have gone 
beyond any appeal either to a more original choosing agent that goes out to meet an 
alien object, or to an objective truth that forces itself onto an alien subject for 
explaining why things are the way that they are. This is because we have seen that 
the subject and object so conceived only exist as abstracted aspects of the 
meaningful situation, the comprehending relation. (Russon, 2003: 20) 
Yet how are we attend philosophically and rigorously to this comprehending relation? In 
order to bring these thoughts on and from Merleau-Ponty and Nancy back into relation to 
the questions we have been putting to and receiving from Heidegger, let us return to a 
lengthy quotation in which Nancy most clearly announces the stake and origins of this 
question of ecstasy: 
Ecstasy, ifwe understand it according to a rigorous strain of thinking that would 
pass ... by way of Schelling and Heidegger, implies no effusion, and even less some 
form of effervescent illumination. Strictly speaking, it defines the impossibility either 
of an individuality, in the precise sense of the term, or of a pure collective totality. 
The theme of the individual and that of communism are closely bound up with (and 
constituted other cultures, worlds, and persons as ob-jects; like something "thrown before" it s eyes. The 
"covered" [cubierto] has been "dis-covered" [des-cubierto]: ego cogito cogitatu1ll, europeanized, but immediately "en­
covered" [en-cubierto] as other. An Other constituted as the Same" (Dussel, 1992: 36). Dussel explains a litany 
of reasons as to why this encubierto took place in lieu of an authentic des-cubierto--some historical, some 
philosophical-but what I am interested in here is his connection between the Yo conquisto and the ego cogito that 
he draws. Dussel explains, "the modern ego was born in its self-constitution over and against the dominated." 
The origins of the modern self as kind of sovereign can be encountered here in Dussel's assertion of the 
identity of the cogito and the 'I conquer' of the Yo conquisto. The Yo conquisto of the subject taken as hypokei1llellon 
over and against the world as pure hy/e is taken to its logical consequence when we see other people and/or 
land taken as the pure matter to be worked upon by the active subject whose task it is to mold the world into 
their image. It is not an innocent coincidence that humans who take themselves as sovereign begin to act as if 
they were sovereign like the biblical God who creates humans in his own image. Thus, not only does an 
illogical, contradictory position follow from the postulation of pure, self-certain, self-possessed subjectivity-it 
also yields a wildly destructive ethos. This ethos will remain a question for us for the remainder of this project, 
and it will be returned to in full and in various modulations in Chapter VI. 
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bound together in) the general problematic of immanence. They are bound together 
in their denial of ecstasy. (Nancy, 1991: 6) 
Here we see Nancy announcing those concerns which we have already been discussing in 
this chapter-the status of individuation and totality as both eliminations of the 
differentiation which is constitutive of our being-but we also see him naming names. Ifwe 
want to arrive at a rigorous thinking of ecstasy-this extroversion which defines all of 
life-we have to return to a "strain of thinking that would pass by way of Schelling and 
Heidegger." Why is Nancy concerned with pointing us to a "rigorous strain of thinking" in 
relationship to the question of ecstasy? As we discussed in the introduction, the most 
pressing reason is precisely the connotations of madness and insanity, what Hegel called 
Schwcirmerei, that people tend to associate with such a thought. Is not ecstasy reserved for the 
St. Theresa's of the world who have experiences of divine inspiration? Is it not a specific 
kind of immersion into the immanent oneness of being? Nancy not only thinks that if we 
want to understand why this is not the case, we must return to the Heidegger and Schelling's 
thinking of ecstasy, he thinks we must return there to understand that this is the way in 
which our world essentially unfolds. 
How does this thinking of ecstasy assert itself in Heidegger's text? We have already 
brought this to light in this chapter-Da-sein is as ek-sistence. This was the reason why we 
had to make an excursus into Nancy in the first place. Earlier we said that Da-sein ek-sists, 
stands out, into the truth of being; now I believe we may be circumscribing exactly what is at 
stake in thinking about the first portion of this statement-Da-sein's ek-sistence. Why does 
Da-sein ek-sist? Why does Da-sein stand outside of itself? Because this is the fundamental 
character of all things-as Adorno will say in Negative Dialectics, "What is, is more than it is. 
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This "more" is not imposed upon it, but remains immanent to it, as that which has been 
ousted from it" (Adorno, 1966: 162). That does not mean that we cannot be mistaken about 
the way in which we are always already thrown out ofourselves into a world, but this does mean 
that it is a mistake when we take ourselves to be subiectum, we are not the site at which the 
consistency and coherence of the world is guaranteed, rather we are part of a complex 
constellation of identities which are constituted through their relationships which the 
entirety of that which is nonidentical with them. Even logically speaking it is an error to 
think outside of the realm of the ecstatic, as it is brings us to a self-contradictory 
understanding of the world. We are always-already in relation to those things which 
surround us and swarm in on us, and we are only what we are insofar as we are constituted 
by those relations, i.e. our relationship to those things which stand outside of us. Merleau-
Ponty writes, 
What I discover and recognize through the cogito is not psychological immanence, the 
inherence of all phenomena in 'private states of consciousness', the blind contact of 
sensation itself. It is not even transcendental immanence, the belonging of all 
phenomena to a constituting consciousness, the possession of clear thought by itself. 
It is the deep-seated momentum of transcendence which is my very being, the 
simultaneous contact with my own being and with the world's being (Merleau-Ponty, 
2006: 438). 
Here, Merleau-Ponty's transcendence ought to be heard as a reiteration of the sense of the 
ek-static character of the human that I have been fleshing out through Heidegger. The I that 
I am relies on things which are outside of me, in fact the I that I am is this relating, this 
excessive, ecstatic moment of self-transcendence. Hence, I can only say "me" because of the 
way in which I am more than just my isolated bodily presence. I am ecstatic in my world 
both spatially and temporally. Another way to approach Da-sein's spatial ecstasy is through 
Heidegger's thinking of the In-der-Welt-Sein, being-in-the-world, character ofDa-sein. 
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Heidegger writes, "there is no such thing as the 'coexistence' of a being called 'Da-sein' with 
another being called 'world'" (Heidegger, 1966: 74). Why Da-sein and the world are not 
sufficiently separable to ever coexist, or stand side by side, has already been explicated by the 
way we have considered ecstasy., but let me clarify this point again. I cannot say 'I' without 
the relations in which I stand. In fact, this way of thinking the 'I' as a result already ought to 
muddy up the way in which phenomenology is traditionally understood; this is the claim that 
we will return to in section three of this chapter. 
Alejandro Vallega elucidates the relationship between Da-sein and being-in-the 
world. He writes, "the question of being occurs in Da-sein, and Da-sein may only occur as a 
being-in-the-world along with others, a being with others that makes room for others" 
(Vallega, 2003: 64). That is to say, Da-sein occurs as the making room for others, but its 
occurrence is possible only insofar as it is constituted by that which it makes room for. We 
have a relationship of reciprocal constitution. We do no lie as the subiectum of the world for 
Heidegger, nor are we fundamentally apart from it. Both of these models are entirely 
contradictory to the basic understanding of the In-der-Welt-Sein in Being and Time. Da-sein is 
primordially bei the world, amidst the world, not alongside of it. Thus, "such taking up 
relationships towards the world is only possible because Da-sein is as being-in-the-world as it 
is. This constitution of Being does not first emerge because outside of the being with the 
character ofDa-sein still another being is present and meets up with it. This other being can 
'meet' with Da-sein only so far as it is able to show itself from out of itself within a lJJorld' 
(Heidegger, 1966: 77). This meeting is not merely the collision of two bodies, but a knowing 
relationship. Heidegger will go on to explain that knowing does not bring us into such a 
relation, but rather a knowing relationship is possible only because of the primordial fact of 
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our being-in-the-world. Recall Merleau-Ponty's comment about the cogito: a being that was 
actually completely self-possessed would never even ask questions. We can only have 
knowledge about the world because we are constituted as fundamentally ecstatic amidst it. 
This belonging to the world does not have to bring us to a complete collapse of distinction 
between self and world-as this would be to err on the opposite side. Yet we are like the 
world, we are amidst the world. For Heidegger, the fact we can hear (hiJ'ren) the address 
(Anspruch) of the world demonstrates our belonging (gehiJ'ren). We do not constitute our 
reality, nor do we constitute our thoughts. For the sake of adumbration: we are given die 
Sache, the matter, for thought by the world in which we find ourselves, and this Sache---this 
matter-is what it is because of the constitution of this world into which we are thrown. 
Section II
 
Time and Identity
 
The bodily 'I' that I am, is constituted by what I am not-that is, by the referential 
totality of the world into which I am thrown. But this is only half of the account of the 
ecstasy ofDa-sein in Being and Time; we must now turn to Da-sein's temporal ecstasy. For 
Heidegger, the temporal 'I' that I am is constituted by the ways in which I am ec-static into 
my past and my future. Da-sein is constituted by three temporal ecstasies; the center point 
ofwhich, if such a thing could be said to exist, is where one will find the being that Da-sein 
is. This center point does not guarantee the coherency of the three temporal ecstasies, but 
rather is the result of the phenomenological experience of these three ecstasies which are 
named as (1) anticipation, or coming-towards-itself, (2) having-been, and (3) presencing or 
making-present. Thus we not only stand outside of ourselves into the world in terms of 
spatiality-we also do so in terms of temporality. Richard PoIt writes, "we stand out into 
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future possibilities, into a past heritage, and into a present world", and it is only as the 
gathering of these three moment, as I have said, that we have consistency as Da-sein (FoIt, 
1999: 34). Following Daniela Vallega-Neu's reading of Being and Time, these three moments 
could be described as follows: first, Da-sein is given to itself in relationship to its ownmost 
possibility, i.e. its death. That is to say, first and foremost Da-sein is always running ahead of 
itself, and experiences itself as coming back to itself thus providing it with a manner of 
understanding itself now. Insofar as this futural character fundamentally relates to Da-sein's 
finitude-the "ownmost" possibility which is the closure of all possibilities-it takes a 
certain sort of precedence; as only when Da-sein has a relation to what it is to be, i.e., a 
relationship to its projects, do the other temporal ek-stases become sensible and thinkable. 
Heidegger writes, "anticipation makes Da-sein properlY futural and in it is true that 
anticipation itself is only possible insofar as Da-sein as a being in general always already 
comes towards itself, i.e., in its being in general it is futural" (Heidegger, 1966: 431). Da-sein 
is thus defined as understanding itself primarily in terms of its being oriented towards its 
future possibilities, which are not seen as something not yet arrived, but rather determine the 
meaning or sense ofDa-sein's being in its present. 
After this coming back to itself, Da-sein is able to take over its past as thrownness in 
a meaningful way-and this implies that Da-sein is always a having-been (Gewesenhei~. 
Without a past, there is nothing to interpret in light of the coming-back-to-oneself out of 
anticipation. Vallega-Neu writes, "Da-sein can come toward itself [first ectases] only insofar 
as it is a having-been. Da-sein can come toward itself only in coming back toward itself' 
(Vallega-Neu, 2003: 20). The fact that Da-sein has a past in its thrownness is in one sense 
the condition of having a future-yet within a phenomenological engagement of the way in 
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which the meaning of ones being makes its manifest, the past-the character of having been 
(Gewesenhei~-"springsup, in a certain way, from the future" (Heidegger, 1966: 431). Our 
past is made sense of-it is given its sense, meaning, and direction-by Da-sein's 
anticipatory character. 
The third ecstases is thus the presencing that occurs in the way in which we interpret 
what is encountered in our actions at this moment. The fact that particular beings disclose 
themselves to us in certain ways in the present moment of our being-in-the-world hinges 
upon the Sinn generated by the character of Da-sein as anticipatory and having-been. 
Without these movements into the future and past, we have no meaningful, present 
engagement with our world as Zuhanden, to hand. Heidegger writes, "The having-been 
springs up from the future in such a way that the future which has been (better: which is 
having been) releases the present (Gegenwar!) from out of itself" (GA9, 432).8 Thus the 
manner in which we interpret our present milieu phenomenologically is always determined 
by the way in which we are ecstatic into our future, past, and present. 
Heidegger is quite explicit in the paragraphs that follow in Being and Time about how 
this model of thinking temporality takes us far afield from any ordinary conception of time 
which could simply think the past as what has been, the present as what is, and the future as 
what is not yet. Rather the sense of the future and the past here are alive and robust in the 
manner in which they constitute our present self-understanding. This is why Heidegger has 
8 This is quite a tricky passage in GenTIan. Heidegger is playing with the word Gewesen, changing it from a 
simple adjective-which even itself presents a degree of awkwardness-to a gerund. I chose to render this as 
the spift from "the future which has been" to "that which is having been" in order to demonstrate that the 
Gewesenheit character of Dasein is in no way terminated as it past. To think in such a way would lead us into an 
ordinary conception of time, thus returning us to the problem of origins. For posterity, the German as a whole 
reads, "Die Gewesenheit entspringt der Zuktltift, so i}J'ar, dass die gewesene (besser gewesende) ZukUlift die GegemJJart aus sich 
entkisst." 
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the caveat in the previous quotation wherein he says"bessergewesende" after having said 
"gewesene" to describe our futurity, and our relationship to our past-our Gewesenheit, our 
having been, is something which must be thought as actively taking place, and hence the 
switch the gerund. Permit me to quote Heidegger at some length prior to moving to 
investigation of how this sense of temporality necessitates a radicalizing of phenomenology. 
He writes, 
Future, having been, and present show the phenomenal characters of the "towards­
oneself," the "return from," and the "letting-oneself-be-met-~." The phenomena of 
the towards ... , the to/from... , and the amidst ... reveal temporality as that which is 
simply ekstatikon. Temporality is the primordiallY "outside ofitse!l" in andfor itself. We 
therefore call the characteristic phenomena of future, having been, and the present 
the ecstasies of temporality. Temporality is not a being prior to this that first 
emerges from out of itself, rather its essence is the temporalizing in the unity of the 
ecstasies. (Heidegger, 1966: 435) 
The inherence of an identity, the guarantee of consistency, the possibility of having a 
direction or meaning hinges first and foremost upon the temporalizing of temporalitY that 
describes Da-sein. Thus, to reiterate, not only are we outside of ourselves in a world, but we 
are outside of ourselves across time-or we are ourselves insofar as we exceed ourselves. 
There is no site of origin here from which the other temporal ecstasies take their leave and 
their foundation-rather the coherency emerges in the interwined character of these three 
moments. Da-sein is essentially outside itself, Da-sein essentially occurs as its ecstasies, Da­
sein is its temporality, and temporality as Heidegger explains is not. It is not a being, even 
though we speak of it that way, rather temporality temporalizes (Zeitiichkeit zeitig~ 
(Heidegger, 1966: 435). Thus Da-sein is not-in a certain sense-rather Da-sein occurs. 
What might this mean for the ways in which we normally conceive of thinking? Who, what, 
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or where is the seat of thinking? From where does thinking emerge and how does this 
transformation of the identity and being of Da-sein alter the status of the phenomenologist? 
Section III
 
Thinking Outside Ourselves
 
Concerning the superstitions of the logicians: I will never tire of repeatedly 
underlining a small terse fact that is only grudgingly conceded by these superstitious 
people-namely, that a thought comes when "it" wants, and not when "I" want, so 
that it is a falsification of the facts to say that the subject "I" is the condition of the 
predicate "think." It thinks; but that this "it" is clearly the old celebrated "I" is, put 
mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and before all, no "immediate certainty." In 
the long run, this "it thinks" is already too much-the "it" already contains an 
interpretation of the process and does not belong to the process itself. One infers here 
according to the grammatical usage: "Thinking is an activity; every activity belongs 
to something, the activity is, consequently-" 
-Friedrich Nietzsche, Bryond Good and Evil (KGA, VI/II: 24) 
Insofar as the type of being that we are is fundamentally determined as ecstatic, i.e., 
insofar as my identity is constituted first and foremost by the relationship I have to that 
which is not, insofar as identity needs difference, gigantic ramifications emerge with regards 
to the way in which we must think. Heidegger is first and foremost a thinker of 
responsiveness, and to think phenomenologically for Heidegger means to respond to the 
givenness of things. My thinking always emerges only in response to what is given to me to 
think, and even if that which is given, and the giving of it, are an-archie, this does not mean 
that I can readily find myself thinking outside of it. In fact doing so, or at least desiring to 
do so, may be a desire for the impossible. Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology 
rests on the presupposition that we, for the most part, take for granted the givenness of the 
world that we live in. We tarry with what is given, put it to work, and live within a world 
while rarely noting or asking about the fact that things are given to us to use, or even less, to 
think about. Richard FoIt explains, "we are primally familiar with the whole; we inhabit it. 
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It is our own in the sense that we are comfortable in it, as a fish is comfortable in the sea. 
But this is why we cannot recognize it as our own, any more than a fish can recognize that it 
belongs to the sea and not on land" (polt, 2006: 25). Only when something interrupts our 
normal manner of proceeding in the world are we able to investigate the givenness of the 
world as such, rather than what is given. This move backwards towards investigating the 
givenness of things is the first step of the phenomenological process for Heidegger, yet I 
must establish more clearly the importance of this notion of the 'given' character of the 
world prior to investigating Heidegger's uptake of phenomenology. 
Let me begin with a brief foray into the Letter on 'Humanism". Here, Heidegger 
writes, "Thinking.. .lets itself be taken by being in order to be able to say the truth of being. 
Thinking accomplishes this letting" (GA9, 313). In this same text-the Letter on 
'Humanism "-Heidegger will go onto say, "The history of being is never past but always 
stands before us. The history of being sustains and determines every condition et situation 
humaine" (GA9, 314). Given that the most basic understanding of phenomenology may not 
be in accord with this sense of thinking qua response to what is given, I want to elucidate 
why it is reasonable on Heidegger's terms to claim that he remains phenomenological. 
The view of Heidegger as phenomenologist is not original, though that is not to say 
it is uncontested. Reiner Schurmann writes, "Throughout his texts, the essential concern in 
Heidegger's thinking remains the same: to understand 'being' phenomenologically as 
presencing, and to understand it through the manifold modes that entities have of rendering 
themselves "dense," of ordering themselves, of constituting a text or a poem" (Schurmann, 
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1990: 12).9 Yet, if Schiirmann is right, we are fairly far afield from the usual object-entities 
encountered after the phenomenological reduction in their stasis or eidos--that defines the 
movement of phenomenology. The question of this shift will provide us with our question 
for a remainder of the chapter. 
Let me begin again with another question: What is so phenomenological about 
ecstatic thinking-particularly if we take Nietzsche's thought seriously, as, is it not the case 
that phenomenology requires an active, self-possessed subject to undertake it? Is not 
thinking, even ecstatic thinking, in some way the work, the activity, of an agent? I want to 
argue against this view, and articulate that a true phenomenology that engages the self-
showing of the world requires a sense of the ecstatic, as otherwise, we are not actually 
obeying the fundamental phenomenological ethos, we are not attuned to the way in which 
things, including the self to which things are shown, show themselves. This is thus not to 
say that there is no such thing as a phenomenologist, rather, it is to say that the process of 
phenomenological engagement for Heidegger is excessive to any simple distinction between 
subject and object. 
Insofar as we take the basic demand of phenomenology to be the assertion that we 
"let that which shows itself be seen from itself just as it shows itself from itself" (Heidegger, 
1966: 46), it is clear that this demand from Being and Time, is still present in Heidegger's later 
works. In fact, we encounter a very similar formulation at the beginning of the Letter on 
'Humanism", where Heidegger writes-to repeat, "Thinking.. .lets itself be taken by being in 
order to be able to say the truth of being. Thinking accomplishes this letting" (GA9, 313). 
9 Schiirmann will go on to articulate how the object-if that word can hold its significance for 
Heidegger-changes throughout what Schiirmann sees as the three eras of Heidegger's thinking: the meaning 
of being, the truth of being, and the topology of being. 
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To understand the relationship between this demand to let beings be and the 
phenomenological imperative, we must understand what exactly is at stake for Heidegger in 
this sense of accomplishment. Prior to this quotation Heidegger just finished explaining that 
to accomplish something is not to take part in a spontaneous act, a creation ex nihilo, but 
rather to accomplish something is to let that thing unfold. Hence he writes, "Only what 
already is, is properly accomplishable" (GA9, 313). Of course, we as Da-sein do not 
encounter being as such; we encounter beings. It is through this encounter with beings, 
those things which west, essentially occur, that we come into relation to being thought in its 
simultaneously substantive and verbal form. This encounter insofar as it is a thoughtful (and 
we have yet to explore what this means) lets being be said, lets being come to fruition by 
establishing the relationship between Da-sein, the t/here of being, and being. 
Let me take a step into terrain that has thus far gone uninvestigated in order to 
attempt to situate Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology-and accordingly the way 
in which I am using the term throughout this project-from Heidegger's understanding and 
criticism of Husserlian phenomenology. In Ideas Towards a Pure Phenomenology and a 
Phenomenological Philosop0', Husser! writes, "Any possible object, logically speaking, "a'!Y suo/ect 
ifpossible true predications", has its ways, before all predicative thinking, precisely in a 
representing, an intuiting that encounters it in its "incarnate selfhood," which "seizes upon" 
it" (Husserl, 1950: 15). This activity of representing or intuiting the object by empirical or 
eidetic science is the act of the subject, the activity of the bracketing of the particular and 
encountering the eidetic essence in its unconditional universality. Elsewhere Husserl will 
say, "the specificallYphenomenological consists in the consideration of essences which places us in 
the intentionally all encompassing consciousness which thus relates everything that arisesfrom 
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eidetic consideration to the eidetic essence rfconsciousness in which all being is constituted" (Keller, 
1999: 119).10 We should already note one major point of difference between Husserl and 
what I have attempted to layout thus far regarding Heidegger. While Husserl wants to reject 
the I in a certain sense-he will call into question the I as it functions in "personal 
association" and society-he does maintain the pure 1ch, the pure I, as the undergirding of 
phenomenology. The fact that all eidetic essences are related back to consciousness by 
consciousness, demonstrates the grounding role that a certain sense of the I plays for 
Husserl. He writes, "the pure I would, however, seem to be something principally necessary; 
and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in 
experience, it cannot in atry sense hold as realpart or moment of the experiences themselves" 
(Husserl, 1950: 138). Husserl immediately goes on to equate this ego to Kant's 
transcendental unity of apperception, quoting Kant saying, "The 'I Think' must be able to 
accompany all my representations" (Hussed, 1950: 139). Regardless of how far this 'I'is 
from the masterful I as agent for Husserl, even if, as Joseph Kockelmans explains, there is a 
recoil of the phenomenological reduction on the subject which "reduces the psychologically 
purified subjectivity to 'transcendental subjectivity'" (I<ockelmans, 1967: 19), this recoil will 
not be sufficiently radical for Heidegger, as he makes clear in Basic Problems rfPhenomenology, 
which will be discussed momentarily. 
Jean-Luc Marion makes this fundamental difference between Husserl and Heidegger 
quite clear in a particularly interesting manner that will be returned to later in this project. 
10 Keller uses this quote as an example of Husserl's ambiguity about the relationship between 
phenomenological and eidetic reduction. While Husserl wants to separate them and say that there is something 
crucial about facticity which is not ignored and closed off in the phenomenological reduction, Keller indicts 
Husserl for privileging the eidetic and thus moving towards general classes and genuses and thus ignoring 
factical individuals. On a cursory reading, Heidegger certainly gets some mileage out of such an interpretation 
as we shall see in a few pages when he specifically rejects the idea that Dasein could be taken as having an eidos 
at the beginning ofBeing and Time. 
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Referring to Heidegger's What is Metaplijsics?, he explains, "when through anxiety or any 
other fundamental affective mood, the world of being recedes and vanishes, what still speaks 
has a name-the fact of being, that being is." Marion explains that Heidegger refers to this 
as the "wonder of all wonders," whereas, "Husserl recognizes [the phenomenon par 
excellence] in the I, whose pure consciousness defines an original region that is absolutely 
distinct from the region of the world and from its objects precisely because it constitutes 
them" (Marion, 1998: 163).11 
Ifwe accept Heidegger's reading of Hussed2, the latter thinker's phenomenological 
project leaves us a long way from thinking as fundamentally responsive activity. In fact, it 
seems as though the activity which Husserl is calling for, the reflective and abstractive 
activity of the subject, is completely antithetical to Heideggerian phenomenology. And on 
the surface this may be the case-and we may have to split the difference here, forgoing a 
more thorough investigation of the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger, given that 
this is not a project on their relationship. Yet, for Heidegger the only truly phenomenological 
comportment is one which, as I have said, is attuned to the lack of transparency of the 
subject-the agent-of phenomenology itself. And insofar as Husserl does maintain a kind 
of transcendental idealism wherein the subject constitutes the world, it is unclear to me as to 
11 Yet as Marion explains, problematizing Heidegger's account of Hussed, not even the I, the wonder of all 
wonders, is safe from reduction. He writes, ''The phenomenological method never stumbles upon the slightest 
limit or border-not even the Being of beings, nor even (contrary to what Heidegger leaves one to suppose) 
the T' (Marion, 1998: 164). 
12 I specify that I am dealing with Heidegger' understanding of Hussed here to attempt to avoid the inevitable 
criticism that this reading does not give Husserl a fair shake. While this may well be the case, as is made 
apparent by numerous interpretations of Hussed-already in Eugen Fink's work for example-and even in the 
wide variance of views that Husserl himself displays from the Logical ImJestigations up through the Crisis if the 
Modern European Sciences with regards to his relationship to transcendental idealism and the Kantian 
transcendental unity of apperception, I am limiting my task to elucidating how Heidegger takes up Hussed on 
this issue of the agent of phenomenology and the reflexive recoiling-not reflective-move that 
phenomenology must make on its practitioner. 
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whether or not he was willing to think the consequences of his phenomenological project 
radically enough. As Heidegger will say, a real question puts the questioner herself at 
stake-and unless this move is made, phenomenology has not become radical enough. 
On Francoise Dastur's account, the distinction between Heidegger's conception of 
the phenomenologist and that of Husserl can largely be explained by their relationship to 
time. Affirming the impact that Heidegger's thinking of ecstasy has on the status of Da-sein 
as a subject, she writes, "with respect to time, Husserl continues to see it as something 
immanent or internal to the subject, while for Heidegger the issue is instead to think the 
"subject" itself as time" (Dastur, 1998: 8). I believe that this seemingly subtle distinction can 
in fact account for the primary differences between Heidegger and Hussed in their 
respective conceptions of phenomenology. Husserl does not exclude the phenomenologist 
from phenomenological investigation, in fact he insists that it is a necessity (Hussed, 1950: 
154). Yet the undertaking of this self-investigation is not radical enough for Heidegger, so 
long as the transcendental I is left standing. Its certitude is guaranteed, if nowhere else, in 
the fact that Hussed discusses the eidetic essence of consciousness, implying that even if we 
do fundamentally engage individuals in their facticity, there is a deeper essential level 
available to us if we were to go through with the phenomenological (and eidetic) 
reduction(s). In light of Heidegger's conception of Da-sein as temporality, such an essential, 
universal, eidetic level becomes unthinkable.13 
13 For the sake of brevity, I have focused on the status of the I in phenomenological analysis, yet Heidegger's 
critique of Husserl actually begins with a critique of the Husser!'s understanding of the meaning of expressions 
with regards to a particular object. Husser! holds that while any particular thought can be expressed in a many 
ways, the meaning will always stay the same, and it is this universal meaning that is sought in phenomenological 
investigation. In the Prolegof1lena to the History ojthe Concept ojTif1le, Heidegger claims that Husser!'s 
phenomenology, insofar as it is based on the method of reduction, "not only abandons reality, but also 
abandons the particular separating out of experience. It thereby abandons the fact that an act is mine or that 
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In Basic Problems ofPhenomenology, Heidegger gives a concise explanation of how he 
sees his project relating to Husserl on this point regarding the phenomenological reduction. 
He writes: 
For Husser!, phenomenological reduction, which he explicitly worked out for the first 
time in the Ideas Towards a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological PhilosopfD! is the 
method of repatriating phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the 
human whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the 
transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences, in which 
object are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us phenomenological 
reduction means repatriating phenomenological vision back from the as always 
determinate comprehension of a being to the understanding of the being of this 
being (projecting upon its ways of unconcealment) (GA24, 29). 
Heidegger's explanation of Husserl reiterates what I have set up this far: the transcendental 
life of consciousness, while in question, is still the fundamental undergirding of the project. 
Heidegger thinks that the reduction means making the move away from the way in which we 
encounter a being as a static entity and focusing instead on the way in which the being 
discloses itself-its manner of occurring or taking place. This sense of reduction does not 
move us away from the entity in question, rather, it takes us deeper into the way into which 
the entity west, essentially occurs-that is we make a move to its being. The engagement has 
now become ontological. 
Given Heidegger's explanation in Being and Time that Da-sein itself is what is to be 
interrogated ifwe are to do phenomenology as fundamental ontology, it ought to be clear 
that there is no possibility of positing a concrete, guaranteed, grounding function to Da-sein 
as the phenomenologist anymore than one could inquire into the persistent essence of 
beings which exceeds their existence as a temporal occurrence (Heidegger, 1966: 18). In 
Being and Time, he is fundamentally concerned with the way in which Da-sein occurs as its 
acts are of another individual human being, and views them only according to their what' (GA20, 151). I will 
return to this theme in the body of the text momentarily. 
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possibilities, i.e. in its questionability. Da-sein does not have an essence which could be 
reached via an eidetic reduction-hence we read, "the title 'Da-sein', with which we refer to 
this being, does not describe its 'what', as in the case of a table, house, or tree, but rather its 
being" (Heidegger, 1966: 56). Heidegger's rejection of the analytic of Da-sein as being an 
investigation into the 'what' of Da-sein should be heard here as a rejection of an attempt to 
think of Da-sein in terms of its essence, which Heidegger elsewhere correlates with a things 
"whatness" (GA24, 20). This rejection of the investigation into the essence of Da-sein has 
already been presaged in Heidegger's rejection of thinking humans as the animal ratz'onale in 
the Letter on "Humanism)) -no such essence from all time will do for Heidegger, insofar as 
essence can only be thought in terms of temporal unfolding as essential occurrence, i.e. wesen 
as a verb, and no longer a noun. And here we must recall that Da-sein is its temporality, and 
temporality is not. Da-sein's essence as its whatness-if it is to exist at all-lies in how it 
occurs, how it zeitz'gt, temporalizes or blossoms. To proceed otherwise, to think of Wesen as 
Was-Sein, the "what-of-being", falls into the trap of determining being's manner of 
presencing in advance. Gadamer is helpful here: 
What shows itself as here as eidos, i.e. as an unchangeable determinateness showing 
its what-being [Was-Seins], implicitly understands 'being' as a continuous presence 
[Gegenwart], and this determines as well the meaning of unconcealedness, that is, of 
truth, and establishes the criterion of right and wrong for every essential assertion 
about beings. (Gadamer, 1987: 240) 
Thus, to think that by returning to things in their constant presence via an eidetic reduction, 
i.e. to encounter the truth of a thing beyond its historical or temporal situatedness, is to do 
nothing but enforce a particular historical determination and interpretation of being and in 
no way asks the question of the way in which being presences. 
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With this in mind let us follow Heidegger further in his critiques which are both 
explicit and implicit. Dispelling the possibility that Da-sein could be thought of as having an 
essence as a type of "whatness" Heidegger says that Da-sein cannot be thought of as an 
instance of a genus-rather the only way to approach Da-sein is in terms of its jemeinigkeit, 
its mineness, in each and every case. These passages could be heard as an act of 
undercutting the possibility of making phenomenology reflect upon the phenomenologist as 
if the phenomenologist qHa Da-sein had some kind of stable basis which we could inquire 
into and find the truth of. For Heidegger, there is no fundamental basis-no Grnnd of Da­
sein, and this is why I have said that the movement of phenomenology is a reflexive 
recoiling, not a moment of reflection into an essence. Heidegger's discussion of Da-sein as 
defined in its ecstatic character-both spatially and temporally does nothing but make this 
point even clearer. 14 The essence of Da-sein is constituted in its being-outside-of-itself-and 
thus, there is no essence that could ever be brought to light other than through an 
engagement with Da-sein's existence as occurrence. 
Heidegger goes on in the Basic Problems to explain that the reduction is not the 
entirety of the project of phenomenology-in fact, it is only one portion ofwhat he lays out 
as the tri-partite structure; the other two being phenomenological construction and 
destruction. Heidegger characterizes construction as free projection into being itself. For 
him this is the positive moment that follows out of the negative moment of the reduction. 
Given the process of reductions which must take place to find an object as it shows itself 
14 I thus agree with Alejandro Vallega's reading of Being and Time-and Heidegger's work in general-insofar as 
Vallega sees Heidegger's thought as fundamentally exilic, i.e. in exile. The accord with my above exploration is 
to say that Dasein as a being is fundamentally in exile, that is a being that experiences itself as fundamentally 
without origin. For Vallega exilic thought "indicates a thought that cannot return to unchanging origins or 
principles in order to find its sense of being" (Vallega, 2003: 7). 
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above and beyond the horizonal frame out ofwhich it shines, phenomenology is 
simultaneously the activity of undercutting and re-establishing the identity of an object. We 
realize that though we may reflectively be able to take an object out of its context and 
thereby posit some kind of reductive relationship which supercedes the givenness of the 
empirical object, this is not an encounter with the actual self showing of the thing, but rather 
with the activity of taking something as Vorhanden, or present-at-hand. To do so drags us 
away from the thing as such, and into a reflective remove from the self-presentation of an 
object. For Heidegger, the wayan object is given is fundamentally in its reference to the 
totality to which it belongs, and it is primarily in this referential totality that we first 
encounter and understand objects. This relationship to things becomes more and more 
primordial the more we engage objects in their Handlichkeit-their handiness (Heidegger, 
1996: 93). But this increased level of primordiality could only be used to describe an 
engagement with beings that investigated this referential totality in terms of the way in which 
being presences as the Sinn of that totality. John Sallis explains, "the sight which is operative 
in one's dealings with the ready-to-hand is a sight by which is held in view a referential 
totality correlative to projective understanding; it is a sight which to that extent is grounded 
in understanding and correspondingly is remote from immediate intuition" (Sallis, 1995: 80). 
Given that Heidegger was to explore phenomenological construction in part three of Basic 
Problems-which was never presented-this seems to me to encapsulate what he has in mind 
with the sense of construction as free projection laid out earlier in the text. Construction as 
free projection is the movement towards the handiness of things in their referential 
totality-insofar as this projection has taken upon itself the project of understanding the 
ontological structure of those beings which were initially encountered as ontically given, or 
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understand "pre-ontologically", prior to the movement of reduction. The act of 
construction thus places the being back into its referential totality but with a new richer 
sense of its being after the removal of it in reduction. 
Heidegger characterizes the third aspect of the tri-partite structure of 
phenomenology-destruction-as "a critical deconstruction [AbbauJ that overcomes 
concepts that are necessarily used at first, and the source from which these concepts are 
acquired. Ontology can first be certain of the phenomenological genuineness of its concepts 
through destruction [DestrnktionJ" (GA24, 31). This destruction will allow us to investigate 
the ways in which our world as referential totality is given to us-and what the categories we 
inherit may conceal whilst they reveal. This is what Schiirmann has in mind when he speaks 
of a phenomenology of being's presencing-how do the referential totalities that we return 
to in an ontological manner during the course of construction tell us about how being 
presences in a particular epochal domain? And here we can begin to see the need for this 
engagement with history. Steven Galt Crowell explains: "in a historico-hermeneutic move 
that has little parallel in the more positivistic phenomenology of Husserl, the 
phenomenological method of Being and Time requires reflection on the history of 
philosophy... to deconstruct categories that, in the present, conspire to veil the phenomena 
to which an inquiry into the meaning of being must attend" (Crowell, 2001: 208).15 Though 
at present, I am not interested in a thorough investigation of the way in which Heidegger 
attends to the history of ontology in either Being and Time or in Basic Problems, the manner in 
15 For example, in the Logical Investigations Husserl writes, "No truth is a fact, i.e., something determined as to 
time. A truth can indeed have as its meaning that something is, that a state exists, that a change is going on etc. 
The truth itself is, however, raised above time: i.e. it makes no sense to attribute temporal being to it, nor to 
say that it arises or perishes (Husserl, 1970: 109-110). For Husserl the meaning of the utterance of a truth, in 
the Logical Investigations, may change depending on its context, but the truth as such abides across all temporal 
determinations. I think Heidegger will refuse to grant such a distinction. 
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which he attends to the question seems less important to my point than does the fact that he 
attends at all. Heidegger's focus upon the history of ontology-later die Geschichte des Sryns, 
the history of beyng-demonstrates his move away from any sense of the essential 
constitution of things, and a move towards-as he says in Basic Problems-the manner in 
which being discloses itselfvia the occurrence of beings, which is always going to be 
historical, just as it always going to occur in a world, i.e., a referential totality. The 
historically situated character of any and all objects thus only further serves to problematize 
the possibility of thinking that the activity of reduction could somehow or other bring us to 
an experience of the essence of some object-as that meaning and essence of that object is 
only in a referential totality which itself is only to be found in history. The most important 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that the meaning or sense of any particular entity is just 
as determined by its spatial ecstasy-in the form of its placement in referential totality-and 
by its temporal ecstasy, i.e. its place in history, as is the being of Da-sein. 
To quickly recapitulate these three movements of phenomenology: First, reduction 
moves from the ontical givenness of an object and encounters it in its being. Second, 
construction returns this object once "ontologized" back into the referential totality out of 
which it has been abstracted, and without which it is meaningless. But now, this totality is 
encountered ontologically, so that what is at stake in viewing it as such is the manner in 
which this totality shows the phenomenologist the presencing of being. Yet this presencing 
occurs historically-accordingly we must begin the destructive investigation of the history of 
philosophy in order to encounter the manner in which this presencing has changed and 
transformed throughout history. In doing so we discover that manifestation is founded 
upon nothing, i.e. being is nothing but presencing, and as Schiirmann explains, 
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"manifestation founds nothing. It is therefore gained at the cost of deconstructing historical 
presence or 'being manifest'. From the situated entities, to their site, then to the 
situating-the emerging into the open, presencing-the transcendental retogradation [of 
hermeneutic phenomenology] is deconstructive essentially" (Schiirmann, 1992: 20). This tri­
partite structure will repeat itself again and again in Heidegger, even once the language of 
phenomenology has disappeared. 
Section IV
 
Moving to the Middle Voice
 
Following Schiirmann, the irony is thus that phenomenology demonstrates that 
nothing is given to us in immediate, isolated intuition-and accordingly and bracketing 
which tries to get us there does not attend to the self-showing of an object. Rather, as Sallis 
explains, a thing shows itself in a manner that demonstrates its lack of "persistent self­
sameness, as enduring presence to intuition, as the permanent possibility of presenting itself 
intuitively throughout all structural variations" (Sallis) 1995: 81). Why? Because, the manner 
in which a thing is shown to us in its givenness is always already determined by the way in 
which it inheres in a world, in a referential totality. Accordingly, the identity of a given entity 
is not permanent; it does inhere in any essence that we could come into contact with via 
eidetic sciences. Thus the thing of the "to the things themselves!" of phenomenology is 
always still a question-a question which Heidegger returns to engage explicitly in The End if 
Philosop!?J and the Task ifThinking-and only insofar as the move is made in which 
phenomenology recognizes this fact about the conditions of the self-showing of 
things-that not just subjects, but also things are always ecstatic and determined 
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accordingly-can phenomenology continue. In fact, I would argue that it is only here that 
phenomenology can truly begin.16 
Thus for Heidegger the phenomenological character of thinking occurs insofar as we 
understand that thinking fundamentally takes place in the moment wherein Da-sein lets itself 
be claimed by the way in which a thing and its whole accompanying referential totality show 
themselves to us. This claim of being is the Anspruch, the address; it is not found or sought 
out by an active, isolated, self-possessed subject. One must be receptive to the address 
insofar as one is going to be able to bring it to word. Accordingly, the most important facet 
of what is at stake for thinking is that it lets itse(fbe addressed-and here we can see and hear 
the resonance of Heidegger's determination of the temporal ecstasy of the present as 
Begegnenslassens von, that is, letting oneself be met by that which shows itself. Things must 
show themselves to us so that we can begin to engage them at all. Thinking, in this sense, is 
always a response to that which is given to us to think. Thinking is not a moment of action 
conceived of as a making. I do not create my own thoughts, nor do I create the matter (die 
Sache) that is at stake for me in my thoughts. This is the weight of the quote from Nietzsche 
with which I began this section. It is the prejudice of the philosopher to think that we are 
somehow or other responsible for the generation of our thoughts, when it is in fact clear, 
from a phenomenological perspective, that prior to the coherency of the cogito, we find 
ourselves thinking-unaware from where this thinking came. The matter which is given to 
us to think seems to necessarily precede our thinking of it. The problem with maintaining 
16 John Sallis says that it is only through such a reconfiguration of identity that "it become[s] possible to 
reconstitute phenomenology at the edge of metaphysics." (Sallis, 1995: 82) While I am not one to bicker, I 
would want to say-as ought to be clear by now-that I believe that it is only here that phenomenology can be 
constituted at all. This is not a moment of reconstitution but initiation. A phenomenology which is to be true 
to the self-showing of things must always attend to the ecstatic character of all things-only here are things 
actually showing themselves. 
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the term phenomenology, however, is that it is often connected with the continuation of the 
project of transcendental philosophy which attempts to attribute all acts of consciousness to 
an intending subject-even if this is subject is a vague and elusive variant of Kant's 
transcendental unity of apperception. What I have argued is that phenomenology which 
remains true to its ethos will not attempt to posit something which falls back into the 
prejudice that Nietzsche diagnosed. Rather, phenomenology ought to acknowledge the lack 
of mastery and the postfacto character of all ownership with regards to our thoughts. 
All of this, however, is not to say that thinking, for Heidegger, is passive, or that true 
phenomenology does not have a subject which undertakes it. Rather, I must comport 
myself in such a way, in a sense in the middle voice, which is neither passive nor active, to let 
myself be claimed. I must let things show themselves, this is the true task of the 
phenomenologist. In a sense, the passive stance and the active stance are both subject to the 
same concerns. The active stance can delimit the self-showing of objects before it ever takes 
place-which does nothing to negate the fact that my thinking is fundamentally a response, 
but can make it such that I am in no way receptive to the ways in which things show 
themselves and insist that they conform to a certain set of norms and standards that are 
given to me as the appropriate way of engaging the world around me. This is the concern 
with regards to representational thinking, for example. I can take the world as object, over 
and against myself as subject, but this is to conceal the basic mode of disclosure of being. 
Engaging the world passively seems to suffer from the same concern, as it is likely 
that I will unintentionally enact the same concealing as that which is generated by a purely 
active engagement, insofar as the 'I' never merely find myself in a world without being given 
a basic mode of interpreting beings handed over to me by that world. Hence, in our 
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contemporary world which is dominated by calculative thinking, I will inevitably take the 
world as already chopped up and delimited without intending to do so-stepping out 
beyond this is the hard part. The middle voice is a strenuous position to adopt, as it is an 
attempt to grasp the ways in which things show themselves outside of the historical 
frameworks which all epochs impose upon them-in fact Schurmann wants to argue that 
this may not just be strenuous, but may be one of the fundamentally reasons why he and 
others encounter human life as a fundamentally tragic phenomena. To not yet close the 
question, the middle voice is, in a sense, the most active and strenuous of all relations one 
can adopt towards beings, as it requires that one attempt to break outside of the frameworks 
which are given to us by the world which we inhabit in order to let beings be. Thus they will 
assert themselves in a manner that is appropriate to them and not to our specific framework, 
which in the modern world happens to be conceptual. The task of thinking is to engage the 
way in which interpretations of beings take place from out of epochal-linguistic 
determinations which are incapable of questioning their own constitution. The task of 
thinking as this letting beings be is to ask about the very constitution, the grounding of these 
delimitations, so as to attempt to bring us to the brink of their own unquestioned moments 
of delimitation to begin the process of thinking beyond them. This is precisely what this 
middle voice moment, this active receptivity, attempts to do outside of the bounds of the 
active and the passive. 
The phenomenological character of thinking is thus the active receptivity of thinking 
to what is given to it to be thought. Thinking is letting what is given to be thought show 
itself is manner which is appropriate to it-a manner which presumably cannot be 
sufficiently elucidated or encapsulated by anyone worldview or delimited manner of 
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grasping beings. Ifwe are to engage the world from within any particular given framework, 
unquestioningly so, we end up receiving things in a way that is already determined for us. 
Our domain of objects is already delimited before we even begin investigating. Such a 
thinking must attempt to bring us to the limits of these delimiting moments of any specific 
domain of inquiry, to encounter how being presences (Anwesen) in any particular present 
(Gegenwart). In the language of Being and Time, it makes us think about why we apprehend 
beings in the manner which we do, insofar as we do this apprehending theoretically. 
Assuming that this clarifies what exactly is at stake, at the most basic level, for a thinking to 
be phenomenological, let us recap why such a thinking requires and yields the type of ecstasy 
which we have been thematizing for the last two chapters. 
The necessity to understand a phenomenological engagement with the world as 
fundamentally ecstatic is already implicit in an interpretation of Da-sein as fundamentally In­
der-Welt-Sein, being-in-the-world. As has been said, Da-sein occurs as the making room for 
others, but its occurrence is possible only insofar as it is constituted by that which it makes 
room for. We have a relationship of reciprocal constitution. The activity of the 
phenomenologist can only truly commence once she or he is willing to get beyond her or his 
own sense of mastery and her or his belief that thinking is the Grundsetzung of the world. We 
do no lie as the subiectum of the world for Heidegger, nor are we fundamentally apart from it. 
We can thus begin to see why even our thinking as phenomenological is what it is only 
because we are ecstatic, because we always already have and are amidst (bez) a world, our 
relationship to which constitutes the very character of Da-sein's ek-sistence. Andrew Mitchell 
writes, "To step over something... there must be room for movement, an openness that in 
some sense precedes the overstepping and makes it possible. Precisely this open expanse 
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remains unthought within representational thinking" (Mitchell, 2002: 325). Is this openness 
which precedes and grants the possibility of our ecstatic movement our world? This may 
seem to be the case, insofar as our having a world, as our belonging to the world seems to 
condition the fact that we are given anything to think at all. Nevertheless it is not clear that 
the openness which Mitchell is pointing to here can be exhausted by talking about our 
Lebenswelt-lifeworld-as our horizon of knowing and it certainly cannot be thought in 
terms of geometric space. Taking this openness into which we stand as Da-sein-or the 
space which we are as the t/here of being, i.e. Da-sein-as geometric would be to think of 
this space in terms of the pure and ideal presence constitutive of a metaphysical 
understanding of space. Rather Heidegger wants to push this question deeper, to what in 
The Prolegomena ofthe History ofthe Concept ofTime, he calls "a more originary spatiality" (GA20, 
56). This more originary sense of spatiality is described by Vallega as "dasein's spatiality or 
the spatiality of the appearing of events of being" (Vallega, 2003: 67). What is the spatial 
character ofDa-sein's Da, and how does it relate to any particular interpretation of space, 
such as that of geometric space? This is what we must begin to investigate-however we 
will not do so direcdy, rather we will do so through an interrogation of Heidegger's sense of 
thinking. 
Given the potential variability of the identity of any thing which can be taken upon 
phenomenologically, we may want to start asking about the way in which various referential 
totalities are determined. Ifwe do not give our world the meaning that it has, if we do not 
structure our world into this referential totality, is there an agent of this activity? From 
whence does this structuring come and to where does it go insofar as we note that things can 
have variable meanings or senses, even in their handiness? If phenomenology encounters 
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things in their variable identity in relationship to a particular determination of that totality, 
what does this tell us about being as such? Phenomenology does not stop here, settled and 
satisfied with an awareness of the handiness of things in a particular arrangement. Rather, 
what I will begin to investigate is how phenomenological activity is in and of itself a process 
of freeing, insofar as it undercuts the apparent solidity and selfsameness of any identity. In 
this process, phenomenology itself becomes an experience of freedom, in the form of the 
exposure of the absolute contingency of any given determination of a referential totality of 
beings, and this happens through an encounter with that sense of the Da which points to a 
space beyond and excessive to spatiality. I want to argue that this space speaks in the es of 
the ever problematic es gibt Sein, i.e., there is/it gives being. 
If these beings could be arranged otherwise, and thus the Sin1}--thought in the 
words multiplicity as meaning, sense, and direction--of our world could be entirely different, 
how does this impact the way in which our world unfolds for us? Does this bring us to a 
new kind of lightness? Or does this bring us to a new kind of gravity? Given Heidegger's 
analysis of the first and the other beginning in the Beitrlige and other texts from the late 
1930s, I would like to claim that this experience of the contingency of things brings us to 
both an experience of openness and possibility in the form of the thaumazein, wonder, and 
simultaneously an experience of Erschrecken, terror. This experience of freedom will always 
have a pharmacological character-as contingency will always produce both possibility and 
uncertainty, even horror. Yet for now let us be satisfied with these early gestures, as in the 
next chapter we will explore these consequences more fully in relationship to Heidegger's 
later works, and the encounter with another moment of levity-die Lichtung, or the clearing, 
.._._------------­
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and its relationship to the giving of being. Only from there we will be able to explore more 
fully the sense of freedom at play in Heidegger's corpus. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE FREEDOM OF THE CLEARING: THINKING IN THE BEGINNING(S) 
The previous chapter attempted to lay the groundwork for a rigorous thinking of 
freedom in Heidegger through a confrontation with the reconfiguration of phenomenology 
that takes place in light of Heidegger's thinking ofDasein's temporal and spatial ecstasies. In 
this chapter I will follow out the consequences of Chapter I in three sections. Section one 
will explore the way ecstatic thinking asserts itself in Heidegger's later writings, especially in 
The End rifPhilosopfD! and the Task rifThinking, wherein the latter term is most explicitly 
determined in his critiques of his earlier phenomenological works. I will focus and continue 
to discuss the function the esgibt plays as a provocation for thought-particularly in light of 
the discussion of a more originary spatiality in the previous chapter, and Heidegger' claim 
about the unthought element of the call "to the things themselves!" My claim is that all 
thinking, insofar as it enacts the tripartite structure of phenomenology, is essentially the 
thinking of the clearing, das Denken der Lichtun~a genitive which must be encountered as 
double; thus a genitive which problematizes the agent and object for thought. 
We will thus grapple both directly and indirectly with Heidegger's claim from the 
beginning of the Beitrcige that, "because of that which philosophy takes as what is to be 
known at all times in simultaneity-being-human in its standing in the truth, truth itself and 
thus the relation to beyng-displacement comes and no representation of something present 
is possible, the thinking of philosophy remains foreign" (GA65, 14). What is thinking if is 
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not thinking of something present, an existent? From here we will move into the second 
section of this chapter where we will discuss how such thinking is a freeing; or, to say it 
otherwise, an experience of freedom. I will elucidate and defend that freedom as the 
realization of the lack of necessity of any particular epochal determination of being, as the 
experience of possibility through contiJ?gency, is what emerges for us in the experience of 
thinking the clearing. To get at this point with sufficient poignancy it will be necessary to 
think through quite carefully the role that history plays for Heidegger in relationship to what 
he calls words for being and the first beginning of philosophy as metaphysics. Then, in 
section three, we will explore the relationship between the lack of a word for being and the 
thinkability of the clearing in some detail in order to ask whether or not the clearing, insofar 
as it is precisely that which escapes and grants the possibility of thinking things which are 
extant, is only thinkable under the name Ereignis-which is not a new name for being-via 
Gelassenheit thought of as a particular kind of comportment, that which is proper to thinking, 
when all our other words break. Here we will encounter intimations of what Heidegger calls 
"the other beginning," the experience that we have in the face of the abyssal character of 
things insofar as we do not attempt to stop-gap this abyss with a new principle or name for 
being, either wonder or terror. 
Finally we will begin to think through the relationship between the first and the other 
beginning in order to further the move towards that other beginning which is only intimated. 
The chapter will close with a litany of questions which will provoke and sustain our move 
into the next chapter wherein we will begin investigating the role ofwhat Schelling calls the 
Unvordenklichkeit des Sryns or the nie atifgehende Rest, in relationship to Ereignis and Lichtung. 
This will hopefully begin to take us through the movement from Erstaunen-or thaumazein, 
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wonder or astonishment-as the Stimmung of the first beginning towards "fright, restraint, 
and reverential awe (Erschrecken) die Verhaltenheit, die Scheu). Together these constitute the 
foreboding (die AhnuniJ, that anticipates being as the event of an agon or apolemos turned 
against itself' (Schiirmann, 2003: 527). This torsion and tension-this turning against-will 
lead us into Chapter III where we will begin to confront Schelling's Ages ojthe World. 
Section I 
Das Denken der Lichtung 
We concluded the last chapter with an investigation of the way in which our being­
in-the-world determines, precedes, and makes possible phenomenological investigation in 
Being and Time. Yet we have not rigorously investigated the ways in which this same sort of 
engagement comes to the fore in Heidegger's turn towards thinking-at least on his own 
terms. In The End ojPhilosop!?J and the Task ojThinking, Heidegger writes, "metaphysical 
thinking, starting from what is present, represents it in its presence and thus exhibits it as 
grounded by its ground" (Heidegger, 1988: 61). Elsewhere, Heidegger refers to this same 
thinking as onto-theology, i.e., the quest undertaken by metaphysics to discover that which 
could be defined as that which "unifies as the ground which brings forth" (Heidegger, 2002: 
121). It should be clear from the previous chapter that I do not think that Heidegger's 
phenomenology necessarily functions as such a move-particularly as the meaning of being 
which was sought in Being and Time is described as temporality, which is not, but rather 
temporalizes or blossoms. We have no ground that has being-which persists-in 
Heidegger's explicitly phenomenological writings, nevertheless he expresses dissatisfaction 
with these undertakings. Why? 
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In the End ojPhilosopry and the Task ojThinking, Heidegger writes that "it is necessary 
to question what remains unthought in the call "to the thing itself'''' (Heidegger, 1988: 71). 
If this is the task of thinking, then we can see why Heidegger may say that Being and Time's 
phenomenological investigation did not go far enough, but this is not to say that 
phenomenology itself must be abandoned-particularly given the restatement of the 
tripartite structure of phenomenology we find in Basic Problems. This is something we have 
already considered thoroughly and will return to again. Let us leave fighting with Heidegger 
about his self-interpretation to the side and follow his thinking in this essay. 
That which remains unthought within the call of 'to the things themselves' is 
precisely that which permits the self-showing of these objects. What else must be there for 
things to appear to us as phainomena? Heidegger notes two things-the light in which shines 
on them and the space into this light can shine. He writes: 
Such appearance [Scheinen] necessarily occurs in some brightness. Only through this 
brightness can what shines show itself, i.e., shine. But brightness in its turn depends 
upon something open, something free, which might illuminate it here and there, now 
and then. Brightness plays in the open and battles there with darkness. (Heidegger, 
1988: 71) 
For something to show itself, to come to presence, it is required that there is an openness 
which "already rules"-the region of openness must always already be in play such that 
things can appear. This openness, this free region, this clearing (die LichtuniJ is not 
something which we can encounter as a phenomena, rather it is what grants us the possibility 
of encountering something as a phenomena at all. For Heidegger, all philosophy insofar as it 
encounters phenomena-and whether it does so phenomenologically or attempts to 
determine things in advance conceptually-relies upon and, in some sense, encounters this 
clearing. "However, philosophy knows nothing of the clearing" (Heidegger, 1988: 73). It 
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takes for granted the groundedness of the beings it encounters and is not puzzled about this 
region which grants us the possibility of encountering beings as phenomena, but which is 
not some existent thing that can be encountered. In fact, attempting to conceive of it as a 
region, or a space, maybe to move to quickly and to be bound too much within the 
traditional metaphysical structures of determination-so long as our understanding of space 
remains governed by a geometric and metaphysical determination. Instead, we may have to 
hear this as the "more primordial form of spatiality" discussed in the previous chapter. 
To justify the previous claim, one need only to look to the very next page of 
Heidegger's essay wherein he offers another term by which we can think the clearing. Thus 
far he has described this space or moment or occurrence which undergirds the 
phenomenality of all phenomena with the terms, das Freie, das Offine, and die Lichtung---which 
we encounter in translation as the free region, the open, and the clearing respectively. 
Heidegger's addition to this list is aletheia--truth as unconcealment. Why does this 
problematize encountering this Sache des Denkens as a region? Because, aletheia, 
unconcealment is not a place, rather it is an occurrence. It cannot be thought geometrically. 
Elsewhere, Heidegger explains, "This unconcealedness comes about in the unconcealment as 
a clearing; but this clearing itself, as occurrence, remains unthought in every respect" (GA12, 
39). How is this an occurrence and not a state of affairs? As a noun derivative of the Greek 
verb aletheuein which could be translated as 'to disclose', we must appreciate the simultaneous 
verbal and substantive character of this word. John Sallis writes, "aletheia would never simply 
be present as such. This is why the opening to it could never be simply a regress to a more 
originary origin but rather one in which the very determination of origin-as ground, i.e. 
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presence, to be itself brought to presence in metaphysics-is eroded, reinscribed as 6runt!' 
(Sallis, 1990: 37). 
In Intimations ifMortaliry, David Farrell Krell explains that Lichtung must be thought 
"as lighting in the sense of clearing, making less heavy or burdensome" (Krell, 1986: 92). We 
find Krell recounting the difficulty of translating Lichtung, he traces the term back to the 
German verb lichten which he explains has two distinct meanings, "two make bright and to 
illuminate" and "make less heavy or to heave up and carry" (Krell, 1986: 82). Given my 
previous quotation, we see the way in which this difficulty was resolved. The lighting up, the 
illuminating first depends upon an occurrence which is the act ifclearing. Prior to this, the 
lighting, in the sense of illuminating, cannot occur. Accordingly, there is no way in which we 
can interpret Lichtung as a region, in fact, Krell recounts a conversation with Heidegger 
wherein he explained that "a number of his translators had been thinking of using the word 
"opening" to render Lichtt-mg, recalling his use of die r!ffene Gegend, das Offine) and Offinheit." 
Heidegger responds, "No, that is incorrect. The point is that openness is the result of 
lighting. Die Lichtung comes first" (Krell, 1986: 92). Here, the list of nouns that Krell offers 
as examples of how English speakers had been thinking Lichtung seems to be shot down 
precisely because they attempt to think Lichtung as a region, ignoring its character as an 
occurrence. Therefore, it does not necessarily seem to be the outcome of this quotation 
from Heidegger that we can no longer think clearing as openness-but we can only engage 
this list of terms as a series of 'synonyms' as Sallis suggests (Sallis, 1995: 120), if we provide a 
caveat, which is that we must attempt to understand all of these nominal moments as 
somehow explicitly verbal in character. Therefore, to return to our discussion of aletheia, 
things become unconcealed, they assert themselves in unconcealedness. This is both a 
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noun-we encounter things as disclosed-and a verb-we encounter things in their 
disclosing. Heidegger writes, "we must think aletheia, unconcealment, as the clearing which 
first grants being and thinking and their presencing to and for each other" (Heidegger, 1988: 
75). Unconcealedness is not a space; ifwe can think it in terms of nouns at all it is a way of 
being. It is that which grants to us the possibility of taking things as phenomena. 
We have now found ourselves explicitly engaging the problem of the openness 
which is traversed in Dasein's ecstasy understood as its character of being-in-the-world that 
closed our previous chapter. To return to Heidegger's assertion from the Prolegomena to the 
History rj'the Concept rj'Time regarding a more originary or primordial spatiality, we can now 
see the consequences of this move in a richer frame. During the conjoined process of 
construction and destruction with regards to a phenomenological engagement with a 
particular entity, we are led to an encounter not only with the manner in which being 
presences, i.e., the manner in which being gives itself over to us, but simultaneously to an 
encounter with the historical contingency of that mode of presencing. For example, the 
encounter with space as fundamentally geometric space in the form of ideal and constant 
presence can be called into question through an engagement of the sense of space that 
presents itself elsewhere in the history of philosophy, i.e., in Plato's Timaeus or Aristotle's 
Pf?ysics. If space presents itself as the ever troubling chora or the comparably mysterious 
topos-both determinations which are incommensurable with a Newtonian conception of 
space-then we encounter the possibility that not only that particular object of inquiry, but 
the entire domain of objects could present themselves in a different manner. This leads us 
to ask questions about the relationship between being and these epochal determinations or 
sendings which we encounter through this investigation into the Lichtung. Is being nothing 
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but how it presences? Is it excessive to these forms? Is this a form/matter distinction? 
With these questions in mind-not all of which will be responded to explicitly-let us 
proceed. 
In an investigation of Heidegger's On the Essence ifTruth, Rodolphe Gasche explores 
this issue of determination/destination (BestimmuniJ, in light of the difficulty Heidegger is 
investigating regarding attunement (StimmuniJ and accordance (UbereinstimmuniJ. Gasche 
writes, "All Stimmen as Ubereinstimmen presupposes Bestimmung by an order, or more generally, 
by the possibility of yielding to order" (Gasche, 1999: 34). Thus anything that we can 
encounter must either already have a place within a world or be encountered as something 
placeable, or as Gasche says planable, destinable. So long as it can be put to work or given a 
place it can be assimilated into our domain of objects. Gasche is here playing with the 
double sense of bestimmte as destined and determined-we can destine things for certain 
ends, which means we can determine them as part of a structure. The claim is thus that we 
can only encounter existent objects-and that includes objects of thought-as within a 
particular structure of presentation; a particular mode of presencing. Is there anything 
excessive to these multitudinous modalities of presencing? Yes, but it is not another entity 
amidst entities-rather it is precisely the field of openness which Mitchell reminded us of at 
the end of the previous chapter. But did we not just encounter Krell quoting Heidegger that 
die Lchtung is prior to this open region? What sense of priority are we speaking of here? Is 
being just unformed matter waiting for its epochal Bestimmung? If so, would this not bring us 
back to a quest for an origin-and not just any origin but that which is excessive to thought? 
Given John Sallis' interpretation of aietheia, the response would seem to be no. But why? 
We have two problems; the exploration of which may help us to clarifY our interpretation: 
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first, the understanding of priority. And second, the status of being in relationship to its 
various Bestimmungen. 
To hear afetheia, das Offine, die Lichtung, or das Freie, this region, as an enactment or an 
occurrence, means to hear it as the sending which gives what there is to think. This must 
stand opposed to an understanding of these terms which would take them to be a site, such 
as the locale at which being as unformed matter, i.e. as Bestand, could be found waiting to be 
determined and hence to become thinkable. Such thinking is not nearly active enough for 
Heidegger-that is, it lacks the movement which thinking must engage in insofar as it is to 
understood all of these various terms in their verbal character. Heidegger writes, "only so 
long as the clearing of being comes to pass [ere{gne~ does being pass itself on to man. But 
that the Da, the clearing as the truth of being itself, comes to pass [ere{gne~ is the sending of 
being itself. This is the destiny of the clearing" (GA9, 224). What we have to begin to 
reckon with is the way in which the Da, the 'ek' of Da-sein's ek-sistence is both dependent 
upon the clearing, and this clearing is itself emergent-only occurs-insofar as humans enter 
into Da-sein, i.e, insofar as they are ecstatic. Here there can no longer be a transcendental 
condition of the possibility, we are left with reciprocity-the question of priority thus 
becomes more difficult, but also breaks us out of a quest for origins. This reciprocal 
determination of clearing and thinking is what we must begin to think through more 
carefully to think through the question of priority and of being in-and-out-of determinations. 
The remainder of this section of this chapter will attempt to deal with the question of 
priority, the question of being and its Bestimmungen will be dealt with in the next two sections 
of this chapter at length. 
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Jean-Luc Nancy's Experience ofFreedom may be helpful while we attempt to think 
through this sense of reciprocity and the problem of priority. Taking up the task that I put 
forth for myself, attempting to find where freedom is at play in Heidegger's later work, 
Nancy writes, "it is no longer a question here offreedom as a property or as a power in 
whatever sense, but of a specific element, 'the free,' which appears as a quality attributed to a 
substratum, 'the dimension,' only through the banal constraint of language, but which in 
reality is indistinguishable from this 'dimension'" (Nancy, 1993: 43). This "banal constraint 
of language," which Nancy points to is precisely what makes thinking the non-regional or 
non-spatial character of the clearing/free/open/aletheia so difficult. We must consider what 
it would mean to understand the clearing as that which grants us die Sache for thought, given 
the reciprocal relationship between the Da of Da-sein and the clearing. To translate es gibt 
Denken, we must be aware of the peculiarity of the status of the way in which German says 
"There is", to which I have already alluded. There is thinking, also means, quite literally, it 
gives thinking. Following upon Heidegger's late seminar Time and Being, the answer to the 
question, "what is the it that does the giving?," is the giving itself. In that seminar he writes, 
"We now cease the attempt, to univocally determine the "It" for itself. But this we must 
keep in view: The It names, at least in nearest available interpretation, a presence of an 
absence" (Heidegger, 1988: 18). He explains that because of the linguistic constraints 
handed over to us by sentence structures that function via subject-predicate relationships we 
are stuck speaking of the It as if it were a thing. Instead of substantiating this It into an 
entity which is engaging in an act of giving, we can avoid the trappings of the subject­
predicate relation, "Simply by thinking the "It" from out of the kind of giving that belongs 
to it: giving as destiny [Geschick], giving as a reaching that clears [lichtendes Reichen]" 
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(Heidegger, 1988: 19). Hence, if the It and the giving are simultaneous we must come to 
think das Freie as the "region" from which the giving takes place-or which does the 
giving-as the giving itself, which in some sense is enacted, or at the very least held open, by 
our status as Da-sein. 
How can one undertake a phenomenological engagement with things ifwhat we are 
attempting to think is no longer an entity, but rather an occurrence-no longer a noun, but a 
verb? What happens when we take seriously that, "what Heidegger cannot abide is the 
determination of this open taking its start in things. The representational tradition 
objectifies the open by thinking of it from the overstepping of things" (Mitchell, 2002: 325)? 
What we have to begin thinking is how dramatic this move away from representational 
thinking really is. As Mitchell explains, ifwe do not make this move away from 
representational thinking, this opening into which we must step insofar as we are ecstatic 
cannot be encountered at all. And this is where the true difficulty emerges-and where the 
importance of ecstatic thinking asserts itself. We have to think outside of ourselves in 
multiple senses. Not only do we have to think ecstatical1y into our world to which we 
belong and which we are amidst, but we also have to begin thinking in a manner which is 
ecstatic to the dominant modes of receiving and interpreting phenomena. In fact, we have 
to think beyond any given phenomenon, and towards the giving of that phenomena itself. 
Our thinking can thus no longer be conceptual, as we cannot grasp (greifen) movement, 
occurrence, or enactment as a concept (Begrijjj. Such thinking would be to isolate movement 
and insist that it speaks to us from one moment within its movement, which is thus to annul 
motion or occurrence itself. Thus thinking an occurrence has to be as mobile as the 
occurrence which is to be thought. Here the sense of phenomenology has to be 
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reconsidered-it is no longer letting the phenomena show itself in a manner that is 
appropriate to its self-showing, (i.e., we cannot rest on our laurels with regards to the 
ungedachte of the call "to the things themselves", and proceed without questioning) but rather 
a demand that we think occurrence as occurrence, as a phenomena which cannot be reduced 
to any given existent entiry. 
What happens to the ontic-ontological distinction at this point in time? What 
remains ifwe are no longer attempting to ask the question of the meaning of being over and 
against beings, but rather attempting to think the question of being, insofar as it is an 
occurrence which takes place as the occurrence of beings? Heidegger names this occurrence 
Sryn, reintroducing an archaic spelling (which we will translate as beyng) which "serves not 
only to distinguish it from Sein als Seiendheit (being as beingness) but also to suggest a certain 
anteriority with respect to the metaphysical concept of being. As the condition of 
possibility, as that by which the very space of circulation between beings and beingness is 
first opened up, beyng can itself be identified neither as a being nor as the beingness 
(whatness, idea) of beings" (Sallis, 2004: 86). In relationship to the Beitrcige and the demand 
for beyng-historical thinking, Alejandro Vallega writes, "[In Being and Time Heidegger] speaks 
of an ontological difference between entities at hand and being. Indeed, the very term 
srynsgeschichtlich indicates a single motion of thought, a single matter to be thought in this 
motion, a single temporal occurrence beyond this ontological dualism" (Vallega, 2001: 52). 
"Metaphysics thinks the different-Being and beings-but not the dif-ference as 
such," argues Caputo. Citing as examples of what he has in mind, he writes, "Plato thinks 
the difference between eidos and individual; Aristotle, between first and second ousia; 
Thomas, between esse subsistens and enspariticipatum." But as Caputo notes, this is not what 
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constitutes a thinking of being, at least not for the later Heidegger-and I would argue, at 
least in a certain sense, the early Heidegger as well. Caputo continues, "none of these 
thinkers who stand in the light within which metaphysics occurs thinks the granting of that 
light, thinks the clearing, the very light process by means of which the ontological difference 
between Being and beings is illuminated" (Caputo, 1982: 4). But this of course, is not the 
only thing to be thought in the move beyond onto-theology for Heidegger. 
To see this readjustment of the relationship between being and beings as a collapsing 
of the distinction runs the risk of sounding like a move away from the question of being 
which Heidegger repeatedly says is always his guiding question. So how are we to think 
about this collapse? Is it a collapse at all? In The Onto-Theo-Logica! Constitution 0/Metap&Jsics, 
Heidegger presents the ontological difference in the following way: "not only does being 
ground beings as their ground, but beings in their turn ground, cause [vernrsach~ being in 
their way. Beings can do this only insofar as the fullness of being "is" as beings"(Heidegger, 
2002: 137). That is to say that being essentially occurs as beings-no beings without their 
being, but in turn, being only "is" because there are beings which are. There is no univocal 
grounding relationship between these two moments, rather we can only speak of them as 
differentiated insofar as they entail (vernrsachen) one another. Thus, if we want to think being 
outside of metaphysics, and beyond aprioricity, we must think the way in which beings 
west-as being-in-itself is nothing at all. And this is to think Sryn-beyng. 
While proceeding cautiously, let us look more closely at how the intertwining of 
being and beings, i.e., their reciprocal entailment, requires us to proceed (and eventually 
proceed beyond this opposition), particularly as, if one is taking careful note, they will 
identify that we have returned to the tripartite structure of phenomenology at this point: an 
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engagement with being must take place with regards to an entity, then we move to the 
site-which in this case is the particular epochal determination of being in question, and 
finally we look to the act of situating-from whence is this Bestimmung des Seins given, if it is 
appropriate to say gibt es (Schurmann, 1992: 20)? This tripartite structure looks as follows: 
we think beyond the initial moment of phenomenological engagement as it takes place in 
relationship to a being in a given domain of human experience-we also have to attempt to 
think beyond the bounds of comprehensibility, beyond the bounds of any given delimited 
domain, back to the ground of that domain, that which makes any such delimitation possible 
in the first place. This is precisely what Heidegger is attempting to point towards with this 
language of clearing. This is precisely what Nancy has in mind when he writes the following 
extraordinarily difficult and revealing passage: 
Every thinking is therefore a thinking about freedom at the same time that it thinks 
f:y freedom and thinks in freedom. It is no longer exactly a question here of the limit 
between the comprehensible and the incomprehensible. Or rather, what happens 
here, in the free arising of thought, happens precisely on this limit, as the play or 
very operation of this limit. Thinking is always thinking on the limit. The limit of 
comprehending defines thinking. Thus thinking is always a thinking about the 
incomprehensible-about this incomprehensible that "belongs" to every 
comprehending, as its own limit....there is no thought unless it is carried to the limit 
of thought. (Nancy, 1993: 54) 
Not only is Nancy demanding that thinking take place on the limits ofwhat is 
comprehensible conceptually speaking, but rather, we have to question the very way in 
which we understand what it means to think-particularly if, as Nancy will say and I will 
argue, thinking is the experience rffreedom. Here the demand for an ecstatic thinking which 
breaks through the bounds of a philosophy which is one of purely immanent exegesis is 
what it constitutes to think at all. Thinking is critical and the enactment of critique is itself 
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the experience of freedom. Let us hold this aside for the next section of this chapter-it will 
reassert itself more fully there. 
John Sallis articulates this impossibility, this thinking at the limit, from within 
philosophy as metaphysics-and potentially as a kind of phenomenology-in the following 
way: 
... as a turning to Being as presence, the thinking of philosophy is incapable ofwhat 
one might call-leaving open still even its very possibility-thinking the clearing. 
The clearing is the unthought site of the thinking of philosophy, a site even 
unthinkable for the thinking of philosophy, for that turning whose very condition is 
that the site be concealed as such, and along with it, the belongingness of thinking to 
that site. (Sallis, 1990: 32) 
In a potentially identical manner to the way in which any regional ontology is incapable of 
questioning its own foundations without halting its possibility of doing what it does, e.g. if 
applied biologists begin to question what exactly constitutes life and why we delimit the field 
of biology the way that we do, the act of 'doing' biology will be called into question, 
metaphysical thinking, insofar as it is a representational, conceptual thinking which 
necessarily grasps (greiff) and halts the objects of thought cannot ever begin to think its own 
origins in (the) clearing. Why is this? It is because, as we just said, clearing is not an object 
to be grasped, beyng cannot be reduced to beings or being. We cannot configure it as such 
while at the same time grasping what is at stake in it. Sallis continues, "If clearing first grants 
thinking, then thinking cannot be a representational activity of a subject that would take the 
clearing as the object of thinking. Thinking is not the subject of, but rather is subject to, the 
clearing-even in the case of a thinking that mimetically opens the clearing" (Sallis, 1990: 
35). Thinking is subject to the clearing, yet reciprocity alters this distinction such that we can 
no longer understand clearing as the ground of our thinking, as the transcendental condition 
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of possibility of our thinking. Sallis argues that thinking as 'nonphilosophy' takes place as a 
mimesis of the movements of transcendental philosophy, and is thus still within the domain 
of philosophy-insofar as it is defined via negativa (Sallis, 1990: 33). The question is, 
whether or not in this repetition of digging and tunneling under the edifice that is the 
metaphysical structure as such, the very notion of grounds is not transformed in such a way 
as to push us beyond the logic of the supplement that Sallis is putting to work at this point in 
time.17 Can a mimesis of philosophy as transcendental take us beyond the bounds of what 
are available to philosophy as such? What do we encounter, what do we think in a thinking 
of the clearing? 
Insofar as one inquires into this ground of our thinking, insofar as it is a ground only 
insofar as it is an occurrence, and accordingly not a solid basis, a consistent foundation, it is 
important that we realize that this Grund is itself an Abgrund, a perpetually receding 
ground-an abyss. Let us turn to a provocative quote from Heidegger's Principle ojRtason 
lectures. In closing this lecture course, Heidegger writes, "Being, as what grounds, has no 
ground; as the abyss it plays the play that, as Geschick, passes being and Grund to us. The 
question remains whether and how we, hearing the movements of this play, play along and 
accommodate ourselves to the play" (GA10, 169). If thinking is what brings us towards this 
Abgrund, this abyss, this perpetually receding ground, what exactly are we left with other than 
Erschrecken, paralyzing terror? Susan Schoenbohm explains that insofar as is this is one of 
17 I mention this language of digging and tunneling in reference to another work ofJohn Sallis', as it seems that 
he may feel he is enacting the same deconstructive maneuver in Echoes in relationship to Heidegger that he does 
with Kant in his Spacings. There, in relationship to the critical project, Sallis writes, "The fissure of critical 
reason is now unmistakable: in its opening move toward restoring the ground it cannot but plant itself upon 
that very ground-that is, the bedrock to which it would tunnel down is identical with the ground that that 
bedrock would support and make firm, the ground tunneled out by the history ofmetaphysics" (Sallis, 1987: 
16). This is an astonishingly powerful insight in relationship to the Kantian project-however, insofar as 
Heidegger rethinks Grund, and does so in a knowing relationship to the history from which he emerges, I am 
unsure if this same deconstructive move holds. 
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the fundamental attunements of the 'other beginning' that is at stake in the Beitrage, "thinking 
is attuned more to the withdrawal of being than to their wondrous arising" (Schoenbohm, 
2001: 22). What would it mean to be attuned to this perpetual withdrawal, this absolute lack 
of ground and foundation? How might one respond? Is it in wonder or terror-are these 
separable from each other? Or is this rather the determination of the moment in which one 
receives, struggles with, and responds to the experience of freedom? It is precisely this 
moment that we must attempt to think through more rigorously in relationship to the 
sense(s) of reciprocity, ecstasy, and thinking that we have been bringing to light thus far. 
Section II
 
The Freedom of the Abgrund
 
A thinking that is of the clearing in the double sense has numerous consequences. 
Not only must we think outside of ourselves in the way in which all phenomenology is 
ecstatic, but we also must think beyond the bounds of pre-determined theoretical 
apparatuses that determine the limits of thinkability for us in any given historical epoch. 
Thinking will thus begin to function as a moment which pushes us beyond or before the 
bounds of our own epoch towards (an enactment of) the clearing. Thinking thus takes place 
in the confrontation with those supreme historical principles which determine the manner in 
which being presences as beings. Thinking encroaches on these principles and asks about 
how and why they reign. Heidegger explains, "There is being only in this or that historical 
impression (PraguniJ: Phusis) Logos) Hen) Idea) Energeia) Substantiality, Objectivity, Subjectivity, 
Will, Will to Power, the Will to Will" (Heidegger, 2002: 134). History occurs insofar as these 
principles give way to one another as the dominant manner of presencing transforms. 
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Robert Bernasconi cautions, as to how we should not mistake what Heidegger is saying with 
regards to these words or names: 
The words for Being are titles for the rule that holds sway in different historical 
epochs. These epochs are not to be understood as historical periods. They must be 
understood in terms of the granting and withholding of Being, the granting of Being 
through the rule of the word that determines how things are and how they are not. 
The words for Being are not just formal titles or descriptions that might be provided 
afterward. They are ... originary. (Bernasconi, 1985: 40) 
These guiding words-these names foriof being-are not intelligible from within the epoch 
itself, they only become thinkable insofar as the reign of that guiding word begins to falter. 
Schiirmann writes, "the reversals of history are what makes it intelligible. The focus that an 
epoch ranks supreme-the code that holds together the activities and the words in which it 
recognizes itself-comes into sight in the crises that are fatal to its rule" (Schiirmann, 1992: 
30). Thinking occurs insofar as it is able to think about the giving which is excessive to the 
givenness of beings under the reign of these various epochal determinations, and this ability 
to think the giving occurs only in light of the fact that Heidegger's philosophical labors take 
place in an epoch where a word for being is lacking. Only in this failure do we have access 
to the history of being as the sequence of epochal determinations-otherwise being in its 
character as bestimmt by a guiding word would overdetermine our engagement with being and 
foreclose on us the possibility of making the move to the third step of the tripartite structure 
of phenomenology. Bernsasconi explains, "Those words of Being were at once a giving and 
withholding of Being, disclosing Being, but not disclosing themselves as doing so" (Bernasconi, 1985: 
43). It is the fact that they do not disclose themselves as doing so which limits and 
overdetermines. Just as Holderlin was able to name the holy-the site from which the god's 
address normally arises (Bernasconi, 1985: 61)-in the god's absence, so the philosopher in 
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turn must "attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods" (GAS, 272).18 The difference 
between the two being that where Holderlin seeks the gods and finds the holy, the 
philosopher seeks a word for being and finds the clearing. 
With this in mind let us hear Reiner Schiirmann again: ""the turning" is the attempt 
at de-centering the network of phenomena by seeking its condition not in ultimate grounds, 
but in the simple event of coming to presence and its historical modalities" (Schiirmann, 
2002: 41). Following Bernasconi's reading, these simple events of coming to presence would 
only able to emerge for us insofar as we live in an epoch which is not ruled by any word of 
being in particular-and this lack of a guiding word would provide us with the possibility of 
thinking the dispensation of being for the first time. But it would also mean that we could 
experience the groundlessness and an-archie character of being for the first time. At present, 
I want to express some hesitance with regards to Bernasconi's interpretation-though I find 
it profound in the proper sense of the word-as, without further clarification with regards to 
the manner in which these words reign and determine what is thinkable, I do not want to 
assert that Holderlin and Heidegger have the market cornered on the experience of the 
fleeing of the gods, or the experience of the Abgrund. Let us continue, and proceed with 
caution. 
As I have asked before, where does these determinations come from? Asking such a 
question, in a certain sense, always returns us to a kind of onto-theology to which Heidegger 
is resistant, and thus the question may strike us as misguided. Yet at this point the question 
is entirely appropriate, as its answer demonstrates how onto-theology, if taken far enough, 
18 We also ought to be thinking of the famous moment from the Postscript to 'What is Metaphysics?)), wherein 
Heidegger writes, "The thinker says being. The poet names the holy" (GA9, 312). Heidegger there explains 
that this saying of the thinker can only occur in a confrontation with the clearing. We will return to this more 
fully in the next chapter 
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becomes self-deconstructing. Through an investigation of the principle of reason-the 
seemingly ultimate principle of onto-theology-with the principle of reason itself as our 
guide the answer appears: they emerge from nowhere. Insofar as we think back through the 
givenness of things, to how they are given, to where they are given from, we are left at the 
clearing, at aletheia which as our entrance into thinking beyng disrupts the categories which 
the principle of reason employs. In The History ifB~ng, Heidegger writes: 
The Essencing (Wesung) ifTruth as the Clearing ifB~ng 
Occurs on this side and constantly outside of the precinct of the truth of beings as 
such as a whole, this may now be interpreted beyond the purview of re-presentation 
(of thinking) or of "bodies" (of thinking as mechanistic calculation). 
Where does truth essentially occur? 
It can first be experienced essentially from out of the other beginning and as the 
other beginning. 
The history ofbeyng [is the] where of the a-byss. (GA69, 160) 
The a-byss-separated here to presumably point out the relationship between Grund and Ab-
grund-takes place in the history of beyng. Specifically, it takes place in a thinking which is 
directed towards this history and attempts to think the history of beyng as it takes 
place-concealed-behind the back of the history of metaphysics. Heidegger goes on to 
explain that beyng-historical thinking, "stands outside all relation to science, art, 
politics"-all ofwhich are domains constituted by beginning of metaphysics. Rather, 
"beyng-historical thinking questions into the decision of the essence of truth as the essence 
of b~ng. This thinking thinks forth in beyng, it is above all determined as the particular 
attuning to beyng" (GA69, 167). This attuning to beyng as the occurrence of truth in history 
is a thinking which thinks that without which we would have no ability to think of sciences, 
art, or politics. But, as we have said, it is no thing. It makes possible epochal 
determinations, but cannot be thought within them. 
98 
This is a preliminary response to the question posed in the first section of the 
chapter about the way in which being relates to its determinations, and it is an answer we 
have been working out for sometime. Yet this response leads us to ask two new questions. 
First, where does this abyss beyond, before, and within the historical determinations of being 
take us? And second, how do we get there? The remainder of this chapter will deal with 
attempting to respond to these two questions. 
First, how do we get to a thinking of the abyss? Let us posit that das Freie is a 
"region" only insofar as it is a "manner of comportment"-a Richtung and a Verhaiten, a 
relation-and it is this comportment which permits, which frees the human to be able to 
think what is given outside of the delimiting violence of conceptually determinative thinking. 
This freeing, this GeiassenheiP, is the condition of thinking. Yet, what of this reciprocity? 
How are we to understand a comportment as fundamentally a kind of relationship 
(Verhaiten)? Nancy writes, "Freedom precedes thinking, because thinking proceeds from 
freedom and because it is freedom that gives thinking" (Nancy, 1993: 51). The difficulty for 
us is take note of the aforementioned reciprocal relationship between this thought of 
freedom and thinking. Insofar as freedom must now become thought of in terms of this 
giving of what there is to be thought, the remnant of freedom is to be found in adverbial 
renderings such as "freely." What is given to thought can be given "freely", but this is 
possible only insofar as one "freely" comports oneself to what is to be given (Nancy, 1993: 
55). Though das Freie, the giving, is the condition of thinking, it is as a condition only 
because of its relationship with the thinking which is to do the receiving. Thus there is an 
19 With the introduction of the sense of Gelassenheit, the reader should recall the sense of Begegnenslassens von that 
deftned the ecstasy of the present in Being and Time. This letting-oneself-be-met-by, ought to be heard as 
somehow reminiscent of the fundamentally middle voice character of all human comportment that Gelassenheit 
describes a particular variety of. 
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equiprimordial reciprocal determination between that which is given to be thought and the 
thinking which receives it, insofar as it receives what is given in a manner which is 
appropriate to its self-showing. This is the problematizing of transcendental philosophy that 
takes place in the Letter on 'Humanism", where, to repeat, Heidegger writes, "only so long as 
the clearing of being comes to pass [ere~ne~ does being pass itself on to man. But that the 
Da, the clearing as the truth of being itself, comes to pass [eretg-ne~ is the sending of being 
itself. This is the destiny of the clearing" (GA9,336). And it is this that prompts Nancy to 
write, "This freedom is not a question or problem for thinking: in thinking, freedom remains 
its own opening" (Nancy, 1993: 56). This reciprocal movement is also, I would claim, what 
prompts Heidegger to begin to refer to Da-sein as the "between" (das Zwischen). In the 
Beitrag-e, Heidegger explains that "this between grounds the beingness of beings in beyng", 
which is to say that only insofar as the between occurs as the "saying of the truth" and the 
"contemplation (BesinnuniJ towards beyng" can we think the simultaneity of beings and 
beyng over and against the difference between beings and being which seems to need to be 
bridged (GA65, 14). Here, there is not priority-only reciprocity. 
Digging deeper into this oldest ground which is no ground at all, Schurmann writes, 
"the metaphor of clearing must thus not be taken to suggest a patch of light...but a 
fulguration; not an open field, but the opening up of a field; not a glade in a forest, but ... 
the very felling of the wood" (Schurmann, 1992: 221). As has been said, the clearing is not a 
site, a locale, but rather must be understood to be as verbal as it is nominative. Also, the 
clearing is not a transcendental condition of the possibility for my thinking-rather thinking 
and the clearing are always interwined, the latter always being moved both away from and 
towards it in thinking, so long as this thinking is a thinking of the limit. Any present 
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determination or delimitation of beings is in a relationship to the clearing, even if it only 
relates to this name of being in forgetting it, which is the usual manner of proceeding-and 
in one sense, the necessary manner. 
All thinking, insofar as we accept the interpretation of it that I have been presenting 
thus far, is a thinking towards this clearing from out of a world in which the originary status 
of clearing is covered over, concealed, and forgotten. To reiterate, this thinking enacts the 
tripartite structure of phenomenology, by moving from the sheer brute fact of the givenness 
of things, and the way in which this givenness always presents itself as already interpreted, 
towards this interpretation, and finally to the site of its emergence. What is important is that 
this originary occurrence that is clearing never manifests itself as such within any particular 
epochal determination, as it is not an existent thing, rather it is always at play and always 
being moved towards and reconfigured by those who undergo thinking as an experience, 
where experience is understood as both "sudden and unique"-i.e, insofar as it is 
understood as disruption (Bernasconi, 1985: 81). 
Let us ask the question again: How does thinking enact (as a response to) the 
clearing? As Heidegger explains immediately after the aforementioned passage from the 
Letter on "Humanism", "this sentence does not say that being is the product of the human 
being" (GA9, 336). So what is the relationship, what is this reciprocity? Heidegger writes, 
"the thrower in this projection [the human being in ecstatic projection] is not the human 
being but being itself, which sends the human being in the ek-sistence of Da-sein that is his 
essence. This destiny [Geschick] comes to pass as the clearing of being-which it is" (GA9, 
337). Here, is it not the case that the arche kineseos of ecstasy is placed exclusively in the 
hands of being? How is this not to make the status ofDa-sein one of exclusive passivity? 
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Where does the previously discussed middle voice assert itself in Heidegger's text? What we 
have to undertake for the remainder of this section is to gain an understanding of how 
"thinking is a deed. But a deed that at the same time surpasses all praxis" (GA9, 361). In 
other words, if we begin to accept that thinking is a way of being (and this may potentially be 
a double genitive), how does this come about, how is it enacted, and what does it do that is 
more praxical than praxis? 
In his Gelassenheit we find Heidegger offering a particularly succinct account of his 
thinking-specifically a potentially simplified account of the distinction between what he 
calls calculative thinking [rechnende Denken] and contemplative meditation [besinnliche 
Nachdenken]20. To state it simply-calculative thinking is the result and potentially extreme 
end of representational thinking as such. It is described here as thinking which 
"calculates"-thinking which "never stops, never approaches contemplation" (Heidegger, 
1959: 15). Calculative thinking, like all regional thinking never asks questions about its 
origins, its own basic constitution-rather it moves ahead without puzzling about them. Yet 
Heidegger is quick to point out, reiterating a claim that I made earlier, that even in this mode 
of thinking, "we always reckon with conditions that are given" (Heidegger, 1959: 14). Even 
this kind of thinking is still always only in response, even if it does not conceive of itself as 
such. All thinking is fundamentally a response to the givenness ofwhatever is thought 
20 I believe that the standard translation of these terms as calculative and meditative thinking does a bit too 
much violence to Heidegger's text. While words that take their root from 'to meditate' are certainly passable 
translations ofwords that are related to besinnen-an important word for both Heidegger and 
Schelling-translating Nachdenken as thinking without any note of the difference between denken and nachdenken 
can mislead the reader into thinking that these two bearings are distinguished only be the adjectives affixed to 
them. A quick glance at the way in which this word is used in German shows that though nachdenken certainly 
has a wide semantic range, most of the possible translations emphasize carefully attending to something. 
Whether the word is used in the sense of 'tiber eine Frage nachdenken'-where in it probably ought to be 
translated as 'to deliberate'-or as 'griindlich tiber etwas nachdenken'-where in it should be read as thinking 
something through at a fundamental level-they all focus on thinlcing something through. 
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provoking. In another text, Was Heisst Denken?, Heidegger writes, "Everything questionable 
and alarming [Bedenkiiche] gives to think. But it gives this gift always and only insofar as the 
questionable is already from itself the to-be-considered" (GAS, 6). In other words, what is at 
issue for us is that we do not decide-as has already been said-what we get to think about. 
Our thinking is fundamentally responsive to the call of what is most thought-provoking, and 
what is most thought-provoking is discerned by the fact that it demands to be thought 
about. Yet what is given to us to be thought about-what addresses us, in itself serves as a 
kind of pointer. It points beyond itself to "what gives us this gift, the gift ofwhat must 
properly be considered, we call most most questionable [Bedenkiichste]" (GAS, 19). What else 
is this but the clearing? But what does all of this have to do with the way in which thinking is 
the experience of freedom? 
What we have to establish, returning to Schurmann's thought that the clearing is as 
much an act as a site, is how exactly the act of clearing can come about via some kind of 
comportment. If humans as Da-sein are fundamentally the Da of being, the site at which it 
takes place-potentially the (enacters and maintainers of the) clearing as such-how does 
this take place? We have already alluded to how it is a response to a call, a response to 
whatever it is that heisst Denken. We have pointed out, if all to briefly, the way in which this 
calling calls us to think about the calling itself-the giving and the es that gibt, which is, of 
course, nothing but the giving. We have also pointed out that this giving is presumably 
synonymous with the clearing-that which stands before any possible configuration of the 
sense of being, yet can never be an object to our thought. Finally we have pointed out that if 
we are to engage this clearing in thought, it must take place through a rigorous reformulation 
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ofwhat exactly is at stake in ecstasy and in phenomenological engagement with what comes 
to pass as such. Yet, again, why is this an experience of freedom? 
Insofar as freedom is understood as the maintenance or creation of possibility, we 
can immediately begin to understand the way in which thinking insofar as it is a movement 
towards the abyssal character of being is the perpetual realization of the way in which things 
presence as underdetermined. Though we may find ourselves in a rigorously determined 
world of delimitation, normalization, and basic modes of interpretation, it is possible by 
thinking radically-thinking into the grounds and foundations of things-to realize the ways 
in which these grounds themselves are fundamentally merely positings. Is it not the case 
that this is one of the many ways in which we could receive the German title of the Principle 
ofReason? Der Satz Vom GruneR The leap from a ground-the positing of a foundation in 
the moment of a burst or a decision. Not the necessity of the foundation-not the necessity 
of thinking the world within its parameters, but rather the absolute contingency and chance 
that is at stake in the fact that this is the way our world has been determined at all! This is 
not to say that I can wake up tomorrow morning and decide to take my world in a different 
manner than via the principle of reason-this is why this point is so tricky. Let us proceed, 
but with greater caution about the relationship between the givenness of beings as the 
presencing of being and humans response to it as Da-sein. 
The world is fundamentally determined by the principle of reason. Heidegger 
explains, "we cannot leap out of the present age that is held in the sway of the fundamental 
principle of rendering sufficient reason" (GAla, 187). Yet, what exactly is the ground of this 
ground? What is the reason for the principle of sufficient reason, what justifies and 
guarantees it? What if the answer is nothing? What if the answer is, as we have already 
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discussed, "Being as what grounds has no grounds" (GAlO, 169)? Onto-theology's pursuit 
of that ultimate moment of the rendering of reasons fundamentally demonstrates the 
irrationality, or at least arationality, of such a moment. If such a site is to exist-if there is to 
be the location which lies at the Grund as the ultimate basis, as the Theos which gathers and 
unifies-it is not something for which an external reason can be rendered and hence we hit 
an impasse. Either we hold fast to the principle of reason, in which case we are led to assert 
that there can be no original ground-for any such positing begs the question of its ground. 
Or we part off from the principle of reason to posit an original moment which serves as the 
ground of reason itselfwhich is arational. Neither of these conclusions are acceptable to 
onto-theology, as either we lose an ultimate ground or the ultimate ground is something 
which breaks down the principle of reason. Thus, in either case, the principle fails to 
provide our Grund and we seem to be left with Abgrund. What do we do with this abyss, 
with this fundamentally an-archie character of being? Heidegger does not tell us what to do 
with it, but he does tell us what it opens up:" ... being, in sending itself, brings about the 
free of the temporal play-space and, in so doing, first liberates humans unto the free of 
whatever fitting essential possibilities they happen to have" (GAlO, 140). Our world is 
always given to us in a specific configuration-and it is possible that this configuration 
always speaks a specific language-but that this does not mean that this is the nature of 
being as such, rather what is opened up through the thinking towards the clearing is freedom 
itself. Later in the same lecture course, Heidegger writes: 
Being is what its original name-logos-says, destinally the same as the ground. 
Insofar as being essentially occurs, it has no ground. However, this is not because it 
grounds itself, but rather because each founding, also and in particular those which 
found themselves, remain discordant to being as ground. Each founding and already 
every appearance of foundability must degrade being to some being. Being as being 
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remains ground-less. Ground remains apart and away from being, namely as its first 
founding ground. Being: the a-byss. (GA 10, 166) 
Insofar as we are able to think beyond grounds-that is, insofar as we are able to think 
outside of onto-theology-we are led to the a-byss. What is this experience? 
To repeat my claim from the beginning of this chapter: freedom as the realization of 
the lack of necessity of any particular epochal determination of being, as the experience of 
possibility through contingency, is what emerges for us in the experience of thinking. Of 
course, this is why it is necessary that thinking be understood only as that which occurs at 
the limits of comprehensibility, as that which is perpetually transgressive, as that which is 
constantly burrowing under foundations-here to repeat Nancy, "in thinking freedom 
remains its own opening" (Nancy, 1993: 56). This manner of thinking freedom as the 
experience of underdetermination is explicitly described by Hans Ruin as, "an attempt to 
confront and speak out from the present historical situation, in order ultimately to transform 
and transcend it" (Ruin, 1998: 84). While I worry about this language of transcendence, 
Ruin's point is clear---Dnly a thinking which attends to the manner in which being presences 
within a specific historical determination and inquires into its necessity can potentially 
undermine the gravity and necessity of that situation. If this was the objective of this 
section, why did I spend all of this time discussing meditative thinking and Was Heisst 
Denken? It is precisely because, for Heidegger, it is through thinking as Gelassenheit, through 
re1easement that such a movement can take place. 
In his MemorialAddress this is configured as a saying yes and no at the same time, but 
potentially more importantly it is configured as a Gelassenheit zu den Dingen-releasement 
toward things. This can be taken in two ways-it can be heard in one sense, and the sense 
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that Heidegger focuses on here, as a simple detachment from those things-here 
technology-and potentially those modes of thinking which dominate us. But it also can be 
heard as a releasement towards the occurrence of things. Thus, the releasement of the 
former kind will make possible a releasement of the latter kind-which seems to me to be 
the basic phenomenological demand of the move from reduction to 
construction/destruction. In the process of translating this section from the Memon'al 
Address, Schurmann writes, "Zu, then does not mean "before, "faced with," "in opposition 
to," but rather the contrary, namely an approach or a destination" (Schiirmann, 1978: 194). 
Accordingly, Schurmann retranslates, "Gelassenheit ZU den Dingen und die OJfenheitfur das 
Geheimnis gehO"ren zusammen" as "Letting ourselves be destined towards things and openness 
for the mystery belong together." 
What is this mystery? In his On the Essence ofTruth, Heidegger describes the mystery, 
Geheimnis, as "Nothing less than the concealing of what is concealed as a whole, of beings as 
such, i.e. the mystery" (GA9, 194). This mystery is what holds sway "throughout the Da­
sein of human beings." What is at stake for Heidegger at this point is at once quite simple 
and quite complex: being is always given to us in a specific configuration, and all such 
configurations, insofar as they are revealing in a certain way, are always at the same time 
concealing in another. That is to say, insofar as any particular epochal determination 
discloses the world to us in one way, it limits the manner in which things can be 
encountered. All revealing is fundamentally and simultaneously concealing. The 
fundamental example in the Heidegger's later work, and potentially in his work as a whole, is 
that of the epoch of technology. Insofar as things are given to us in their calculability and 
Bestand character, certain other ways of engaging beings-certain other possibilities are 
~ ~~-~~ -~-----~~-----~ ~-~._-----------------
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foreclosed, held of out sight, out of our horizon of comprehensibility. He writes, "to reside 
in what is established is in itself not to let the concealing ofwhat is concealed hold sway" 
(GA9, 195). Why? Because residing in the availability of things-under the established 
domain of some particular interpretation of being-engages things in terms of their pure 
presence and is thus in no way aware of how these particular entities are disclosed via their 
participation in an epochal determination of the presencing of being. Thus, when we engage 
given entities exclusively in the manner in which they are given and never ask questions 
about this givenness, we essentially become ahistorical-forgetting that this manner of 
revealing hinges upon concealment. Ifwe are not able to think beyond the bounds of the 
dominant modes of engaging beings, Heidegger thinks we are fundamentally in errancy, in a 
detrimental way. But that sounds like a tautology is not all errancy detrimental? To assert 
that would be to mistake Heidegger's point-as errancy "belongs to the inner constitution of 
the Da-sein into which historical human beings are admitted" (GA9, 196). However, we 
must be cautious and to think that this concealment is "a limit that occasionally announces 
itself', as if we engage this concealment in this manner "concealing as a fundamental 
occurrence has sunk into forgottenness" (GA9, 195). In other words, though we always 
only find ourselves in a world which reveals certain possibilities and conceals others, it is not 
sufficient for us to live with the availability of things most of the time and occasionally turn 
to acknowledge the constitutive character of concealment-to think means to keep this 
concealment at play at all times. If concealment is a limit, it is one which is constantly 
asserting itself. It is not merely the periphery of revealing, it is immanent to it. It this 
thinking of aletheia---the play of revealing and concealing-that is the "unthought as such. 
And yet this means that aletheia pervades all thought, persisting through metaphysics, 
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unheard until its end" (Bernasconi, 1985: 15). Let us now turn to investigate this play that 
has been adumbrated for the entirety of this chapter. 
Section III
 
Ereignis and Gelassenheit
 
What would it mean to be open to the mystery-to this revealing-concealing 
character of all epochal sendings or determinations of being? It would mean that we are 
open to the fact that revealing-concealing always rules and that we find ourselves within a 
possibility, with always more possibilities lying outside of our horizon. But this horizon 
must not be thought of as the limit point, beyond which there is unbestz'mmt being waiting to 
be formed-rather we must understand this horizon, and the word itself is probably 
problematic, as the point at the gravity of the readily available breaks down. It is for this 
reason that Heidegger writes, "Freedom, conceived on the basis of the in-sistent [always in a 
world] ek-sistence [yet always standing outside of itself and potentially holding open the 
clearing] ofDasein, is the essence of truth ... , only because freedom itself originates from 
the originary essence of truth, the rule of the mystery in errancy" (GA9, 198). Freedom 
originates from the essence of truth, which as we have already discussed is the occurrence of 
disclosure (aletheuein)-but insofar as this occurrence only occurs as it is via the thinking of 
Da-sein, the determination is once again reciprocal. Freedom emerges in the thinking of 
being, the thinking towards the clearing, and that clearing only occurs insofar as it is brought 
to word, via the thinking that is the ek-sistence of Da-sein.21 For this reason-and the ways 
21 Michel Haar explains, "Freedom is the act through which Dasein surpasses every particular entity as well as 
the totality of entities. This surpassing is accomplished solely by its ek-sistence and ekstatic movement. This 
freedom defined as Dasein's being exposed to uncovering would beprior to all traditional definitions of 
freedom: arbitrary freedom or whimsical choice, absence of contraint, being receptive to a demand or ontic 
necessity" (Haar, 1993: 124). 
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in which this plays itself out in the relation of freedom and necessity has already been 
discussed in Chapter I and will be discussed more thoroughly in the two chapters which are 
to follow this one-Heidegger writes, "In the thinking of being the history-grounding 
liberation of humans for ek-sistence comes to word" (GA9, 198). Heidegger again: 
Philosophical thinking is releasement of charitableness [Gelassenheit der Milde] that 
does not deny the concealment of beings as a whole. This thinking is especially the 
resoluteness of strictness that does not disrupt the concealing but compels its 
unbroken essence into the open of comprehension and thus into its own truth 
(GA9, 199). 
As if thinking could disrupt the concealing as a whole! What is at issue here is not that 
thinking as technological demand that all things account for themselves, but rather that 
thinking as technological is ignorant to the fact that insofar as it is a determinative mode of 
engagement it closes off other possibilities-and hence ignores the concealment that its own 
act of revealing enacts. This is what enables such locutions to describe the history of 
metaphysics: a revealing-concealing which conceals that its revealing conceals, or a forgetting 
which forgets that it forgot. Schiirmann writes, "when beings manifest themselves to 
[humans] under the traits of technology, the world opens itself in such a way that it closes 
and precludes other possibilities of settlement. It grants and refuses itself at the same time" 
(Schiirmann, 1978: 195). Yet, this is not the major thrust of this quotation for our present 
task-rather it is most important that we notice that for Heidegger philosophical thinking is 
a Gelassenheit, a letting-be which enables us to think the abyssal character of any specific 
configuration of being. 
Yet the letting is still the most important moment of all this-in fact it is a double 
letting, a reciprocity. As we have already discussed in the previous chapter, Gelassenheit is first 
and foremost a middle voice occurrence. It is fundamentally receptive-and hence the 
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letting be that could be said to be a comportment of the human being is dependent upon the 
fact that this same comportment (if we can say that being has a comportment) belongs to 
being. Being lets itself be determined by the decisions which ground epochal 
determinations, yet humans enter into Da-sein when they let themselves be directed by that 
determination, which is both generative of the thinkers comportment at that time, but is also 
generated and reinforced insofar as the thinker does not think beyng. Ifwe remain 
determined by the availability of beings in their already established character, we do not 
encounter beyng-and this occurs precisely because one does not encounter the historical 
character of the way in which beings presence in their availability at that moment. This can 
only be experienced insofar as one begins to think the fact that being is something which can 
be appropriated. 
The reciprocal determination of being and thinking is explicitly described by 
Schurmann as follows: "At this point, releasement designates identically man's thinking and 
being's openness" (Schurmann, 1978: 200). Only because being asserts itself in this middle 
voice and lets itself be taken up in such a letting-or because being always only discloses 
itself to us in some specific historical configuration, which demonstrates that it is open to 
interpretation, but an interpretation which from the perspective of human beings in the 
world which is always already undertaken for us, can Gelassenheit be thought of as a 
comportment which belongs to human beings. Being's only way to be is in some specific 
moment of having been appropriated (in the sense of ereignen) , and this is because being is 
fundamentally released to this possibility. This is what makes it possible for Schurmann to 
write, "releasement and appropriation [Gelassenheit und Ereignis] , now, are names for one and 
the same event" (Schurmann, 1978: 212). Ruin affirms and echoes this claim in his 
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discussion of the importance of the introduction of the term Ereignis into Heidegger's 
thinking. He explains, 
The task is not to add new determinations to being, but to reveal the dependence on 
being of thinking and language in general, or rather, to enable an experience of this 
dependency. To perform this task is to step into the Ereignis, a name for being to the 
extent that it gives itself precisely as that to which the thinker belongs. (Ruin, 1998: 
84) 
The importance of the status of Gelassenheit cannot be overstated, and even less so can the 
force of Ereignis in relationship to the words for being. It is through this simultaneous yes 
and no which is an openness to the mystery-the revealing-concealing character of all 
epochal determinations of being-that we can come into relationship and enact the clearing. 
Gelassenheit is the moment of enacting the clearing which Schiirmann names above-and 
which Heidegger names somewhat differently in an essay entitled Aletheia. We must turn to 
the end of this essay to get a sense of the interplay between Ereignis and Gelassenheit named by 
Schiirmann and Ruin. 
Near the end ofAletheia, after an extensive discussion of the relationship between 
phusis as upsurgent presencing and hiding in Heraclitus' fragment, ''phusis kruptesthaiphilet", 
(to which we will return via Schelling in the next chapter) Heidegger writes: 
The goldenness of the invisible shining of the clearing does not let itself be grasped, 
because it is not itself a grasping. Rather it is the pure coming to pass [EreignenJ. 
The invisible shining of the clearing effuses in the self-sheltering, safe-keeping of 
destiny [Verwahrnts des Geschickes]. The shining of the clearing is therefore, at the 
same time, its self-veiling and in this sense, it is the darkest. (GA7, 288) 
Here, we encounter what Jean-Francois Courtine refers to as the "proper name" of Lichtung, 
"the name which emerges more and more clearly (so to speak) as the "word" of a long path 
of thought: das Ereignil' (Courtine, 1993: 250). While this is the word which identifies this 
path of thinking-the path which heads towards the clearing-it is not a word for being, 
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rather it is that which precedes and exceeds all the words for being, insofar as they all belong 
to the long history of metaphysics. The encounter with Ereignis is something which can only 
occur insofar as we encounter the lack of a name for being and move towards thinking the es 
gibt. This move towards thinking Ereignis--thinking that which withdraws at the very 
moment of its presence (and accordingly breaks out of the sense of presence which 
dominates all the epochal determinations given and reigning as words of/for being)-means 
that thinking moves into the condition which would make it possible for us to think a world 
at all. 22 This is the move towards thinking in the other beginning. 
Let me be a bit more precise about the relationship between the first and the other 
beginning for Heidegger. As Sallis explains, the first beginning "designates the beginning of 
philosophy, ofwhat later comes to be called metaphysics. The first beginning occurs in and 
through the Platonic determination of being as idea" (Sallis, 2006: 179). According to Sallis, 
the first beginning is thus made the moment at which the distinction between the sensible 
and the intelligible begins to reign; in other words, the first beginning is another way to 
articulate what Heidegger calls onto-theology. This beginning is made in response to the 
confrontation with the groundlessness of things that we experience so long as we are attuned 
towards beings in wonder. 
22 It is for this reason that I believe Derrida's critique (or at least what I take to be a critique, since Heidegger's 
name is not mentioned here) of Heidegger at the beginning of Rogues-and presumably in numerous other 
locales-is slightly mistaken. With regards to the khora, which it seems as though Derrida wants to contrast to 
the clearing, he writes, "Khora would make or give place; it would give rise-without every gjvillg anything-to 
what is called the coming of event...Khora, before the "world," before creation, before the gift and 
being-khora that there is perhaps "before" any "there is" as es gib!' (Derrida, 2005: xiv). Ifwe can assume that 
this is in fact a critique of the originary status of the Abgrund that is clearing-ifDerrida wants to assert, 
following his logic of the gift, that giving and receiving are always in some sense co-originary, and if he wants to 
see this as a deconstructive move in relationship to the Heideggerian text, I believe he has missed the fact that 
this motion this double movement is already present in Heidegger's thinking ofEreignis. I think I have 
elucidated it s occurrence sufficiently to not belabor it yet again here. That said, Derrida's assertion is 
potentially elucidating for my own efforts in this chapter, though not in the way that he may think they are. 
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In BasicQuestions ifPhilosopl:y, a lecture course given when Heidegger was composing 
his 'being-historical' texts (the Contributions, Contemplation, The History ifBryng, etc.), Heidegger 
explains that Er-staunen, the terms with which he translates the Greek thaumazein-and we 
render as wonder-differs from other possible attunements that one could hold towards 
beings insofar as all of the other attunements (Sichwundern) Venvundern) Bewundern) Staunen, 
and Bestaunen) he discusses engage something unified and determinate that strikes us as 
unusual insofar as it shows itself against a background or backdrop of the usual. In 
attending to what strikes us as unusual all of these attunements are instances of a "turning 
back and away from the usual and thereby passing over and letting the usual stand in its 
usualness" (GA45, 166). Er-staunen, which linguistically would appear to be a mere 
intensification of Staunen, or, astonishment at something peculiar, does not turn away from 
the usual that serves as the unarticulated backdrop against which something peculiar-say, a 
moose wandering the streets of downtown Seattle-would mark itself off as unusual. 
Rather through the encounter with the unusual-our city moose-the usual-the city 
itself-strikes us as peculiar or unusual as well. Thus in wonder, "the most usual itself 
becomes the most unusual" (GA45, 166). This leads to a variety of consequences, the most 
of important of which is that "wonder that goes to the greatest extreme knows no way out 
of the unusualness of that which is most usual" (GA45, 167). The reason why one who 
finds themselves in wonder cannot return to the usual is precisely because in wonder the 
usual itself, as the measure by which one could given an account of the unusual-'Oh, the 
moose escaped from the Seattle Zoo'-is lost (the very thought of a Zoo as somehow 
'normal' would be lost). Wonder is thus a Grundstimmung, or a fundamental attunement 
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because it "goes into and stands in the whole" (GA45, 168), determining how the whole 
itself shows itself as a whole. 
The whole that is in question here for Heidegger is, in the first beginning, framed as 
"beings as beings, ens qua ens, to on he on." At the juncture wherein beings, ens, or to on, are 
determined as the beings that they are, i.e., at the interpretive moment that lies in the 
Grundstimmung that is wonder, is overlooked precisely because the as, the qua, the he, is 
overlooked. He explains: 
What is named here with the 'as', the qua, the he, is the 'between' that is thrown 
asunder in wonder [istjenes im Er-staunen auseinandergewoifene »Zwisehen«], the open 
of a still neither intimated nor heeded play space, in which beings as such come into 
play, namely as the beings that they are, in the plqy oftheir being. (GA45, 169) 
What is this play space that is thrown asunder in wonder? Heidegger is quite clear: it is the 
duplicity of aletheia: "aletheia, or unconcealment, is, for inceptual Greek thinking, the essence 
of being itself." Yet this thinking of unconcealment gloms onto aletheia as the "upsurging 
stepping-forth, the presencing in the open" (GA45, 169), ignoring that it may be the case 
that "beyng is, in its essence, self-concealing," a possibility that Heidegger says may be the 
"not yet recognized, and never to be experienced or expressed, truth of the whole of 
occidental metaphysics" (GA45, 189). For Heidegger, the result of the encounter with 
beings as a whole in wonder-the first beginning-is to treat them as pure upsurgence, i.e., 
phusis. Given that this upsurgence is undetermined it could be grasped or engaged in many 
ways, however, the Greeks, according to Heidegger, engaged it through teehne. He explains 
that teehne need not be about exploitation, and actually should be about "holding to the reign 
ofphusis in unconcealment" (GA45, 179), yet this engagement ofphusis through teehne, "holds 
the possibility of arbitrariness, the unbridled positing of purposes [Iosgebundenen ZweeksetzuniJ" 
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(GA45, 180). Heidegger's claim would seem to be that given the emphasis placed upon 
phusis as upsurgence, and the simultaneous neglect of concealment that one finds-or that 
Heidegger seems to find-in Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides, the first beginning 
of philosophy in wonder enables the "continuation of the first beginning to ousia - idea," 
which is the "beginning of metaphysics and philosophy" (GA70, 101). If being is as 
beingness that is purely present, it would then becomepossible to give a principial account of 
how beings as a whole presence. 
However, there is no general necessity that would dictate the turn to 
Eigenmachtigen-arbitrariness or making ones own-from out of the encounter with the 
world through the fundamental attunement of wonder, nor that one who is attuned through 
wonder necessarily ignore the belonging-together of revealing and concealing in aletheia; 
however, if this positing of purposes, this overdetermination of beings as a whole towards 
human ends takes place-which for Heidegger it clearly did-aletheia as unconcealment is 
traded in for truth as correctness insofar as philosophy becomes just another skill that works 
towards ends. Nevertheless, we must wonder if the intimation of the other beginning could 
not be a more robust form of wonder that would, in fact, attend to the duplicity of aletheia. 
Opposed to such an arbitrary positing of purposes that overdetermined beings and 
closed off a questioning posture, the other beginning would then be the recognition of the 
status of attuned human as the between that responds to the abyssal character of the play of 
aletheia. Rather than letting this between be thrown asunder in the moment wherein beings 
as a whole are determined by a Grundstimmung such that the free space in which that 
determination could be made was concealed, the other beginning would take hold of that 
which remained concealed in the first beginning, this free space, this free play of aletheia. 
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This explains why, in the Beitrage, Heidegger says, "The other beginning is the more originary 
taking-over of the concealed essence of philosophy" (GA65, 436); the other beginning 
would be the recognition of that which is the condition of the possibility of the first 
beginning-but more importantly it would be the recognition that this condition, as a 
ground, grants us no security, no certainty, no measure. Thus the attunement of the other 
beginning, for Heidegger, is, as Schoenbohm described for us earlier, attuned to the lethe at 
the heart of aletheia, a point which Sallis echoes and affirms (Sallis, 2006: 190). 
Thus in The History rifBr:Yng, under the heading ""Philosophy" in the Other 
Beginning", Heidegger writes, "incipient philosophy-essential thinking-does not think the 
"human" and it does not think God. It does not think the world and it does not think the 
earth. It does not think beings as such, it does not think beings as a whole-rather, it thinks 
beyng." Thinking beyng, which cannot be grasped and refuses explanation in terms of 
beings, but "grants the clearing" (GA69, 168) is the entrance into freedom. Heidegger again: 
Freedom 
is the belonging to the property of beyng. The property of being is the essentially 
occurring truth as the clearing of concealment. 
The bindingfrom br:Yng not bound to being (Seiende). 
The essential sense riftruth andfreedom. (GA69, 170) 
If freedom is the property of beyng, and beyng is nothing-beyng is not bound to any being 
or beingness-it is this essential unboundedness that gives us the Wesensinningkeit of 
freedom. This essential sense would be a response to the abyssal character of being in a 
manner that did not immediately attend primarily to the presence of things, but to their 
simultaneous withdrawal. I think, thus, that Schoenbohm is placing too much emphasis 
upon the need of the other beginning to attend primarily to withdrawal. It would seem 
entirely consistent with Heidegger's account to think that Erschrecken as a Grundstimmung of 
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the other beginning could be disposed to us in our encounter with the plqy of revealing and 
concealing-it would seem to make Heidegger into too oppositional of a thinker to say that 
the first beginning attends to upsurgence and hence the other beginning will attend to 
withdrawal. 
To begin to wrap up this chapter, let us continue to flesh this thought of the 
unbound-character of freedom via a return to Time and Being. The entirety of this lecture 
could be read as an attempt to bring us beyond the thinking of being under the words for 
being such as, "idea) enety,eia) actualitas, [and] will" which makes philosophy think Being in 
terms of how beings presence under the dominion of these words (Heidegger, 1988: 22). 
The move to thinking Ereignis, as was just said, is the move to think the character of the 
giving which must always withdraw itself such that the gift can be presented without 
breaking down the possibility of the gift, and our attunement to this withdrawal that grants 
us a play-space is thinking in the other beginning. This is why Courtine explains that the 
giving must annul itself for the given-what is given in the es gibt, whether that be Sein or Zeit 
in this lecture-to be encountered. But since that which is given is no longer ruled by a 
word for being, we can now interrogate the giving, even in its fundamental withdrawal. This 
giving, which Courtine describes as "that instance of nonappearance of which grants 
appearing, grants phenomenality to all phenomena" (Courtine, 1993: 251) is the constitutive 
limit of thought-present in its absence. And it is only in our encounter with it that 
freedom as a rupture with the determinations of being is experienced. 
The realization of the abyssal character of all grounds opens up the realization of the 
possibility that things could, will be, and have been otherwise. This is the movement, the 
experience of ec-static thinking, and this is why it is an experience of freedom-an 
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experience of the underdetermined character of all the configurations of sense that emerge 
throughout the history of being. John Lysaker writes, "As a child of History, sense is not the 
consequent of any ground, but a leap out of a white emptiness into a differentiated 
dimension of co-presencing that comes to pass in an underdetermined yet characteristic 
fashion" (Lysaker, 2002: 182). All configurations of being, i.e., sense, are unnecessary 
determinations-which must take place. We necessarily find ourselves amidst sense, but not 
this specific sense. The sense of the world can and has changed throughout history-insofar 
as we are able to comport ourselves towards the things of our world, "the appearance of 
beings in some impression [Pragung]" (GA10, 131), in such a way as to attempt to see beyond 
that impression-to see beyond our desire to encounter the coming to pass that is being as 
objects for us to conceptualize, and begin to think of them in their singularity and their 
verbal character as an occurrence, we are moved to a feeling of freedom, a realization of the 
lack of necessity, the an-archic character of being, and the preservation of possibility. 
Yet this preservation of possibility and the feeling of freedom which emerges from it 
maintains itself fully within what Heidegger has characterized as the first beginning of 
philosophy-after all as Schurmann is quick to point out, the Beitnige remains nothing but a 
contribution to that which s~nsgeschichtlichesDenken-beyng-historical thinking-seeks to 
twist free from. Hence the title, these are 'contributions' (Schurmann, 2003: 524). The 
fundamental attunement of the experience of freedom that I have thus far detailed has been 
experience of wonder-yet what of this other beginning which is intimated? Ifwe accept 
Erstaunen/thaumazein/wonder as the Stimmung or attunement of the first beginning-which is 
something I intend to call into question as this project continues-how does this attunement 
relate to the fact that die Uchtung is the site of lightening and shining while at the same time it 
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is the site of the greatest darkness, as Heidegger explained in Aletheia? Already in our 
discussion of On the Essence ifTruth we have had a glimpse of that towards which we must 
turn our exploration. In the midst of this essay which spends its earlier focus upon the 
character of freedom as the letting-be that we have been detailing here, Heidegger makes a 
turn towards an investigation of the mystery. As Gasche writes, "the concealing of this 
concealedness-the mystery-is older than all letting-be" (Gasche, 1999: 46). This 
Grundgeschehen, this fundamental occurrence, is the lethe that accompanies all aletheia, it is the 
gravity and density at the heart of all levity. As Heidegger writes in the Beitrcige, "questioners 
have cast off all curiosity; their seeking loves the abyss, in which they know the oldest 
ground" (GA65, 15). This oldest ground-a ground which as Abgrund/abyss ruptures with 
the metaphysical sense of ground-insofar as we face the fact that this "ground grounds as 
a-byss" (GA65, 29). 
I would hope that this chapter would have provided the justification for calling into 
question the sense of whether or not lethe or aletheia is more ancient the sense of temporal 
priority-since the encounter with the lethic only occurs via the fact that something is given 
to us in its disclosure, even though this disclosure implies the closure prior to it-yet I do 
think that there is something about this Abgrund which has thus far gone uninvestigated, i.e., 
the attunement which accompanies the kind of thinking which inquires into the withdrawal 
of Ereignis. 
In the next chapter, I will investigate the figure of the Unvorkdenkliche in Schelling's 
writings to attempt to make the case this moment names that which is encountered in 
Heidegger's thinking of the clearing. I hope that show that the unprethinkable names that 
which one arrives at insofar as they think along with the disclosure of nature in its own 
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movement. In other words insofar as we think according to the mandates of the matter 
itself, die Sache selbst, we are lead to a think of this unprethinkable-die nie atifgehende Rest, i.e., 
the remainder which can never surge forth, yet serves as the ground of all that which we are 
given to think. Heidegger, in his pointing to the mystery and the play of revealing and 
concealing has already given us our bearing, insofar as he names the origin of history as the 
naming of being as phusis-nature-which he translates into German as aufgehendes Anwesen, 
i.e., upsurgent presencing (GA9, 190). This upsurgent presencing, or what Merleau-Ponty 
calls, the "pure, unmotivated surging-forth" which is nature, is always simultaneously 
haunted by the barbarian principle, the brute fact of existence, the remainder which never 
surges up, yet which is the Grund of all of our thinking. But it is a Grund in a peculiar 
sense-the sense that the Ereignis is the Grund of being and time. If this claim can be 
substantiated than we must admit that Schelling's thinking, specifically in Ages 0/the World, is 
already underway towards the other beginning. My claim will be that the encounter with 
lightness of the determinations of being can just as easily be attuned by this gravity as it can 
by this lightness-yet we may encounter it more clearly by passing through Schelling's 
Schleier der Schwermut-the veil of melancholy-which he says covers over all of nature (I/7, 
400). 
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CHAPTER IV 
SCHELLING'S THINKING OF THE DISSEMBLING SUBJECT OF FREEDOM 
I concluded the previous chapter with the suggestion that Schelling gives a rigorous 
articulation of what Heidegger has called "the other beginning" of philosophy, insofar as 
that other beginning is defined by the willingness to hold the groundlessness of being open. 
My objective in this chapter is to make a case for this claim taking our starting point in 
Heidegger's reading of Holderlin and the relationship between thinking and poetry, insofar 
as the task of these two domains is to say being-which for later Heidegger can only mean 
Ereignis-and name the holy. I will lay the stakes of Schelling's questioning of "eternal 
freedom" via Heidegger's reading of Holderlin's language of the holy, insofar as both of 
"eternal freedom" and "the holy," in some sense, name nature as that which is eternally past. 
I will then layout what the eternal past means for Schelling. In order to do so I will deal 
with a number of Schelling's texts from his middle period, particularly the Ages ofthe World, 
the Initia Philosophiae Universae (which I will refer to as the Erlanger Lectures), and the 
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence ofHuman Freedom and Matters Connected Therewith (which 
I will refer to as the Freedom essay). 
My claim will be that nature and this eternal past are ways that Schelling names 
freedom. I will show that freedom serves a double role in Schelling's corpus: it indicates the 
matter and manner of thinking. Schelling's thinking of freedom as the subject which, "Passing 
through all things and not being atry ofthem, that is, being no thing such that it could not be 
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another" (Schelling, 1969: 16), leads us to think of freedom as the ground of all thought, 
which as ground, is fundamentally unthinkable due to its perpetual dissemblance; this is the 
matter, the Sache of Schelling's thinking and the majority of this chapter will focus on this 
theme. It is unthinkable insofar as it is the condition of, and hence prior to, 
thinkability-Schelling will refer to it as das unvordenkliche S0in, the unprethinkable being.23 In 
light of this, I will continue to articulate what manner of thinking-or, what kind of 
philosophical attunement-is necessary for us, or for Schelling, to arrive at the thought of 
freedom as the unprethinkable being; this manner of thinking will be introduced and hinted 
at throughout this chapter to be returned to in full in Chapter V. 
I intend the next three chapters to have a spiral structure that builds upon itself as it 
progresses, thus much ground that is covered in this chapter will need to be recovered in 
Chapter V and Chapter VI with attention to the role that thinking plays in Schelling's 
account of freedom. I claim that when Schelling says that whoever wishes to think "the 
incoercible, the ungraspable, the truly infinite .,. must raise themselves to this level" 
(Schelling, 1969: 17), he is echoing the demand of the phenomenological ethos that we 
encounter in his Naturphilosophie and throughout Heidegger's writings, but now in terms of 
an engagement with being as both abyss and plenitude-or better, an abyssal plenitude. It is 
this modulation of being as abyss and plenitude that will occupy the entirety of this chapter 
23 Rodolphe Gasche has done more than enough work to elucidate the philosophical purchase of this move 
that Schelling makes-though Gasche emphasizes the presence of this move towards that which is the 
condition of the possibility of reflection, but which, in turn, cannot be reflected upon, in the work ofJacques 
Derrida. I am fond of Gasche's articulation of this unprethinkable ground as the 'the tain of the 
mirror'-stealing the phrase from Derrida's Dissemination. Gasche explains that, "Derrida's philosophy, rather 
than being a philosophy of reflection, is engaged in a systematic exploration of that dull surface without which 
no reflection and no specular and speculative play would be possible, but which at the same time has no place 
and no part in reflection's scintillating play" (Gasche, 1986: 6). I use Gasche's language throughout this 
chapter and hence wish to acknowledge the debt up front; I also wish to show-if I make a compelling case 
that this is a viable way to read Schelling-that Schelling presages numerous conversations that dominant the 
philosophical discourse of the twentieth century. 
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and it will serve to show Heidegger's limitations as a reader of the history of philosophy 
insofar as he is committed to his notion of epochal determinations of being. I will argue that 
Schelling is not merely a "heat-lightning of a new beginning", but rather a full-blown 
thunderstorm. 
Section I
 
Unprethinkability and Unpredictability
 
Let us take our cue for this initial section from Heidegger. In his What Are Poets 
For... , he investigates the poet's-particularly Holderlin's-engagement with the "holy." 
Discussing the poet's engagement with the holy, which has already been discussed as the site 
that is left absent after the fleeing of the Gods, he writes, 
With this lack [Feh~, the ground as grounding for the world is missing...The ground 
is the soil for taking root and standing. The age of the world [Weltaltet], for which 
the ground is missing, hangs in the abyss ... In the age of the world's night [1m 
Weltalter der Weltnacht] , the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured 
[ausgestanden]. But for this it is necessary that there are those who reach into the 
abyss. (GAS, 269) 
The language and context of this passage are striking, to say the least. In an essay on 
Holderlin, Schelling's one-time roommate at the Tiibingen Stiff, Heidegger explicitly employs 
the title of one of Schelling's most famous philosophical works-Die Weltaltel'-numerous 
times. Not only does the title of Schelling's unfinished magnum opus recur in this essay, but 
the philosophical matter at issue resounds with the beginning of the 181S version of 
Schelling's Ages if the Worldwith astonishing consonance. 
Heidegger is insisting that the task for those of us who live in an age in which the 
God's have fled-or for us thinkers, in which epochal principles no longer reign-is to take 
stock of this lack of the God's as a lack, and to not permit this lack to be covered over. In 
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light of this lack we find ourselves hanging in the abyss. This epoch, in which we hang into 
the abyss, is described as the "age of the world's night," a night in which, one can only 
assume, "the abyss of the world must be experienced and endured," because only in such a 
night could it be encountered and endured at all. Yet even in such a situation, such an epoch 
in which the God's have fled and we are left only with a lack of determinacy or 
mandate-insofar as the holy, as the poetic naming of the Sache elsewhere named as Ereignis, 
is the site from which the nomos of being is dispensed to us (GA9, 360)-we need those 
"who reach into the abyss." For Heidegger, this figure who does the reaching is the poet; in 
particular, it is Holderlin. 
Schelling's initial assertion of the world's night occurs in under a different guise, yet 
indicates the same demand. At the beginning ofAges ofthe World, he insists that the matter 
for the highest science-which we are to assume he is undertaking-is what is "primordially 
living...nothing precedes or is exterior to this primordial life that might have determined it" 
(Schelling, 2000: xxxv). Insofar as this primordial life has nothing outside of itself or prior to 
it that could determine it, it is ohne Grund, without ground; unless, of course, it is its own 
ground. But what it may mean to say such a thing-that this primordial life, this freedom is 
its own ground (and hence auto-nomos, autonomous)-always remains a question for 
Schelling. It is precisely the nature, or essence [Wesen] of this primordial life that Schelling 
sets out to investigate in this text-and arguably in all of the texts of his middle period. 
Here, he suggests that the proper site at which to investigate this primordial life is in "the 
deepest night of the past" (Schelling, 2000: xxxvi). Is this the night of the world in which 
"the abyss of the world," as Heidegger says, "must be experienced and suffered"? I will 
argue that it is, and if I can make a case for this fact, then it is clear that Holderlin is not the 
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only member of the Tubingen trio who was able to reach into this abyss. In order to 
understand what this may mean, we must begin by investigating Schelling's understanding of 
this "night of the past"-and thus his understanding of the past as such. 
Prior to turning to Schelling's articulation of the eternal past in the second section of 
this chapter, which I will attempt to show appears in a certain way in which he thinks nature 
and what he, in his Erlanger Lectures, calls "eternal freedom," it will be more than instructive 
for us to turn to some Heidegger's meditations on the holy in his writings on Holderlin. 
First, it is important to recall that Heidegger says, "The thinker says being. The poet names 
the holy" (GA9, 312). Our initial task is to establish some sense of what this might mean. 
In an extended excursus on the holy, Ben Vedder explains: "the holy is not an 
attribute of the divine, but the dimension in which the godlike can appear" (Vedder, 2005: 
143). What role have the gods, or what is godlike, played throughout history and what is 
there to be gained from reaching in, holding open, and suffering their absence? It is clear 
that the gods have been the origins of directives, the site from the proclamations of law for 
communities have originated; in other words, gods have been and have laid foundations. 
Gods have served as the means by which particular peoples, places, or historical epochs gain 
their Sinn, both their meaning and their direction. When the gods speak, they give things, 
beings as a whole, a kind of coherence, a kind of clarity through density. As Richard Polt 
puts it, Heidegger thinks about the gods "in terms of the existential possibilities that inform 
a people's interpretation of itself and of the world around it. The gods bring to life the most 
important existential possibilities for a community-the "immeasurable possibilities" that 
126 
orient our concerns and establish the significance of everything" (Folt, 2006: 208).24 
Historical humanity has taken their directive-and ironically-found their freedom and 
vocation through god's determinations. Hence, following Schiirmann, the god's dichten: they 
thicken things, they make things dense.25 Insofar as this thickening takes place, the question 
"what is to be done?" is always already answered even in the asking of it: how we would 
question and the kinds of answers we would either desire or anticipate to such a question 
hinge upon beings already having been determined in some meaningful array. 
In Wozu Dichter? Heidegger offers numerous answers to Holderlin's question that 
prompts this essay, but all of these answers circulate around one specific claim. Heidegger 
says exactly what poets are for in desolate times: "To be a poet in impoverished times 
means: to attend, singing, to the trace of the fugitive gods. Thereby the poet says the holy to 
the time of the night of the world. Thus, in Holderlin's language, the night of the world is 
the holy night" (GAS, 272). We have already seen Heidegger characterize this night of the 
world as abgrundlich, abesos, without base, abyssal26; the task of the poet in such 
24 A few pages later Polt offers an extended example ofwhat this might mean: "A tribe celebrates the New 
Year with a day of dancing and feasting; on this day, they plant a tree in the center of their village and sacrifice 
a goat at the base of the tree ... if the gods are really at work here, they may be at work not as beings at all, but 
as sources of the import of beings: the day and the sacrifice, the tree and the goat, make sense in terms of the 
gods ...The tribe's gods allow it to be a people-a community that shares an understanding ofwhat matters 
and why" (polt, 2006: 212). 
25 Regarding the being's poietic character, and thinking dichten as to thicken, Schurmann writes: "Only in his last 
writings does he [Heidegger] raise the question of presencing as that of "loci." These loci are the historical 
economies. In each moment they constitute a field of presencing. Across the epochs presencing articulates 
itself differently, sets itself to work (poien) differently. The 'poietic' character of presencing is what Heidegger 
calls Dichtung, "poetry." "Poetry that thinks is in truth the topology of being." Needless to say, this has 
nothing to do with the art of composing verse, or even with human language.· "The poietic character of 
thinking" is only the echo, the reverberation of presencing and its poietic character. Presencing crystallizes 
(dichten means "to thicken," to render dense) into successive orders. Conversely, these epochal crystallizations 
determine the kind ofwords we speak and write in. The self-ordering of presencing thus must be understood 
as the primordial language" (Schurmann, 1992: 12). 
26 I am compelled by John Sallis' defense of translating Abgrund as abyss, as abyss derives from the Greek abesos, 
without bottom, just as Abgrund suggests in German. Of course, the Ab- prefix in German usually has more of 
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impoverished-or abyssal-times is to reach in, hold open, and suffer this abyssal character 
of this age of the world. We now find him saying that what the poet encounters insofar as 
they hold open and withstand this abyss is trace of the gods who have fled. It is precisely 
this trace of the gods, as the trail they have left behind in their fleeing, that Heidegger names 
the holy. A poet is able to encounter the holy, the trace of the fugitive gods, only insofar as 
the gods have fled. As Robert Bernasconi says, "it is because "holy names are lacking" that 
Holderlin can name the holy" (Bernasconi, 1985: 42). The holy as such, the space in which a 
god would appear, strictly speaking, can only be encountered as such when it is vacant. Or 
to put it more boldly: poets can only poetize the holy insofar as the thickening that is the 
proper activity of the gods has not come to pass. 
Just as we encounter Ereignis in its withdrawal-and accordingly in its 
unprethinkability, though we have yet to stake out what exactly that means for 
Schelling-we encounter the holy as we can experience the site of the donation of a nomos 
for a community-a nomos that would bind a community together, thicken it, make it dense, 
restrict the general economy of being such that humans could find a nomos for their 
oikos-insofar as that nomos is lacking. If the nomos were not lacking, the holy as such would 
be unencountered, it would be indescribable, one would not even be able to encounter it 
such that he or she would have to struggle for the words with which to call it forth and name 
it, as for Heidegger "nomos is not only law, but rather, more primordially, the directive 
secured in the sending of being" (GA9, 361). The holy, as the site from which such a 
directive contained in sending or dispensation of being would be given would be un-dictable 
a sense of pulling away, and not a simple negation, but Heidegger himself is emphatic at the beginning of Wozu 
Dichter? that we should hear the word in this essay as an instance of the bottom dropping out. (Sallis, 2004: ef. 
92). 
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because the act of thickening which would occur in light of the presence of a god would be 
the condition of diction as such, i.e., the condition of dichten as the act of poetizing. It would 
be to say that the act of poetizing would first depend upon beings having been made dense 
by their belonging to an economy of presencing. The site from which such a thickening 
would take place would thus be pre-diction. In its being pre-diction, a condition for our 
articulation, it would forever escape the capacity of a language that received its directives, 
laws, and determinations from it to describe it as it was prior to the dispensation or 
assignment of a nomos. Thus it would be unpredictable in the manner in which Ereignis is 
unprethinkable. To employ Derridean language, the unthinkability of that which is the 
condition of the possibility of reflection, but which, in turn, cannot be reflected upon, shows 
us the limits of transcendental philosophy by exposing the simultaneity of the conditions of 
both possibility and impossibility of the success of such an endeavor. It is both vor, in that it 
is a condition and prior to thinking, and un, in that in being such a condition it is by necessity 
unthinkable. It is precisely the lack of participation of this condition of possibility in the play 
of reflection, or the self-description of any particular restricted economy (of presencing), that 
makes Ereignis and the holy surface as matters for thinking and poetizing respectively. 
Looking at the structure of the descriptions of Ereignis from the previous chapter and 
the brief explanation of the holy that I have just given, it should be clear that these two 
phenomena are extraordinarily similar. That being the case, why would Heidegger bother to 
distinguish between these two Sache? I have already answered the question to some extent: 
the task of the thinker is to say being-or recognize the appropriative character of being in 
light of encounter with Ereignis-whereas the task of the poet is to name the holy, insofar as 
the poet's task is to announce the fleeing of the gods by attending to their trace. Given that 
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Heidegger asserts that, "Thinking, obedient to the voice of being, seeks from it the word 
from out of which the truth of being comes to speech," and that "the naming of the poet is 
of a similar ancestry" (GA9, 312), we should be left asking, why exactly do these two 
vocations need to be held apart? There are inevitably far more reasons for this bifurcation 
than I can attend to here. At present, I would only like to point to one of these reasons, 
which, to put it simply, is Heidegger's commitment to being-historical thinking and the belief 
that philosophers, are fundamentally limited by the epochal determinations of being in which 
they find themselves. For Heidegger, such a constraint is in large part due to the limitations 
of philosophical discourse insofar as that discourse is metaphysical. Dennis Schmidt 
explains: 
Metaphysics is the name of the force behind the abuse and destruction of language 
... The language of metaphysics, a language that submits itself in advance to the 
logic of the idea, freezes and immobilizes the very event-what Heidegger called das 
Ereignis-that Heidegger argues is most in need of being thought in its vitality. 
(Schmidt, 2005: 172) 
As Schmidt is quick to note, the history of being, though defined by forgetfulness of das 
Ereignis, is still pregnant with possibilities through which we may be able to engage the truth 
of being. He notes, "H6Iderlin's work is repeatedly designated as something of a model for 
just how it is that language can be brought to say faithfully the event that is most in need of 
thought" (Schmidt, 2005: 173). The simplest reason for this was that H6lderlin was a poet: 
as a poet he was able to speak outside of onto-theology, outside the strictures of 
philosophical language-and thus the boundaries for thinking that being committed to such 
a discursive array necessitate---did not tie him down the way they did his Tiibingen Stift 
roommates. As Vedder says, "onto-theology...needs the poets to get an entrance to the 
holy" (Vedder, 2005: 151). Yet, if! am right, and the structure of unprethinkability that 
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describes Ereignis and the structure unpredictability that describes the holy holds, than is it 
not the case that Schelling was, at nearly the same time as H6lderlin, attending to exactly this 
Sache? 
In reading H6lderlin's Wie Wenn Am Feiertage, Heidegger is quick to note that, 
"H6lderlin names nature 'the holy'" (GA4, 58). Elsewhere, in On the Beginning, Heidegger 
explains that, "nature" and "the holy ... name the most proper history of the other 
beginning" (GA70, 157). What nature is this? Heidegger specifies that it is not nature in the 
sense of a domain of objects, nor is it simply a one-sided interpretation of the Greek 
thinking ofphusis which Heidegger explains as follows in On the Essence ofTruth: "Beings as a 
whole reveal themselves as phusis, "nature," which at this point does not yet mean a 
particular domain of beings, but rather beings as such as a whole, and specifically in the 
sense of upsurgent presencing [aufgehendenAnwesens]" (GA9, 190). H6lderlin does not think 
of nature in this poem as exclusively the upsurgence of presencing. Rather, Heidegger 
claims, "In its essence, H6lderlin's word "nature," in this poem, poetizes [dichte~ according 
to the concealed truth of inceptual ground-word phusis" (GA4, 57). What does this mean? 
For Heidegger it means that when H6lderlin names nature, he names what is constantly 
present, but not as a being present at hand. Rather it is what is constantly present in its 
being-prior: "Nature is more timely [zeitiger] than "the Ages", because as the wonderfully all­
present it already, in advance, gives the clearing to what is actual, the clearing in whose 
openness whatever is actual is first able to appear" (GA4, 59). Heidegger himself at least 
implicitly affirms this conjunction of nature in the holy in his analysis ofMachenschqft in the 
Beitriige. Heidegger explains that under the domain of machination, nature is interpreted 
according techne, such that phusis is thought of primarily as a mode of production. In our 
--------------
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encounter with the truth of being, with Ereignis, "'nature' is not set back, rather it is 
transformed in an original manner" (GA65, 32). What is this original nature? We have 
already made clear that for Heidegger it is the play of revealing and concealing, he also says 
that originally-or at least that is what I take his assertion "it was once" prior to the 
domination of machination-it was "the site of the moment of the arrival and the abode of 
the gods who rested in the essencing of beyng when this site was stillphusis" (GA65, 277). 
How else should we receive this assertion of nature in its original dimension than as a way of 
naming the holy? 
Thus, as Heraclitus says,phusis kruptesthaiphilei, this nature is present in its constant 
withdrawal; in its essence-the essence that H6lderlin's word "nature" poetizes in accord 
with and according to-its upsurgence is simultaneous with its hiding. As has been said 
repeatedly, nature as the holy is thus the site in which gods would dwell, but given their 
fleeing, their fugitive status, H6lderlin is able to poetize the holy in all of its 
unprepoetizability, its unpredictability, insofar as he attends to the traces of that which is 
always prior, which in "the history of being must be proclaimed as Er-eignis and is thought as 
the in-between" (GA70, 157). 
Given that H6lderlin once lived with one of the most famous thinkers of the 
question of nature, it would seem unlikely, that he-Schelling-would go unmentioned in 
Heidegger's excursus. He does not. He is mentioned as one of many thinkers who would 
think of nature as "particular domain of beings." We are told that if we follow Schelling in 
his thinking of nature, we will be misguided: "if one wanted to posit what, in this poem, is 
named "nature" as "identical" with "spirit" in the sense of "identity" as H6lderlin's friend 
Schelling thought it around this same time, this would be to misconstrue nature" (GA4, 56). 
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It may just be that I am too fond of Schelling for my own good, but this assertion gave me 
pause, to say the least. I have already noted the uncanny resemblance of the language that 
Heidegger uses at the beginning of Wozu Dichter? to Schelling's language in the We/talter. Let 
me turn now to another, even more striking, congruity. 
Recall that Heidegger names phlms as a'1fgehenden Anwesens, upsurgent presencing, in 
On the Essence ofTruth. As I have just finished explaining, for Heidegger, this upsurgent 
presencing is only half of the necessary play ofphuszs, as it is the play of revealing and 
concealing. It is being concealed insofar as it is that which opens up the possibility of the 
revelation of beings. The Spur, the trace, of the gods that H6lderlin attends to, singing, in his 
poetizing, brings us back to an encounter with the necessity of concealment or withdrawal 
for revelation. These traces themselves, though present, bring us back to the condition of 
presencing that in itself does not presence. What else is this than the that which "in things is 
the incomprehensible basis of reality, the never upsurgent remainder [nie aufgehende Res~, that 
which with the greatest effort cannot be dissolved in the intellect, but rather eternally 
remains in the ground" (1/7, 360)? What else is H6lderlin's naming of nature as the holy in 
light of attending to the Spur of the fugitive gods than a variant manner of attending to the 
same Sache that Schelling here describes as the Rest, the irregularity or the rulelessness of the 
ground prior to the primordial decision that makes reality possible as the play between 
ground and existence? It is precisely this unruly ground before the ground that Wirth 
describes as the inexhaustibility of nature's productivity, its unprethinkability and 
unpredictability: "It is ... the unfathomable mystery of productivity's inexhaustibility and its 
unvordenkiiche or unpredictable capacity to reconfigure the oblique manifestations of its 
plenitude" (Schelling, 2000: xxii). 
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Schelling refers to nature's productivity as the subject of movement that is the 
condition of life and the condition of philosophy which is, ''passing through all things and not 
being a'!Y ofthem" (Schelling, 1969: 16). He specifies, much like Heidegger would do one 
hundred and thirty years later, that though this movement is the principle of philosophy, this 
unprethinkable and unpredictable productivity cannot be captured in a supreme law, though 
this is what most philosophers have done: 
...philosophy was seen as a chain of laws which followed from one another. It was 
imagined that there must have been a supreme link in this chain-a first law, from 
which a second and again and third follows, etc. Thus Cartesius has cogito eJ;go sum as 
supreme law. Fichte: I is I. In a living system alone, which is not the consequence 
of law, but rather is the moments of progression and development, there can be no 
account of any such supreme principle. (Schelling, 1969: 16) 
Like Heidegger in his Onto-TheoLogical Constitution ofMetaplfysics, Schelling criticizes (though it 
is unclear whether or not we could call what Heidegger is up to criticism) previous 
philosophers for being committed to particular principles that enable the thinkability of 
beings as a whole-even if that principle is God. For Schelling, "according to its nature" this 
principle, nature's productivity, or eternal freedom, "is not static, and even with God it 
cannot stand still" (Schelling, 1969: 27). How is this any different from what Heidegger sees 
in H6lderlin's naming of nature as the holy as it is prior to all that is active, even the gods 
(GA4, 59)? Or from Heidegger's own assertions regarding the necessity of rethinkingphusis 
in light of our encounter with Ereignis in his Beitrage? Just as Schelling would say God can be 
God only because the absolute subject as eternal freedom passes through him, Heidegger 
hears H6lderlin say that the gods are divine only because they inhabit the holy. That which 
is holy, that which is eternally free, as H6lderlin himself says in Wie Wenn am Feiertage, is the 
holy chaos out which fixed laws are begotten. He writes: 
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But now day breaks! I waited and saw it come,
 
And what I saw, the holy shall be my word,
 
For she, she herself, who is older than the ages
 
And higher than the gods of Orient and Occident,
 
Nature has now awoken amid the clang of arms,
 
And from high Aether down to the low abyss,
 
According to fixed law, begotten, as in the past, on holy Chaos,
 
Delights, the all-creative,
 
Delights in self-renewal. (Holderlin, 2004: 462)27
 
Just as Hesiod would have it when he sang, "First of all there came Chaos ... from Chaos 
was born Erebos, the dark, and black Night" (Hesiod, 1991: 130), this holy chaos that is 
older than the ages of the world, the chaos that can only be encountered in the world's night 
in its perpetually receding priority, is that which Holderlin and Schelling name nature. A 
nature that is prior to our attempts to bring particular conceptual apparatus' to bear upon it, 
prior to and conditioning of our ability to engage beings as a whole in terms of names of 
being. Why does Heidegger ignore this? Why does he insist that only the poet in the other 
beginning can "prophesy [vor-denk~ the up until now unprethinkable [bislang Unvordenkliche] 
and his poetry opens the time-space for the first time" (GA70, 159)? This is a question that 
may need to be answered more thorougWy later in this chapter, but for moment I would 
argue that Schelling gives us a provisional answer as to why Heidegger misses Schelling's 
attending, thinkingly, to the remainder of the eternal to past. Schelling writes: 
27 I made very minor adjustments to Hamburger's translation. In German, this poem reads: 
Jezt aber tagts! Ich harrt und sah es kommen, 
Und was ich sah, das Heilige sei mein Wort. 
Denn sie, sie selbst, die alter denn die Zeiten 
Und iiber die Gorter des Abends und Orients ist, 
Die Natur is jetzt mit Waffenklang erwacht 
Und hoch vom Aether bis zum Abgrund nieder 
Nach vestem Ganze, wie einst, aus heiligem Chaos gezeugt, 
Fiihlt neu die Begeisterung sich, 
Die Allerschaffende wieder. 
135 
Since the beginning, many have desired to penetrate this silent realm of the past 
prior to the world in order to get, in actual comprehension, behind the great process 
of which they are in part cooperative members and in part sympathetic members. 
But most of them lacked the requisite humility and self-denial because they wanted 
to tackle everything at once with supreme concepts. (Schelling, 2000: 63) 
As Wirth explains, "For Schelling, all philosophical positions, that grand history of the great 
western isms, is a history of clotting, of inhibitions, of stoppages, and hence of trauma, of 
sickness and of evil" (Wirth, 2003: 164). This would be opposed to Schelling's own account 
of the experience of naked existence [blofie Dasryn]: 
Naked existence without consideration of its kind and form, to the extent that it is 
beheld as such, must appear as a miracle [Wunde~ and fill the soul [Gemuth] with 
wonder: as it was undeniably this observance of pure existence that, in the earliest 
intimations, assaulted [ubedie~ souls with horror and a kind of holy terror [einerArt 
von heiligem Schrecken]. (1/7,200) 
On Schelling'S own account, then, the experience of wonder and holy terror are potentially 
synonymous, precisely because Grund is, "an original opacity, or refusal to appear and unveil 
itself" (Hadot, 2006: 302). Frighteningly powerful and instructive as it may be, Heidegger's 
insistence upon epochally-determined sendings of being throughout the long history of 
metaphysics force him to read Schelling as a metaphysician-who as such could never 
"stand in an essential ... relation to the poet" (GA70, 159)-whereas Holderlin is able to be 
taken as the roommate who shows us the true essence of both poetizing and thinking. 
While I agree with Peter Warnek that Heidegger's "question of the history of the truth of 
being is not supposed to be simply applied to Schelling'S work and thought as a kind of 
hermeneutic "method" that promises to unlock the truth of the text," I am stillpostfacto 
suspicious of Heidegger's engagement with history, precisely because it generates readings 
that appear as ifhe did seek to "uncover the (more or less hidden) ontological doctrines" 
(Warnek, 2005: 169). Even if Heidegger approaches Schelling with a care and attentiveness 
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to the Sache of his text that was unseen prior to Heidegger's engagement with the Freedom 
essay, I still worry that he may find, at least in part, what he puts in. Even if it is true that all 
great thinkers-and I contend that Schelling, on Heidegger's terms is a thinker, not a 
philosopher qua metaphysician-at bottom, fundamentally misunderstand one another, it 
may be the case that Schelling was more prepared, or at least more desirous, to give up such 
supreme isms as we encounter in Heidegger's being-historical thinking-though Heidegger 
would of course roll over in his grave at such an assertion-and perhaps that thinking itself. 
Maybe Schelling was more able than Heidegger to enter into the releasement, the Gelassenheit 
that defines the activity of thinking for the both of them. 
Section II
 
Schelling's Eternal Past
 
Now that I have laid some groundwork for a reading of Schelling that take seriously 
his status as a thinker who thinks beyond the strictures of what Heidegger will often call the 
long history of metaphysics, it is necessary to layout Schelling's thinking of the eternal past 
and its connection to "eternal freedom" in a much more rigorous manner. For Schelling, it 
is clear that the past that is at issue in his Ages ofthe World is not the historical past. Using the 
language of a certain strain of psycho-analysis, one could say that it is a past that has never 
crossed the present. It is not last week, it is not last year, it is not the last millennium, it is 
not even pre-historic. Well, in a certain sense it could be said to be pre-historic, but this pre­
history would have to be thought of as the history before history-even before the 
distinction between recorded history and the time and events that elapsed before humans 
began leaving traces of themselves behind, written or otherwise. Rather, this 
past-particularly this "deepest night of the past"-is "the beginning of the ages" (Schelling, 
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2000: xxxvi). Judith Norman explains, "This is an odd conception of the past: the past is not 
just the chronological but the transcendental ground of the present, the condition of its 
possibility. This means that the past is not a past present, it was never a 'now'" (Norman, 
2004: 97). 
What are we to make of this beginning before the beginning of history? Slavoj Zizek 
explains that for Schelling, "the true Beginning is not at the beginning, there is something that 
precedes the Beginning itself-a rotary motion whose vicious cycle is broken, in a gesture 
analogous to the cutting of the Gordian knot, by the beginning proper, that is, the 
primordial act of decision" (Zizek, 1996: 13). The question of decision as primordial act 
must be left aside for now, to be returned to in full in the next chapter. For now, we must 
focus on the question of this rotary motion. To put it most simply, it is God prior to 
creation; God prior to having decided to create the world. It is important to note, however, 
that this is a peculiar deity. It is a deity that is at least dual, which is to say, it is a deity that is 
what it is insofar as it is multiple. At the beginning, God is not one, rather God is the unity 
of "two principles [that] are already in what is necessary of God: the outpouring, 
outstretching, self-giving being, and an equivalently eternal force of selfhood, of retreat into 
itself, of Being in itself. That being and this force are both already God itself, without God's 
assistance" (Schelling, 2000: 6). These two principles, the expansive and contractive force in 
God, what Schelling will call the potencies, the At and the A2, compete with one another for 
priority. It is important to Schelling to note that "each has its own root and neither can be 
deduced from the other," as he wishes to point that "already in that which is primordially 
living, there is a doubling that has come down, through many stages, to that which has 
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determined itself as what appears to us as light and darkness, masculine and feminine, 
spiritual and corporeal" (Schelling, 2000: 6). 
Why is Schelling so concerned to point out this original duality, this original 
bifurcation? Like so many questions that I have posed throughout this project, this question 
can have no one, exhaustive answer, and the second portion of my answer, regarding the 
question of human freedom must wait until the next chapter to come to full fruition. Yet, I 
think, ifwe attend to this question in light of Holderlin's naming of nature as chaos 
alongside Heidegger's insistence thatphusis is the play of revealing and concealing, we can 
come to some interesting conclusions. The question then becomes: does Schelling give us 
reason to read this bifurcation in God as a having anything to do with the chaotic character 
of nature? The answer can only be an emphatic yes, but this chaos is something we must 
seek in its priority, both temporal (whatever that might mean when we are speaking of an 
eternal past) and logical. 
In discussing the play of contraction and expansion that defines what Zizek calls the 
deadlock of the rotary drives, Schelling explains that this play is "the beginning of that 
alternating movement that goes through the entirety of visible nature, of the eternal 
contraction of the eternal re-expansion, of the universal ebb and flow" (Schelling, 2000: 21). 
For Schelling, this play of expansion and contraction-or we could say the play of revealing 
and concealing-is something that we can encounter insofar as we follow out the lifecycle of 
a plant. The growth of tree, for example, hinges upon the expansion of seed that is the 
result of the contracting of a prior tree into that seed. The roots of growth and expansion 
are not present and visible to us in a tree's bearing fruit; rather those roots are only truly 
encountered when one follows the process out as a whole. This universal ebb and flow, this 
----------------------------
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"eternal exhaling and inhaling, a constant interchange between life and death" (Schelling, 
2000: 21) is precisely what Heidegger has called phusis. What is most important about this 
example is that Schelling notes that, "visible nature, in particular and as a whole, is an 
allegory of this perpetually advancing and retreating movement" (Schelling, 2000: 21). In 
other words, what we encounter in this tree can give us access to the nature of being as such 
in its primordiality, in its eternal past, and our initial glimpse into this should suggest that 
being in its primordiality, at least in our encounter with it, will be at least dual. 
How does Schelling describe being in its primordiality? We have already seen that 
for Schelling this is nothing other than the productivity of nature, or as he says repeatedly in 
the Erlanger Lectures, eternal freedom. He presages this description of productivity as eternal 
freedom in the Ages ofthe World. Here he writes: "An inner feeling tells us that the true, 
eternal, freedom only dwells above being" (Schelling, 2000: 23). He insists that this is "not 
divine nature or substance, but the devouring ferocity of purity that a person is able to 
approach only with an equal purity. Since all being goes up in it as if in flames, it is 
necessarily unapproachable to anyone still embroiling in being" (Schelling, 2000: 25). 
Schelling thus echoes his assertion that I presented earlier from his Erlanger Lectures wherein 
he insists that this play of contraction and expansion that is nature thought beyond either 
visible nature or divine nature is something that cannot be encountered so long as one is 
committed to being, or committed to thinking being in terms of supreme principles that 
would capture or isolate the movement that is essential to knowledge (Schelling, 2000: 4). 
In his Erlanger Lectures, in and numerous other texts from his middle and late periods, 
Schelling will also refer to that which is beyond being, "a sublimity beyond being and not­
being" (Schelling, 2000: 27), as a Seinskiinnen, a being possible, which he describes as 
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"possibility for the sake of possibility, possibility without intention or object" (Schelling, 
1969: 22). This openness, this possibility, that may demand to take on a form, but demands 
no form in particular, can clearly be seen as the site which is either manifest as or filled up by 
any or all names for being, gods, or principles that would serve as the grounding by which a 
particular configurations of beings becomes thinkable at all, in a sense, it must precede the 
very bifurcation of the expansive and contractive principles in God. As such, it is only 
encounterable in its infinite mutability and malleability, Schelling writes: 
This incomprehensible but not imperceptible being, always ready to overflow and 
yet always held again, and which along grants to all things the full charm, gleam, and 
glint of life, is that which is at the same time most manifest and most concealed. 
Because it only shows itself amidst a constant mutability it draws all the more as the 
glimpse of the actual being that lies concealed within all things of this world and 
which simply awaits its liberation. (Schelling, 2000: 60). 
Yet it is a liberation that as such can never come, because if it were to show itself as itself it 
would no longer be itself as such. Things can only show themselves, or be objects for 
reflection, insofar as they manifest themselves as present and thus that which makes 
reflection possible cannot appear as an object for reflection without begging the question of 
the enabling condition of that instance of reflection. That which is itself only as pure 
possibility can never show itself in any form of actuality. Rather, it can only be encountered 
as that which withdraws from this actuality; it withdraws insofar as it both precedes it and 
makes it possible. As Andrew Bowie points out: "the difficulty in understanding Schelling's 
position is evident: the demand is to think something unthinkable" (Bowie, 1993: 135). Yet, 
it is important to note that it is not just unthinkable, but unprethinkable. Schelling himself 
explains precisely what it is that he is trying to think: the emergence of rationality out of 
chaos. "The entire world, as it were, lies caught in reason, but the question is: How did it 
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come into this net? (Therefore there is still in the world something other and something 
more than mere reason-even something that strives beyond these boundaries)." (Schelling, 
1972: 222). The question thus becomes, as absurd as this may seem, how exactly does 
Schelling go about trying to think this both un-and-pre-thinkable freedom? And potentially 
more importantly, why? I will attempt to answer these two questions in turn. 
Section III 
A Tangent: There Are Three Kinds of People 
Very near the end of the third draft of the Ages if the World, Schelling makes what 
may seem to be a rather peculiar attempt to carve up all people in the world into three 
distinct categories insofar as they relate to that which is excessive to, and pushes on the 
boundaries of, the net of reason in which the world is trapped. Schelling explains, "there is a 
kind of person in which there is no madness whatsoever" (Schelling, 2000: 103). Such 
people, whom Schelling categorizes as "sober spirits" and "men of intellect," are "uncreative 
people incapable of procreation." It is hard not to hear Nietzsche at this point: 
All that philosophers have handled for millennia were conceptual mummies; nothing 
that is actual has come out of their hands alive. When they worship, they kill, they 
stuff; these gentlemanly idolaters of concepts-they become a danger to the life of 
all things when they worship. Death, change, age, even procreation and growth, are 
objections for them-refutations even. (KGA, VII/III: 67) 
For Schelling, these "men of intellect" or "dead intellectuals" do not engage a world that is 
alive, precisely because they do not tarry with the madness or chaos that lies prior to our 
ability to conceptualize. Instead, they stultify, isolate, categorize; they take up the world as 
dead matter to be tarried with. This is due to the fact that "the whole of modern European 
philosophy from its beginning (in Descartes) has this common lack: nature is not present for 
it [tlir sie nicht vorhanden is~ and it lacks a living ground" (1/7, 356). 
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For whom, then, does nature exist? For what kind of people does the world have a 
living ground? Schelling answers that it is in the "two other kinds of persons in which there 
really is madness" (Schelling, 2000: 103). Such an assertion must be heard in a particular 
way, and I will present two caveats about this sense of madness prior to describing these 
other two kinds of people. First, it should be noted that when Schelling is describing 
madness here, I think it ought to be clear that he is describing that which is excessive or 
prior to determination by any particular rational structure-he does not, I think, have in 
mind someone who has "lost their mind", so to speak (though that could be a consequence 
as we shall say). Second, it is even more important to note that Schelling begins his 
description of his three kinds of people by asserting that not only can nothing great be 
accomplished without "a touch of madness," rather "nothing great can be accomplished 
without constant solicitation of madness, which should always be overcome, but should 
never be utterly lacking" (Schelling, 2000: 103). 
So what of these two kinds of people? Let us hear Schelling out: 
There is one kind of person that governs madness and precisely in this 
overwhelming shows the highest force of the intellect. The other kind of person is 
governed by madness and is someone who is really mad. One cannot say, strictly 
speaking, that madness originates in them. It only comes forth as something that is 
always there (for without constant solicitation of it, there would be no 
consciousness) and that is not now suppressed and governed by a higher force. 
(Schelling, 2000: 104) 
Recalling that for Schelling all things emerge and exist only insofar as there is a constant 
tension and exchange between the forces of contraction and expansion, it is always possible 
for a person or a body to fall too far to one side of this equilibrium. In a body, at least in 
Schelling's conception of disease, if a particular organ asserts itself as the center of activity of 
the body, that body will fall ill. Each organ must remain appropriately self-interested while 
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at the same time interacting in equilibrium with all other organs in the body. As Schelling 
says, 
Doctors distinguish between particular systems in the human organism as well. 
Whoever suffers from one of these systems, i.e., if one of these is particularly 
obtrusive, that person is thereby bound to that system, inhibited in his freedom, and 
quite properly a slave to it. A healthy person feels none of the systems in particular. 
(Schelling, 1969: 12) 
This play of turning inwards and outwards at the same time is what guarantees a healthy 
body, and according to this lengthy passage from Ages if the World, a healthy intellectual life 
as well. The person who becomes completely mad is the person who is not able to temper 
or regulate their solicitation of madness; they are the person who is taken over by the chaos 
at the heart of nature. One may want to say, they are the person in whom there is too much 
life; or who, while holding open the abyss, decided to dive in rather then enduring or 
recoiling from it. 
But what of this mediate person? This figure who is able to solicit madness, but at 
the same time overcome it? Who is this person? Ironically, Schelling spends the least 
amount of time discussing this middle figure, given that I believe it is the most important of 
the three for understanding what Schelling thinks the task of the philosopher is. In fact, I 
would go so far as to say that this middle figure, the person who can solicit madness while at 
the same time overcoming it, is the Schellingian philosopher. I will attempt to make good 
on this assertion by pursuing two thoughts: first, Schelling, as we have already seen, insists 
that one who truly wants to know must raise themselves to the level of "the incoercible, the 
ungraspable, the truly infinite" and "make the indefinable the definition" (Schelling, 1969: 
17). This act of raising oneself up to think along with "the flux of inseparable movement" 
that is eternal freedom is the solicitation of madness, but it also the pursuit of self­
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knowledge. Second, the way in which this encounter happens so that the philosopher does 
not simply drop off into madness is in terms of the dialogical character of Schelling's 
thinking. One must solicit madness, but one must also maintain a center in oneself. In 
raising oneself up to the level of eternal flux, one does not give oneself over to it in some 
collapse into mystical unity, rather one holds oneself in a relationship of Gelassenheit, 
releasement, towards the life of nature, the chaos of nature, that is present in all things, 
including oneself (Schelling, 2000: 63). 
When Schelling demands that thinkers must "raise themselves" to the level of the 
absolute in order to think it, what he is really demanding is that thinkers raise themselves to 
the point wherein they can think movement as movement. Yet on all of Schelling's own 
accounts, this may be an impossible demand. As early as the late 18 th century, in his Ideas 
Towards a Philosopl?J rfNature, Schelling explains that the equilibrium of forces that exist in 
nature maintain themselves in a "lasting, forever undecided, strife" unless humans are able to 
inhibit their interplay so that one of the two terms, contraction or expansion, gains a kind of 
dominance. In that dominance the equilibrium that would have been becomes knowable, 
but only in its absence. I think that it is legitimate to characterize Schelling's relation to 
thinking the movement of the absolute subject as eternal freedom in a similar manner, so 
long as we can hear the account just given continuing to resonate in the following assertion. 
Schelling says that when eternal freedom, or eternal magic, is "acting, enclosing itself in a 
form, it becomes knowing, it experiences knowing as it goes from form to form, steps from 
knowing to knowing, but only in order to be able to break through again in the bliss of not­
knowing (which is then a knowing not-knowing)" (Schelling, 1969: 25). Schelling is then 
quick to note that the process of appearing in forms and retreating from forms, which can 
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only occur insofar as things become sufficiendy contracted, sufficiendy thickened, so that 
particular entities-and potentially even the principles that organize those entities-become 
knowable, generates the science, which is not yet human science. He explains: "Science only 
emerges when a principle steps out from the original state of not-knowing, becomes 
knowable, and accordingly passes through all forms and returns to the original not-knowing" 
(Schelling, 1969: 25). 
But if this is when and where science emerges have we not merely caught ourselves 
in a bind? I have argued that principle-centered, conceptual thinking stands in an antipodal 
relationship to the demands of Schelling's philosophizing. Yet based upon the account he 
has just presented us, do we not find ourselves having to think in terms of principles and 
forms, i.e., in terms of system~, in the plural, in an attempt to make our way back to thinking 
the eternal past? Schelling is all too aware of this concern. Immediately after the quotations 
just presented he writes: 
What the absolute beginning is, cannot itself be known; passing into knowing it 
ceases to be the beginning and therefore must advance until it finds itself again as 
beginning. When this beginning knows itself as beginning, a restored beginning, it is 
the end of all knowing. (Schelling, 1969: 25) 
But now, and no pun is intended, we are right back at the beginning. Schelling's endeavor, 
as Bowie described, may be to think the unthinkable as the ground prior to principle-
centered thinking. Yet for Schelling, we still have an entry point to thinking the beginning as 
beginning-though it is an in-road about which I would like to be quite cautious. That in­
road is humanity-an in-road (which will hopefully be more than a HolzweiJ that we will 
return to in full in the next chapter. Schelling explains: 
It appears that for humans there can be no knowledge of eternal freedom. Yet we 
demand such immediate knowledge, it is true. The only possibility of such 
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knowledge would be if this self-knowledge of eternal freedom were our consciousness, 
and vice versa, if our consciousness were to be a se!fknowledge ifeternalfreedom. (Schelling, 
1969: 33) 
Schelling insists that this would then make the appearance of eternal freedom in humanity 
the reconstructed beginning, the beginning begun anew. We are then left asking: what 
exactly does this mean? We are certainly, yet again, left with a strange way of thinking 
freedom. If our consciousness is the self-knowledge, or coming to self-awareness, of the 
infinite productivity of being would that not mean that all of our knowledge, all of our 
knowing, is a knowledge-or knowing-of freedom, in the full sense of the double genitive 
operative at that moment? 
For the sake of clarity we must now take a brief leave from discussing the manner of 
thinking that is necessary to think eternal freedom in Schelling, we shall return to this 
question as the focal point of our next chapter, wherein we will investigate the consequences 
that Schelling's thinking of being as freedom (a claim I have not yet made good on) has on 
the way he thinks about human freedom. Before we can get to that investigation, we need to 
turn to one of Heidegger's more famous assertions regarding Schelling's Freiheitsschrift. "Kry 
assertion: freedom not the property of the human, rather: human the property of freedom" 
(Heidegger, 1995: 11). There are a wide variety of ways in which this assertion could, and 
have, been taken up. Heidegger himself goes on to explain the stakes of the reversal of the 
subject-predicate structure as an attempt to show that Schelling begins to ask about human 
freedom as an attempt to move beyond the human to that which is "more essential and 
powerful than humanity itself: freedom, not as an addition or an endowment of the human 
will, but rather as the essence of proper being as the essence of the ground for beings as a 
whole" (Heidegger, 1995: 11). And I hope it has been clear by now that, up to a point, I 
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agree with Heidegger on this reading of Schelling. \Vhat is important, however, is how we 
understand the assertion that Schelling would make freedom the "essence of the ground for 
beings as a whole." After putting this assertion forward, Heidegger shows us what he is 
really fixing on to at this point: Schelling's assertion in the Freiheitsschnft that "In the latest 
and highest instance there is no other being than willing. Willing is primal being [Wollen ist 
Ursein], and to this alone do all of being's predicates apply: groundlessness, eternity, 
independence from time, self-affirmation" (1/7,351). On Heidegger's reading this means 
that, for Schelling, "being is comprehended as willing, as freedom" (Heidegger, 1995: 114). 
IfHeidegger is right, and we have entered back to a place wherein freedom in 
Schelling's thinking is to be thought as willing-which is, I think, indubitably the case-are 
we not back to a point wherein Schelling's thinking is based upon "the modern 
interpretation of beingness as subjectivity" (Heidegger, 1995: 206)? And if this is the case, is 
not Heidegger correct when he asserts that, "Schelling thinks metaphysically, onto-
theologically, but in the highest completion" (Heidegger, 1995: 212)? 
Section IV 
Will and Onto-Theology: Heidegger's Critique of Schelling 
Before we can clarify whether or not Schelling is actually able to raise himself up to 
the level of thinking the absolute-and whether or not the very presentation of such an 
absolute necessitates a principle-oriented thinking-Heidegger yet again demands our 
attention. The objective of this section will be to explain the quotations with which the 
previous section closed. In other words, the task for this section is to explain why 
Heidegger thinks that Schelling remains a metaphysician and an onto-theologian. To do so, 
we must return to the Freedom essay with a bit more care than has thus far been done. My 
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objective is to show that while Heidegger, as I previously asserted, is clearly correct in 
asserting that willing is a limit concept for Schelling, what exactly this willing means in the 
Freedom essay-and even more so, what it means in Ages 0/the World and the Erlanger 
Lectures-may disrupt our common sense (or at least, our philosophical common sense) 
understanding of how willing functions and what it entails. 
For Heidegger, the most important aspect of Schelling's thinking-and that which 
makes his thinking, at least in part, exorbitant to the long history of metaphysics while still 
belonging to it-is that, while he is committed to a certain way of thinking ground as arche or 
f:ypokeimenon, the way in which these concepts appear in his writing is peculiar: God is always 
already bifurcated into God as ground and God as existence. Let us turn to Schelling's text 
to get an initial sense of what exactly this means, and why exactly it must be so. 
Schelling's Freedom essay is an extraordinarily complex piece of philosophical writing, 
made no easier to handle by the fact that, on the surface, it presents itself as a strange 
instance in the long history of theodicy. As David Farrell Krell explains, on the surface, the 
essay is an attempt to explain "the philosophical problem of the origin and existence of evil" 
(Krell, 2005: 71). And for the moment, I will approach this essay in accord with this surface 
interpretation, as only when we approach the text in this manner can Heidegger's criticisms 
make sense. 
Schelling hopes to offer an explanation of how humans can be free for both good 
and evil, while at the same time, absolving God, the creator, of any overt responsibility for 
this evil. Schelling does not want to revert to any of the historical interpretations of evil, 
such as those presented by Augustine, Plotinus or Leibniz, which would hold evil to be 
privation. Nor does Schelling want to offer a "merely formal concept of freedom," such as 
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that which his Idealist predecessors offer (at least on his account). Rather, he wants to 
present a "real and living concept [of freedom], which would be a capacity for good and for 
evil" (I/7, 353). In order to attain both of these objectives-a real and living and concept of 
freedom and a perfect God-Schelling introduces the following way of thinking God: 
There is nothing before or outside of God, so God must have the ground of his 
existence in himself. All philosophies say this; but they speak of this ground as a 
mere concept, without making it something real and actual. This ground of his 
existence, which God has in himself, is not God taken observed absolutely, i.e., 
insofar as he exists; because it is only the ground of his existence, it is nature-in 
God; a being that is truly inseparable from him, but still distinguished. (I/7, 358) 
This ground that is in God, inseparable from God, but still distinguished from God is 
described as nature. It is also described as, "what in God himself is not himself" Finally, he 
says (and we shall have to return to this assertion more fully later), "Ifwe want to bring this 
being nearer to humanity, we could say it would be the longing [Sehnsuch~ that the eternal 
one feels to give birth to itself" (I/7, 359). This longing is described as a willing that lacks 
intellect, it is arational drive, it is-interestingly enough-the "remainder which never 
surfaces" in creation (I/7, 360). 
So, how precisely does introducing this bifurcation in God, which we addressed 
earlier in relation to Ages ifthe World, solve the 'problems' that I pointed to a moment ago? 
Why would introducing an arational drive, an arational aspect into God gives us both real 
and actual human freedom and preserve God? The reasons for this are quite simple: God 
taken as ground is arational, primal willing, unconscious self-desiring. God taken as 
existence is God as understanding. Yet in order for God to be given back to himself as a 
unity that knows itself, he must first see himself reflected back to himself in the development 
of nature out of himself as ground (I/7, 364). For Schelling, God cannot exist in full self­
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knowledge in advance, that is, prior to creation, as otherwise God would be responsible for 
evil in his creations. Thus, to repeat, God must only come to self-consciousness through the 
becoming of his creation. In putting this account forward, Schelling believes that both 
God's justice and human freedom can be preserved. 
It must be noted that the account given here is radically simplified, yet I think, for 
the moment at least, it will suffice. As was said, this split in God between God as ground 
and God as existence is central for Heidegger's reading of Schelling. He famously refers to it 
as the SrynsJuge, "the jointure of being" (Heidegger, 1995: 188). This characterization of 
being as jointure is still, for Heidegger, a trope of an arche, a subiectum, a ground. It is the 
reference point, in fact, the basis to which all interpretations of being must be referred. As 
was said, it is exorbitant to a simplistic variant of principial thinking because the principle is 
doubled within itself, yet it is still a principle, a basis. Not only is it still a basis-even if a 
peculiar basis-but for Heidegger it does not even stay all that peculiar. In fact, for 
Heidegger, given Schelling's emphasis upon willing as primal being, the true duplicity of this 
jointure is collapsed back into the univocity of the will. The will is both the will of the 
ground and the will of existence and precedes them both-or put it another way, it is that 
which is "most in being of all beings" and upon the basis ofwhich all things are measured, 
encountered, and thought (Heidegger, 1995: 212). 
Taking will in this way in Schelling permits Heidegger to arrive at the conclusion that 
closed the last section of this chapter-Schelling is the pinnacle of onto-theology. Though a 
bifurcation is introduced, it is introduced only to be sublated in the aspiration for the system 
of freedom. As for Heidegger, it is with the question of system, and its relation to will, that 
Schelling both rises and falls. His desire to arrive at a system of freedom-a seemingly 
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paradoxical task-necessitates that he posits the bifurcation within God. But if this same 
bifurcation between God as primal, arationallonging and God as actualized understanding is 
taken with its full force it means that God as ground cannot be included or accounted for 
within the system, at least insofar as that system is a system takes the will as understanding to 
be its principle. Heidegger writes, "But if the system is only in understanding, then it 
remains that the ground and the opposition are excluded from the system as the other of the 
system, and the system is, taken from the perspective of the whole of beings, no longer the 
system" (Heidegger, 1995: 194). Heidegger refers to this paradoxical necessity of exclusion 
as the "difficulty on which he shatters [er scheiterij." Not only does this difficulty shatter 
Schelling's aspirations in the Freedom essay, for Heidegger it haunts and shatters all of 
Schelling's future philosophical endeavors. It is the reason why Schelling must turn to a 
concept of the absolute that is able to unify this jointure so as to prevent the collapse of the 
system, but this of course would mean that the jointure itselfwould no longer be an original 
bifurcation-absolute as absolute willing would reign over such a split thus nullifying the 
jointure of being's exorbitancy from the long history of metaphysics. 
This shattering is the reason why Heidegger sees Schelling as completion of 
metaphysics, of the first beginning. For Heidegger, Schelling "falls back into the fixed 
tradition of western thought without transforming it creatively" (Heidegger, 1995: 194). He 
takes us to the point wherein we can recognize the necessity of the other beginning out of 
the first. But for Heidegger, this other beginning must take place through a "full 
transformation of the first beginning, it is never possible by merely letting the first beginning 
stand" (Heidegger, 1995: 194). Yet here, I am left wondering, alongside Wirth, "Did 
Schelling really just let the first beginning stand" (Wirth, 2004: 4)? Wirth insists that 
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Heidegger misreads Schelling in large part due to Heidegger's emphasis upon the systematic 
character of Schelling's thinking, saying, "by insisting on Schelling's systematicity, on his 
embrace of oppositional forces that he can never succeed in coordinating into an account of 
the Whole, Heidegger pushes Schelling closer to Hegel than Schelling would have placed 
himself' (Wirth, 2004: 4). For Wirth, Schelling's constant insistence upon the self-revelation 
of God-which really means, the perpetually becoming character of God, a God who can 
never be complete, a God who is always beginning, and beginning again-takes him outside 
of the domain of onto-theology. He writes, "Schelling will never be finished, for the 
beginning can never in any way take possession of itself, while Hegel can complete a thought 
about the Whole, despite the ongoing life of the negative" (Wirth, 2004: 4). Thus, Heidegger 
is right: Schelling's thinking really does shatter. However, this shattering must be heard in a 
very different way ifwe turn away from an attempt to offer an account of Schelling as a 
systematic thinker-or at least a thinker who attempts to posit a system that is based on an 
onto-theological principle. Let us listen to Wirth again, keeping in mind how much like 
Heidegger this sounds yet how differently it resonates: 
Indeed, Schelling often speaks of the problem of the system of freedom, of an 
articulation of the Whole that cannot articulate its ever barbarian and nomadic 
founding principle. A system of freedom is a system constructed upon a principle 
that ruins all ideas. The system of freedom cannot assimilate the principle that bore 
it and that will ruin it, yet such a principle tragically grounds the Whole, disallowing 
the Whole ever wholly to be itself. (Wirth, 2004: 5) 
While being careful, so as to give Heidegger his due, what Wirth demands from us in our 
reading of Schelling becomes clear. How are we to hear Schelling's talk about the will, the 
absolute, and subjectivity if these terms do not serve as onto-theological grounds of system? 
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Section V
 
The Dissembling Subject of Freedom
 
The task of this final section of this chapter is to offer a way of reading Schelling's 
usage of the language of will, absolute, subjectivity, and other terms that Heidegger 
associates with the first beginning, onto-theology, and Western metaphysics in a manner that 
does not let the first beginning stand. To give Heidegger's critique its due, I will begin with 
an investigation of Schelling's discussion of the absolute in the Erlanger Lectures and then turn 
to investigate the relationship between subject and predicate in Schelling's thinking of 
freedom and decision in the Freedom essay and in Ages 0/the World. 
Recall that for Heidegger, Schelling's shattering in the face of attempting to maintain 
a coherent account of the jointure of being and of system leads him to posit a concept of the 
absolute in which these differences are united to the point of sublation, or maybe said better, 
eradication. For Heidegger, Schelling's positing of the absolute leads him to articulate an 
original univocity of being. Is this an accurate account of what actually happens in 
Schelling's text? 
In the Erlanger Lectures, Schelling perpetually reverts back and forth between the 
language of the absolute subject and eternal freedom. As Theodore George notes, "In an 
age marked by a growing awareness of the importance of alterity and difference for 
philosophical inquiry, the issue of the absolute cannot but give pause" (George, 2005: 137).28 
However, if one attends carefully to Schelling's comments about the absolute in his Erlanger 
28 For George, given that his essay focuses in on Schelling's early writings, his understanding of the absolute is 
much more similar to the way in which Kant takes up the term: as the absolute unity of subject and world 
attained through the gathering force of reason. George's purpose here is to show that this unity is a task that is 
excessive to reason-for the reasons Kant demonstrated in the third antinomy. George's claim is that it is this 
internal crisis of reason that prompts Schelling's turn to the poetic. While this account seems entirely correct 
to me, I do not believe that George's account of the absolute in this essay exhausts the way in which the term 
functions for Schelling. 
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Lectures, and elsewhere, the concern that George is describing-as an echo of Heidegger's 
critique of Schelling-may be eased. For instance, formulations such as "this absolute 
subject, eternal freedom" and "the absolute subject or eternal freedom" dominate this text 
(Schelling, 1969: 29). In fact there is not a single instance in this text where Schelling uses 
the term 'absolute' or the phrase 'absolute subject' without give us a sive and an 'eternal 
freedom' at least within the same paragraph. Yet it is clear within the text of the Erlanger 
Lectures that Schelling has made some dramatic reconfigurations with regards to how he 
understands the relationship between expansion and contraction from the time of the 
Freedom essay, and even from the time ofAges ifthe World. Neither the terms ground and 
existence nor the terms expansion and contraction appear in this text, at least not in a 
manner that is operative as in those two texts. Unlike Ages ifthe World or the Freedom essay, 
Schelling does not begin this text with an account of the internal bifurcation within God. 
He does begin these lectures with an account of "originary struggle [UrzwistJ" (Schelling, 
1969: 10), but this struggle is that conflict that emerges between "the original asustasfa of 
human knowledge" and the absolute subject, or, eternal freedom as that which is to be 
gathered into a system of human knowing (Schelling, 1969: 15). This whole conflict is 
described as the matter for thinking. As Wirth explains, "[Schelling] names the prime matter 
of thinking asustasia-incoherence, irregularity, chaos. It is the lack or privation of !ystasis, of 
standing and being together" (Wirth, 2003: 210). 
Looking back to the beginning of this chapter, this absolute subject is that which 
eludes all coercion, conceptualization, and stoppage, and as Schelling notes, this absolute 
subject "should not be confused with God" (Schelling, 1969: 18). Rather, it is that which 
can be grasped as God and as not God, depending on what form it is enclosed in at any 
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given moment-and it is at this point that Schelling explains why he understands this Sache 
as eternal freedom. He explains "it is still originally free to either enclose itself or not 
enclose itself in a form," at which point he immediately cautions his audience: "But I do not 
want to say that it is that which is free to take on form. As then, this freedom would appear 
as a properry, which presumes a still distinct and independent subject-rather, freedom is the 
essence [Wesen] of the subject, or ids itself nothing other than eternalfreedwl' (Schelling, 1969: 21). 
This eternal freedom is precisely what we earlier characterized as "possibility for the sake of 
possibility, possibility without intention or object" (Schelling, 1969: 22). I take this later 
assertion to be particularly important in light of Heidegger's critique, and we shall return to it 
shortly, but for now, let us move in within Schelling's text, so as to enable us to complete the 
task I set out at the beginning of this section. 
At this juncture in the text, a few key terms appear for the first time. Schelling goes 
on to name this absolute subject sive eternal freedom as will, and then again as indifference. 
He writes, "It is will-not the will of a being [Wesens] that is distinct from it-nothing but 
the will itself. It is also not the will for something (as that would already limit it), but rather 
the JJ;ill in itse!!' (Schelling, 1969: 22). It is a will that neither wants nor does not want, it is 
"the will in complete indifference [Gleichgiiltzgkeit] (an indifference which again encompasses 
itself and non-indifference)." Schelling then goes on to say-potentially so as to recognize 
his own greatness, but more likely to reference Jakob B6hme-that "you may at least be 
aware that historically this same indifference was declared as the indifference [Indifferen:?J as 
the form of the properly absolute" (Schelling, 1969: 22). Is this the same Indifferenz that is 
made famous in the Freedom essay? The same Indifferenz that Schelling also names as Ungrund 
when he writes, "It must be a being [Wesen] bifore all ground and before all existence, and 
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thus before all duality whatsoever; what else could we name this than primal ground 
[Ut;gntndJ, or better yet, nonground [UngntndJ" (J/7, 407)? 
Krell clearly articulates the entirety of our problematic in tarrying with Heidegger's 
reading of Schelling with regards to precisely this issue of nonground. As he explains, the 
bifurcation of ground and existence runs the risk of collapsing into a dualism. To avoid this, 
"Science must therefore strive to find that Mittelpunkl' at which ground and existence 
interpenetrate with one another. This ispreciselY the ut;ge and necessity that Heideggerpoints to in 
Sche/ling so as to indict himfor his onto-theological bearing. IfSchelling were in fact an onto-
theologian what else could we call this but an Ur-ground-the ultimate basis of reality in 
things, that principle to which all must be referred for their meaning and fixity? Yet 
Schelling, even in the Freedom essay does not let this stand. Krell writes: 
In Schelling's text (" .. .wie kiinnen wir es anders nennen als den Ut;grund oder vielmehr 
Ungrund?"), the primal, primordial, incipient, originary ground and the nonground 
are brought into the closest proximity: only a single letter distinguishes them, not 
even an entire letter, inasmuch as here it is merely a matter of expanding a single 
stroke of one letter, extending the arc of the r in Ut;grund to the n of Ungrund. The 
one downward stroke of the pen, performed at the stroke of one, alters origins to 
nihilations. (Krell, 2005: 94) 
While I am forced to hold off on commenting on Krell's description of the nonground or 
unground as nihilation, I think it is worth noting that this simple move in Schelling takes us 
from granting the existence of a supreme, primal, super ground in Schelling, to having to 
wonder what exacdy we would have to do to make sense of speaking of such an absolute sive 
subject sive will sive indifference sive freedom as an origin? I, for one, cannot encounter 
Schelling's description of eternal freedom as fitting within his account of the way ground 
functions in onto-theology; it neither rigidly instantiates a distinction between the sensible 
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and the intelligible, nor does it serve exhibit the thought of a thinker who gloms onto 
presence and upsurgence in lieu of concealment and withdrawal. 
If one were to look back to the earlier "Kry sentence: Freedom not the property of the 
human, rather, the human the property of freedom" (Heidegger, 1995: 11) as cited from 
Heidegger, we could see one reason why he would be inclined to read freedom as a ground 
that maintains its internal coherency and constant presence. Yet, as we saw a moment ago, 
for the Schelling of the Erlanger Lectures, this freedom is pure possibility, possibility without 
intention. What sense would make it to refer to possibility having a property as if it were a 
subject of which we could predicate? Wirth explains that to say the human is a predicate of 
freedom "assumes that freedom itself is a subject but. " while freedom first appears in the 
subject position, it is a false subject, a dissembling and ironic subject" (Wirth, 2004: 6). 
Schelling himself will come back to explain this nearly twenty years later in a lecture in 
Munich, writing: 
This unknown what, this X of the unprethinkable being is clearly antecedenter or a 
priori in relation to any existent [das Sryende]. But this does not prevent that precisely 
this, which is apriori to any existent, and can be taken post actum (as it is appropriate 
to say here) as being possible [Seinskiinnende]. We now say that it does not prevent, 
we say not yet: it is actually so - this can first be shown aposteriorz~ through its 
consequences; apriori it is only the possibility to be realized [a priori ist nur die 
Miiglichkeit einzusehen] , it is precisely that which always precedes, and can be taken as 
being possible. (II/4, 338) 
What is particularly exciting about this passage is not just Schelling's articulation of the 
perpetual priority of being as unvordenkliche, but also his insistence-which is persistent 
throughout this lecture-that this Srynskiinnende is prior to any existent, or as Wirth would 
have it in his translation ofAges ojthe World, anything that has being (Schelling, 2000: xxxi). 
This would far remove us from being able to take this eternal freedom-regardless of 
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whether we hear it as will, absolute subject, eternal magic, or any of the numerous names 
Schelling uses to describe the ungraspable-as basis to which things could be referred, at 
least not a basis that is constant and has any standing on its own. 
Much earlier in his philosophical career Schelling makes an even more provocative 
assertion regarding the constitution of the absolute; an assertion that will take us full circle, 
back to the beginning of this chapter. In his Philosop!?J ifArt, Schelling writes, "the inner 
essence of the absolute, wherein all lies as one and one as all, is original chaos itself; but even 
here we encounter the identity of absolute form with absolute formlessness" (l/5, 465). In 
pointing to this quote, I would like to hear it as explained by Marcia Sa Cavalcante Schuback, 
"It is important to note that Schelling doesn't say "chaos" but "the original chaos," hereby 
distinguishing between a simple chaos and an original chaos. By the latter Schelling means 
the chaos that is beyond or indifferent to the difference between chaos and order." This ur­
chaos, in relation to which human reason experiences the Urzwist, is "the inconceivably 
placeless force of an eternal beginning," or is I would have it, it is being as freedom 
(Schuback, 2005: 75). But how are we to think this freedom? Ifmy exposition of Schelling 
thus far has not been sufficient, Martin Wallen can help: 
A history in which the past continues along with the present undermines the single 
narrative development from beginning to middle to end told by a transcendent, 
subjective narrator, reminding us that within the cosmic orgasm an infinite 
possibility obtains. (Wallen, 2005: 128) 
To say infinite possibility obtains, is to say that if anything reigns (in the manner in which 
epochal principles reign throughout the history of metaphysics for Heidegger) in Schelling's 
work it is freedom; freedom thought as the pure possibility of being, the perpetually 
underdetermined character of coming to presence. This can be made all the more clear 
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when we consider another manner in which Schelling's phrase, "nie aufgehende Rest," can be 
translated. I have translated this phrase-in accord with Heidegger's discussion of 
phusis--as the remainder that never surfaces. Krell offers a variant translation: "the remnant 
that is never wholly absorbed" (Krell, 2005: 90). While I have been suggesting that the 
former reading was more salient insofar as my work in this chapter has been to show 
Schelling's attentiveness to the perpetual withdrawal of being in light of Heidegger's critique, 
Krell's translation permits us to think through this Sache in another manner, one which is 
more instructive for our thinking of freedom. 
Since the beginning of this chapter I have been emphasizing the productive 
character-the infinitely productive character-of, or better as, being for Schelling. If we 
hear Schelling's discussion of this Rest, as a phenomenon that both never surfaces and 
precisely as such can never be absorbed, we will see that what is reallY at stake here is excess 
or overflow. This constant beginning, just like Bataille's general economy as described by 
Wirth in the quotation that opens this chapter, thwarts any attempt to capture it in the net of 
reason not merely because it withdraws, but because it isjust too much. On the surface, this 
would seem to fly in the face of Heidegger's perpetual insistence on Ereignis as withdrawal 
and thus open up a new tension between Schelling and Heidegger. While I think this 
tension could be explored, I would merely like to point out an instance from late in 
Heidegger's career wherein he offers a rethinking of Ereignis in precisely these terms, that is, 
as Obermafi or Obeifii!!e, excess or overflow. In the Four Seminars, specifically in his Seminar in 
Le Thor 1969, Heidegger writes, ''What is named together and at the same time in the word 
phuein? It is the overflow, the excess ofwhat presences." This overflow, this excess, is said 
to "correspond" with "the a of a!etheia." Heidegger continues, "Privation is not negation. 
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The more strongly the a of aletheia becomes what is indicated by the wordphuein, the more 
powerful the source from which it arises becomes, the concealment in unconcealment" 
(GA1S,331).29 While it is only a provisional interpretation of this passage, I suggest that 
what Heidegger is announcing here is that the structure of presencing as the oft-mentioned 
play of revealing and concealing amounts to the simultaneous play ofwithdrawal and excess 
of the generosity of being-which he re-characterizes here as Anwesen lassen, or, to let 
presencing; in fact I will venture to say that the withdrawal ofEreignis for thought is precisely 
due to the excessiveness, the overflow, the overfulness (to coin a Nietzschean word) that is 
presencmg. 
And it is here that I come to my conclusion for this chapter: my contention is that 
much like Heidegger will equate being with the perpetually underdetermined character of 
presencing in his later writings-potentially underdetermined precisely due to the excess 
proper to presencing-, Schelling here is equating this unvordenkliche being, taken as freedom 
or pure possibility, with the very nature of nature in its perpetual overflow. As Wirth writes, 
having glommed on to the description of being as asystasia, "asystasia is not therefore 
something, a discernible source out ofwhich philosophical activity properly emerges. It is, 
rather, the absolute nothing. It is not an empty space or lack. It is superabundance" (Wirth, 
2004: 211). But as Wirth is quick to point out, this superabundance, as Schelling says, "is 
nothing-not something, this itself would at least only be a negative definition, it is also not 
nothing, that is, it is everything" (Schelling, 1969: 17). 
Schelling is clearly giving us an account of origins here, but it is an origin that is 
perpetually manifesting itself, and thus perpetually concealing itself-or better, dissembling 
29 I am grateful to Andrew Mitchell for pointing this passage out to me. 
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itself-as an always already completed origin from which things spring always already 
determined. It is the "ewige Anfang, the eternally still to be born, the Unvordenklichkeit or 
unprethinkability inherent in the donation of the ceaselessly discontinuous gift of nature" 
(Wirth, 2004: 17). It is Hesiod's Chaos-which I have argued, following Wirth, Schelling 
names as a!ystasia, nature, unprethinkable being-from which Night is born, it is an 
emergence without an agent. Yet if this is so, why does Schelling use the language that he 
does, the language of metaphysics of subjectivity? Let us recall a passage cited earlier; the 
passage wherein Schelling discusses the longing of God to give birth to himself in the 
Freedom essay. This longing is what Heidegger characterizes as the will of the ground over 
and against the will of the understanding. Schelling says, "Ifwe want to bring this being 
nearer to humanity, we could say it would be the longing [Sehnsuch~ that the eternal one feels 
to give birth to itself' (1/7, 359). I present this passage again to highlight an element of it 
that has thus far gone unexplored: Schelling's initial caveat. In German, he writes, "Wollen 
wir uns dieses Wesen menschlich nailer bringen," and then goes on to articulate this account of 
ground as longing. This passage could also be translated to read, "Ifwe wish to speak of this 
being in terms more accessible to man.,,30 Both Hayden-Roy's translation and my own show 
that Schelling is clearly aware of the anthropomorphic character of this account of ground 
and willing. He clearly thinks that this way of accounting for God qua jointure of being has 
its merits insofar as it makes the phenomena in question more accessible to human 
cognition, or more like the way in which human life unfolds. And at a certain point, I am 
left wondering whether or not he should truly be nailed to the cross of onto-theology for 
making such a linguistic decision-as after all, if we do not understand things in "human 
30 This is Priscilla Hayden-Ray's translation, as found in Philosop!?J ofGerman Idealism (Behler, 1987: 238). 
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terms," how else are you and I to grasp them? If I have made a compelling case that 
Schelling's thinking of being as freedom, or pure possibility, dissembles any constant origin, 
Heidegger's critique may appear to be nothing more than a linguistic quibble. Yet before I 
can truly vindicate such a bold assertion, I must turn back to promises made earlier in this 
chapter, particularly the apparent thesis of this chapter that has thus far gone unexplained: 
freedom is both the matter and manner of thinking for Schelling. 
Having noted the absence of a full-fledged inquiry into this assertion, the stakes of 
the next chapter should now be clear. I will turn back to numerous assertions within 
Schelling'S Freedom essay, the Ages if the World, the Erlanger Lectures, and elsewhere to make a 
case that Schelling's seemingly strange assertion that human freedom is eternal freedom 
reconstructed is not that peculiar at all, and can really only be understood insofar as we 
appreciate the perpetually dialogic and ecstatic character of the manner of Schelling's 
thinking. Here I will argue that Schelling's thinking of philosophizing is much closer to 
Heidegger's following characterization of philosophy: 
It is always to be emphasized that philosophy arises in the dimension of the wholly 
excessive. In fact philosophy is the answer of a human essence that is met by an 
excess of presence, - an answer that is in itself excessive. (GAlS, 331) 
In the end I want to make the provocative assertion that for Schelling philosophizing is the 
activity of dialogue itself, a dialogue that both entails and necessitates the perpetually ecstatic 
character of humanity, and a dialogue in which we both think and experience freedom. 
Schelling himself makes this clear when he writes, "To think is to abandon knowledge; 
knowledge is bound, thinking is in complete freedom, and the word [denken] itself implies 
that all free thinking is the result of a separation, a conflict, or a crisis, that has been 
overcome [aujgehobenen]" (Schelling, 1969: 52). Schelling characterizes such thinking, or 
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knowing-not knowledge, as if it were completed-as a "free and restful observer that 
accompanies and witnesses the movement [of eternal freedom] step by step" (Schelling, 
1969: 55). The objective of the next chapter will be to clarify these assertions and to show 
how they relate to place of the human in nature, Schelling's understanding of conceptual 
thinking. 
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CHAPTER V 
DECISION, THINKING, AND FREEDOM 
Given the work that was accomplished in the previous chapter, the task for this 
chapter is to explain what it would mean to say: for Schelling, freedom is the manner of 
thinking, particularly in light of his manifold discussions of human freedom. While I have 
already spent a substantial amount of time laying the stakes of thinking for Schelling, the 
account given is not yet sufficient to clarify what Schelling is up to with his thinking of 
human freedom, in light of his thinking of being as freedom, his account of philosophizing, 
and his account of the primordial act of decision as detailed in Ages ofthe World (and alluded 
to in the middle of the previous chapter). This chapter will thereby be divided into five 
sections-wherein the first two address the question of decision, the third and fourth 
sections address the question of thinking and freedom, and the final section serves as our 
jump-off point for the final chapter-in an attempt to give an account of these matters of 
thinking that reign so supreme in Schelling's writing from his middle period. 
My objective in exploring these phenomena is to strengthen the reading of Schelling 
I offered in the previous chapter. First, I suggest that, following Nietzsche's famous 
indictment of grammarians, not all acts, even an act such as decision, require a subject to 
perform them. Here again, I show how far Schelling's account of the originary decision of 
existence is from onto-theology, and thereby from the first beginning of philosophy. Yet in 
doing so I raise certain problems for myself: would not such an act of primordial decision 
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necessitate a point of origin, even if not an agent qua I?ypokeimenon? In the second half of the 
chapter, I will show that while this may be the case, it by no means disturbs the account I 
have given thus far for a number of reasons, the most important reason being Schelling's 
caveat about bringing-things nearer to humanity in terms of their comprehensibility in the 
Freedom essay. In accounting for freedom as decision, as opposed to choice-as Felix Duque 
says, "Decision is always originary: it is the origin (in German: Ursprung, the "spring that 
gives origin"). Choice is always derived, and in ground, not wholly free (one chooses on the 
basis of reasons, one de-cides so that reasons come to be)" (Duque, 2007: 74)-Schelling 
makes being as eternal freedom something thinkable to humans, given that human beings 
reconstruct this process of decision as ground-laying act, while at the same time enabling us 
to think beyond the bounds of this decision as one which belongs to a subject, and 
simultaneously gives us a way to think about our own freedom; a freedom that we attain only 
in our confrontation with the unprethinkability of decision. 
By thinking beyond the bounds of the subject, we are brought into dialogue with the 
unfolding of existence, an unfolding that is groundless, and which we ourselves are able to 
reconstruct insofar as we recognize the nonconceptual basis of the concept, i.e., the limit of 
thought. At this moment, in which what Schelling calls "free thinking" (Schelling, 1969: 52) 
is realized, we are brought to the point wherein freedom becomes both the manner and 
matter of thinking; I argue that this moment is the objective of all of Schelling's 
philosophizing, as is made clear by his insistence upon the primacy of ecstasy, self-emptying, 
Socratic ignorance, and Gelassenheit. 
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Section I
 
The Rotary Motion of the Drives
 
Just as Nietzsche served as our guide in tarrying with the subject of phenomenology 
in our reading of Heidegger, I take him as a guide yet again. This time, I would like to look 
at one of his more provocative assertions, it is an assertion that will have consequences that 
will reverberate both to work that has preceded this chapter and what will follow. In an 
extended criticism of the function of reason in philosophy, and its relation to Being-this 
time taken as a static entity, in the highest onto-theological sense-Nietzsche writes: 
We arrive amidst a gross fetish if we bring ourselves to consciousness of the 
fundamental presuppositions of the metaphysics of language, or as we say in 
German, of reason. This sees doer and deed everywhere: believes in will as cause in 
general, believes in "I", in I as being, in I as substance and projects the belief in the 
I-substance upon all things-it thereby first makes the concept "thing" ... Being is 
everywhere understood, foisted on, as cause: only from the conception "I" does the 
concept "being" first follow, as derivative. At the beginning stands the great fate of 
the error that the will is something, something that works-that will is a 
faculty...Today we know that it is merely a word...Very much later, in a world that 
is a thousand times more enlightened, the security, the subjective certainty that the 
categories of reason were in hand, came to the philosopher's consciousness with a 
shock. They concluded that these categories could not be derived from the 
empirical. From whence, then, do they derive? - And in India as in Greece the same 
mistake has been made: "we must have already, at one time, been at home in a 
higher world (-instead of in a very much lower one, which would be the truth!), we 
must have been divine, because we have reason!" ... In fact, up to this point, 
nothing has had a more naive persuasive force than the error of being, as it was, for 
example, formulated by the Eleatics: it speaks for itself in every word we say, and 
every sentence we utter! - Even the opponents of the Eleatics fell under the trance 
of their concepts of being: Democritus, amongst others, as he invented his 
atom ...Reason in language: oh what a deceitful old woman! I fear, we are not 
getting rid of God, because we still believe in grammar. (KGA, VII/III: 71) 
In quite typical fashion, Nietzsche takes out his hammer---doubling as his tuning fork-and 
tunefully nails the history of philosophy to the wall. Yet bombast aside, what are the stakes 
of Nietzsche's assertion? Put simply, Nietzsche believes there is a fundamental connection 
between the way we speak-particularly the structure of language: grammar-and our 
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attachment and commitment to the deed/doer relationship. In other words, Nietzsche 
believes that the way we speak, always attributing an agent to any action-and one need only 
think of the abuse a writer suffers who relies upon the passive voice, rather than upon a 
'one,' such as the one that began this caveat-exists in a reciprocally reinforcing relationship 
with our conception of the I as constant, unchanging, permanent, even immortal, agent. 
Not only does our manner of speaking always speak in favor of ourselves as agents, but it 
also always speaks in favor of the concept of being as constant presence, i.e., as ground. 
One need only think of the emphatic theist who refuses to hear out any account of the 
origins of the universe that does not begin with an intelligence by constantly demanding to 
know "where did that [be it the original compressed point of matter of the big bang, or 
whatever you like] come from?" to understand what Nietzsche has in mind. Neither 
German nor English give their speakers much of an opportunity to learn to think of deeds 
without doers. It is thereby only logical that someone would struggle to think the thought 
that Nietzsche recommends in Bryond Good and Evil: thinking happens, and sometimes I find 
myself at the site of its occurrence, having to deal with it. If that thought proves as difficult 
to think for most as it does for me, I can only imagine how hard of a thought 'being 
happens'-or, 'das Sein geschieht'-truly is; much less, the thought 'happening happens'-or, 
"das Geschehende geschieht.' Yet it has been precisely this thought that I have been suggesting 
we must make the matter for thinking if we are to think freedom in both Heidegger and 
Schelling. On the one hand, Schelling is clearly guilty of accounting for the emergence and 
capacities of humanity as flowing out of a 'higher' world to which we belong, but this is 
merely a surface reading of his text. Can we speak of a God who is internally ruptured as 
'higher'? 
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Keeping Nietzsche in mind, let us turn to a moment in Schelling's text that occupied 
a portion of the previous chapter, but which was left largely unexplained and unexplored: 
decision. As I have already asserted, in thinking decision, we must be careful not to conflate 
it with choice. As Duque pointed out for us, decision is always blind insofar as it has no 
means by which it could decide for what the best path to take would be. Choice, on the 
other hand, is always a choice between already existing options. Given that such options, 
whether they are different manners in which I would like conceive of my identity, or 
different brands of shoes that I could buy, always hinge on the priority of the existence of a 
world, decision can be put into relief as an act by which a world is constituted. And in 
Schelling, the stakes of decision are raised. The primordial decision, or deed, as we 
encounter it in Schelling's text, does not just set up a world in Heidegger's sense of the term, 
but rather sets up the world; this deed is the basis, the ground of all creation. It is the act by 
which the oft-discussed 'primordial deadlock of the drives,' the conflict between the 
expansive force, the A2, and the contractive force, the At, is broken. Schelling writes, 
"precisely that one commences and one of them is first, must result from a decision that 
certainly has not been made consciously, or through deliberation but can happen rather only 
when a violent power blindly breaks the unity in the jostling between the necessity and the 
impossibility to be" (Schelling, 2000: 13). It is this blind breaking of the deadlock to which 
we must hold fast in attempting to answer the question: what is a decision without a decider? 
While it is inevitable that this account presents itself as being somewhat 
contradictory to much of the account of Schelling's thinking of being that I have given in the 
last chapter, I believe that, in time, their consonance-even if ever so slightly out of 
tune-will become clear. For starters, there is an initial similitude between the account that 
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Schelling is giving at the beginning of the Ages if the World and what we have seen from the 
Erlanger Lectures insofar as the account of the latter is in large part concerned to describe 
being as fundamentally being possible. I think that this determination as always yet un-and­
underdetermined possibility can be seen in the Ages if the World-and Schelling himself gives 
us reasons to think this is the case in a number of places throughout this text-as describing 
precisely the chaos out of which the primordial act of decision breaks. Yet articulating this 
similitude is not my objective here, rather, my task now is to explain how-and maybe even 
more importantly, why-Schelling's description of the rupture of this chaos, and its 
subsequent snaring in the net of reason can account for the origins of all creation, or better, 
of all beings. 
Prior to turning to a more robust account of how decision functions in Schelling's 
text, we must look at what exactly is ruptured by this decision: the rotary motion of the 
drives, the principles, or the potencies within God. Schelling's description of the 
competition for priority between the expansive and contractive force in God (recall, as was 
said in the previous chapter, that both of these terms exist from eternity in God) amounts to 
an attempt to describe God's self-revelation from out of the perpetual cycle of one drive, 
either the expansive or the contractive, taking dominance. Picking up this cycle at what 
appears to the beginning-though it may only be the beginning for the mind that is still 
committed to thinking origin, Schelling is quite clear that the contractive force must take 
first priority. Schelling gives a number of reasons for this, but the most basic reason is 
actually quite simple: "it is manifest ... that actual power lies more in delimitation than 
expansion and ... to withdraw oneself has more to do with might than to give oneself' 
(Schelling, 2000: 14). And thus, "That God negates itself, restricts its being, and withdraws 
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into itself, is the eternal force and might of God. In this manner, the negating force is that 
which is singularly revealing of God" (Schelling, 2000: 15). He goes on to give a litany of 
examples to describe why this must be the case, let me attempt to offer a recap of all of 
these accounts. In order for any process to begin, whether that process be the growth of a 
tree or the creation of a number line, one must have the potential for counting or the 
potential for growth first condensed into one initial point-a point which may appear as 
non-being in relationship to the being that would be the tree or the series of real numbers, 
whether that be the seed, the root, or the number one-that serves as the basis for what is to 
grow from it. Bowie describes the image of the number line quite well: "the beginning of a 
line is not yet a line, it has no extension, but a point is not nothing at all, in that lines cannot 
be lines without points. It is this sort of beginning that is at issue here: it cannot be 
structurally located, but can only be understood through what it has ceased to be" (Bowie, 
1993: 99). In this cosmic scheme of things, this point of condensation is what Schelling will 
call, in the Freedom essay, God's ground or, "nature--in God" (J-/7, 358). 
This ground, as we have seen in the previous chapter, is what Schelling characterizes 
as God's Sehnsucht, its longing to give birth to itself. In the Ages if the World, Schelling 
characterizes this ground, the N, in terms of self-desire yet again. He explains: 
Each being primarily wants itself and this self-wanting is later precisely the basis of 
egoity, that through which a being withdraws itself or cuts itself off from other 
things and that through which it is exclusively itself, and therefore is, form the 
outside and in relation to everything else, negating. (Schelling, 2000: 16) 
This immediate contraction as self-desire is thus a no-saying to any form other than pure 
possibility, it is a rejection of expansion that ironically serves as the basis from which all 
expansion can take place. Presenting an analogy for the play of expansion and contraction in 
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Ages ofthe World lifted from Wolfram Hogrebe's Pradikation und Genesis (Hogrebe, 2000: 100), 
Zizek writes, "just before the start, the runner has to 'contract'-concentrate himself, to 
'immobilize' himself, to turn himself into a statue, so that he can then, at the sound of the 
pistol, spring up and run as fast as possible" (Zizek, 1996: 25). Schelling sees this explosion 
of the kinetic energy of the runner after her contraction into potentiality at the starting block 
as a necessity. However, it would be a mistake to see it as a dialectical necessity, at least in 
the way in which this term may usually be employed. Yet again recalling that both of these 
forces have always existed in God, the competition for priority amounts to a competition of 
negation. The contractive force, as represented by the runner at the blocks is pure 
potentiality, is a potentiality that maintains itself as what it is precisely by being "the pure 
power of assuming any and evety other possible form besides what it immediately is" (Thus 
in a sense, the example of the runner at the blocks does not really-make all that much sense, 
as that image is far too determinate to stand in for the A I , presumably this moment can only 
be thought negatively). The expansive force, as the opposed yes-saying, is the runner who 
bursts into her sprint, at which point she is sprinting, she is actualized. As Beach has it, the 
A2 as "solid determinacy remains just what it is, without the ability to be anything else" 
(Beach, 1994: 125). Thus the contractive force, as pure negation of determinacy, and the 
expansive force, as that which actually has being-pure determinacy-can only reign insofar 
as they negate each other. Beach explains "neither can coexist simultaneously with the other 
in its pure condition, for the reason that their essential natures are inherently incompatible" 
(Beach, 1994: 124). 
I said a moment ago that it was a mistake to see night and day relating to one 
another as dialectical opposites; speaking to that matter, Schelling writes, "the day lies 
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concealed in the night, albeit overwhelmed by the night; likewise the night in the day, albeit 
kept down by the day, although it can establish itself as soon as the repressive potency 
disappears" (Schelling, 2000: 18). For Schelling, this interplay of day and night is a 
relationship of negation, however it is an instance of negation that is not based upon two 
fully constituted, self-standing, opposites. Rather, much like the relationship between night 
and day in Heraclitus-rather than in Hesiod, who I cited in the last chapter-night and day 
for Schelling, belong to one another. Heidegger explains that for Heraclitus (and I would 
argue for Schelling as well) "night is day as the going-under of day. To let day and night 
belong to one another lies being as much as logos. This is precisely what Hesiod could not 
understand so as to distinguish it from night and day only in their alternations, as he had 
seen them, as he says in the Theogof!J: 'The house never holds both at the same time'." For 
Heraclitus it is the exact opposite, "the house of being is that of day-night taken together." 
Heidegger translates Heraclitus to say, "Hesiod, the teacher of the multitudes, him they hold 
as a man of deepest wisdom, he who was not familiar when it comes to day and night: in 
truth it is one" (GAlS, 276). This oneness of day and night, in truth-which I read here as 
in unconcealment, insofar as all unconcealment holds within it concealment-for Heidegger 
means that these terms are not thinkable in isolation from one another-but not because we 
can only think one term in conjunction with its opposite. Rather, because this very act of 
opposition hinges on the more originary belonging-together of this opposition in a state of 
contraries, which contain each other, even if only their not-yet character. 
Thus for Schelling, the relationship between day and night-which he uses here as 
an analog for expansion and contraction, respectively-is not a dialectical relationship as 
neither term is sufficiently constituted on its own so as to be able to oppose the other. 
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Taken in their belonging-together, the potencies are then named the A3, which is Schelling's 
manner of naming indifference in the potencies. I would argue that this is what Warnek is 
naming when he discusses Heidegger's reading of H6lderlin, wherein Innigkeit is 'translated' 
by Heidegger as das Zusammengehb'ren des Fremden, the belonging together of the strange. As 
Warnek writes, "the task of translating Innigkeitthus demands the translation of the 
movement of translation itself, the thought of the difference that joins all things together" 
(Warnek, 2006: 65). Accordingly, Schelling says, "this third must in itself be outside and 
above all antithesis, the purest potency, indifferent toward both, free from both, and the 
most essential" (Schelling, 2000: 19). Warnek's account of Innigkeitwill accord with 
Schelling's understanding of the A3 so long as we are willing to re-write Warnek's difference, 
as indifference, a point to which we will return in a moment. The real difficulty in 
Schelling's account emerges when we recognize that "each of the three has an equal right to 
be that which has being" (Schelling, 2000: 19). This moment leads to the greatest quandary 
of Schelling's Ages ifthe World, and the key question to be addressed in the next section of 
this chapter: how does this deadlock ever get broken? 
Section II
 
Differentiating the Indifferent: Decision
 
From a logical perspective, the movement of Schelling's text at this juncture would 
be radically unsatisfactory. The three potencies will continue to swirl around another in their 
rotary motion so long as they all compete to be what is essential in this triad. The only way 
for this deadlock to be broken is for something to come on the scene that asserts itself as 
having being; something higher, in the face ofwhich, the potencies "debase themselves into 
simple being" (Schelling, 2000: 22). What is this other? Because it cannot be one of the 
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potencies, it cannot be any way of being that would compete to be what is essential. It can 
have no determinate character that would assert itself, not even the negative (in)determinacy 
of the A\ it can only be pure possibility, "the eternal freedom to be" (Schelling, 2000: 23).31 
This eternal freedom to be that reigns over the rotary motion of the potencies is no thing; 
though Schelling names it as the Gottheit, which Wirth translates as the Godhead-but would 
more commonly be translated as divinity. I read this moment in Schelling's text to be one of 
the many ways in which he names what Holderlin calls the holy. Given our discussion of the 
holy as chaos, Schelling's description of the Godhead would seem to accord. He writes: 
It is not divine nature or substance, but the devouring ferocity of purity that a 
person is able to approach only with an equal purity. Since all Being goes up in it as 
if in flames, it is necessarily unapproachable to anyone still embroiled in Being. 
(Schelling, 2000: 25) 
My reading of Gottheit as the holy, i.e. as chaos and indifference beyond the indifference of 
the third potency32, is affirmed (insofar as my presentation in the previous chapter is 
compelling) by Schelling's account of "mystics of earlier times" in his Erlanger Lectures who 
"dared to speak of a superdivinity [Ubet;gottheit]" (Schelling, 1969: 18). For Schelling, this 
name, the Ubet;gottheit, is another way of naming the absolute, our dissembling subject of 
31 At this juncture in the text, Schelling spends a great deal of time recounting how this eternal freedom to be is 
precisely the non-intentional will, as it was discussed in the last chapter. What is peculiar about this moment in 
Schelling's text is his quick slippage from saying that this eternal freedom "is like the will that wills nothing" 
(Schelling, 2000: 24) to equating it with the will ("it is eternal freedom, the pure will" (Schelling, 2000: 25)) in a 
one page transition. This slippage from expressing a similarity to expressing an identity is troubling at best, but 
it is a concern that I believe will be quelled by the next section of this chapter. 
32 Drew Hyland makes this connection between chaos and indifference-or on Warnek's reading, Innigkeit-in 
his reading of chaos in Hesiod as gap, or between. Hyland argues against the presentation just given by 
Heidegger, wanting to argue that Hesiod and Heraclitus are akin to one another in their thinking of the primacy 
of difference. Given Hesiod's phrasing, "First of all Chaos came to be," Hyland argues that "Hesiod seems to 
tell us '" that every apparent pair of opposites can only be opposites in terms of and thanks to the "between" 
that allows them to be distinguishable." Hyland further argues that "the between is not of the same order" as 
what it would separate, i.e., oppositional pairs. And finally, he argues that, "the between is prior to the binaries 
that it establishes." And what other name does Hyland give to chaos as this gap? Difference (Hyland, 2006: 
15-16). 
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freedom-and he employs this exact same name, referring, presumably, to these exact same 
mystics in Ages ifthe World (Schelling, 2000: 25). And how should we go about thinking this? 
If it is truly beyond being, how can it be thought? As we shall see, for human thinking to 
raise itself up to the level of the absolute requires, ironically, that we debase ourselves before 
it. 
But what of the rupture of this indifferent, absolute, superdivine, chaos? How does 
it come about? For Schelling, the rupture takes place as a cision, a Scheidung, that emerges 
within the "actual, living God" as the "unity of necessity and freedom" (Schelling, 2000: 27). 
This unity of necessity and freedom is Schelling's way of describing what happens when 
eternal freedom comes into relation with the rotary motion of the three potencies. In the 
competition to be the principle that has being, eternal freedom enters as an other, that given 
its status as Seinsko"nnen, always takes the position of the essential in any relationship. 
Schelling then explains that this encounter between the three potencies and eternal freedom: 
...magically, so to speak, rouses in that life [the rotary motion] the yearning for 
freedom. This obsession [Such~ abates into yearning [Sehnsuch~, wild desire turns 
into a yearning to ally itself, as if it were its own true or highest self, with the will that 
wills nothing, with eternal freedom. (Schelling, 2000: 28) 
Schelling now describes this relationship of yearning, which is made possible by the 
belonging-together of contraction and expansion. He explains that in this confrontation, 
this relationship of desire, a cision takes place-a cut, a separation-insofar as in the face of 
what is highest and most desired, the low must debase itself in order to desire freedom, as 
desire can only properly exist when lack is recognized. As Bowie says, "the lack opens up 
the possibility for striving to get beyond it, ultimately to the unity which would overcome it" 
(Bowie, 1993: 100). At this moment the contractive principle separates itself as the ground, 
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the dark ground of God, as the soil in which all things can germinate while remaining 
hidden. The second potency is then the force of life, which is only able to express itself in 
this ground. This relationship of life and ground is only able to happen insofar as the 
rupture of the drives competition for primacy has taken place. As Robert F. Brown has it, 
"The lower principle serves as the medium in which soul [or: life] can express itself' (Brown, 
1977: 199). Thus in the end, we return to where Schelling began: the contractive force takes 
primacy, as only in negation, or self-emptying, can desire fully emerge. This desire is then 
brought to life, as it were, by expansion, and it binds itself to freedom via the third potency, 
the indifference of the first two. 
As Brown explains, "eternal freedom initiated the subordination of eternal nature to 
it" merely by coming onto the scene such that the rotary motion of the potencies could 
encounter something higher, but "that relationship is maintained by eternal nature's 
voluntary submission" (Brown, 1977: 222). Is this, to steal a phrase from Wirth, just more 
wacky romantic metaphysics? How could we ever know that this cision happened? How 
could ever know that any of this account of the swirling of the potencies happened? 
Schelling'S answer, as Bowie explains, is quite simple: "it is only the fact of the manifest 
world that is our evidence of the decision" (Bowie, 1993: 107). Schelling himself says that 
"we must assume [the decision] as having happened since all eternity" (Schelling, 2000: 17). 
The reasons for this assumption are most readily understood so long as we remember that 
Schelling is, at base, a transcendental philosopher; all things being equal he continues to 
search for the conditions of the possibility of what he sees in front of him. He also 
seeks-as was discussed in the fourth section of the previous chapter-to give an account of 
these conditions that is amenable to the world he wants to see in front of him, i.e., the world 
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in which human freedom is preserved. Looking to the first draft, the 1811 draft, of the Ages 
0/the World, Schelling gives us clear insight into how he understands his transcendental 
project. As a criticism of a mechanistic conception of causality that holds that the world is 
nothing but "an endless chain of causes and effects that runs backwards and forwards," ~A 
I, 10) Schelling explains that if one were to hold this position and try to give an actual 
account of a ground, a basis, you would by necessity fall into contradiction, in fact the very 
contradiction that Kant describes in his third antinomy (I(ant, 1998: A451/B479). Whether 
or not Schelling is able to escape from Kant's third antinomy, on this point, is a question for 
an entirely different project. Nevertheless, let us turn to the explanation that he gives in his 
attempt to step outside of his Kant-inspired indictment of mechanistic causality. He agrees 
that the basis of all knowledge ought to be sought in the past, but asks (and answers): 
But if the basis of all knowledge, science, or derivation comes from out of the past, 
where is there respite? For even having arrived at the last visible presupposition, 
spirit finds another presupposition that is not grounded through itself; a 
presupposition that guides spirit to a time where nothing was, as the one 
impenetrable being contains all things, devoured into itself, out of the depths of 
which all things where brought forth. ~A I, 13) 
As Bowie points out, "the key issue ... is the understanding of 'nothing'" (Bowie, 1993: 102); 
the understanding of which I have spent the last two chapters building up. This nothing is, 
for Schelling, the dark night of the past in which the potencies compete with one another up 
until they are put in their proper place by their confrontation with eternal freedom, the 
cision in which contraction is lack can be recognized as such, so as to give birth to the desire 
for fullness, which in turn can generate the striving for being. 
Yet it is crucial that this striving for being is not, by necessity, actualized. Schelling 
explains that, "the Godhead is the highest freedom precisely because it is both [Yes and No], 
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in an equally essential fashion. All of this had to be so that thereby a necessary ground of 
the world would never be found" (Schelling, 2000: 74). Via this assertion Schelling (at least 
thinks he) circumvents the problem of the third antinomy by pointing out that a causal chain 
must have its basis in something that is itself uncaused and contingent!J necessary. By this latter 
phrase, I intend that for Schelling, given that being is, the decision by which the Godhead 
confined itself and became actual must have happened-however it need not have 
happened. The decision was free. As Zizek explains, in a typical grandiose assertion, 
"Schelling's entire philosophical revolution is contained, condensed, in the assertion that this 
act which precedes and grounds every necessity is itself radical!J contingent-for that very 
reason it cannot be deduced, inferred, but only retroactively presupposed" (Zizek, 1996: 45). 
Schelling affirms this reading in his famed Munich Lectures when he describes the first entity, 
the first moment of actualization. He writes, "The first being [Sryende], what I have called 
the primum Existens, is likewise the first contingency (the ur-contingency). This whole 
construction thus begins with the first contingency-unlike itself-, it begins with dissonance, 
and must begin as such" (1/10, 101). 
What is even more important for my project is that for Schelling, one cannot speak 
of this decision as if it we were describing a conscious being making a choice between 
existence and non-existence, as it is only in the aftermath of the decision that God becomes 
actualized-and thereby conscious; as for Schelling consciousness can only emerge in 
dissonance, differentiation, and limitation. It should be clear by now that for Schelling, 
dissonance and difference are always already present, even in the past that has never been 
present. Yet without limitation, without stricture and structure, no conscious 
act-particularly a choice between two visible options that have clear-cut consequences if 
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selected-is possible. The entry into the realm of choices-and of beings in their actuality, 
as Schelling states in the quotation above from his Munich Lectures-is what happens when 
the decision is made, prior to this, the dissonance is an indifferent differentiation in which 
self-supporting opposites could not yet be said to exist. If this is so, is my formulation, 'the 
decision is made' tenable? Can we talk about a decision being made that is prior to 
consciousness? Zizek certainly thinks so, and for good reason given a number of things 
Schelling says in the Freedom essay that we shall return to in a moment; yet I worry that 
privileging the moment of decision as God's unconscious decision in which he chooses 
himself, leads us back to the concerns of onto-theology that occupied our study in the last 
chapter. I am more inclined towards Duque's reading of decision. Discussing the Freedom 
essay he writes, "so ... ground' and 'existent' emerge together, at once, suddenly, in the 
moment of decision. But, whose decision is this? It seems that it can only be the decision 
of Existence itself." Yet for Duque, even to say this is to say too much, as this question 
'whose decision?' asks for a subject "when it is the de-cision itself . .. that generates the subject" 
(Duque, 2007: 73). Making the move that Zizek does (a move that is arguably made by all 
psycho-analytic readers of Schelling3\ to posit this decision as the property of a not-yet­
constituted subject seems to ignore Schelling's warning about the unprethinkability of 
decision. He writes, "this primordial deed becomes a beginning that can never be 
sublimated, a root of reality that cannot be reached through anything" because "the decision 
33 See, for example, Adrian Johnston, Ghosts ofSubstance Past: Schelling, Lacan, and the Denaturalization ofNature, in 
Lacan: The Silmt Partners, ed. Slavoj Zizek, (London and New York: Verso, 2006). Johnston's argument in this 
essay is both lucid and insightful, however it amounts to little more than a recapitulation of the work done by 
Zizek on Schelling, and I fear he falls into the same traps of overdetermining the past in Schelling. Alenka 
Zupancic's Ethics ofthe ReaL, Kant, Lacan, (London and New York: Verso, 2000), could be cited here as well. 
While this text does not focus on Schelling, her account clearly bears the same trajectory as Johnston and Zizek 
in accounting for the emergence of ethical character than an unconscious decision, via a reconfiguration of 
Lacan's vel, or forced choice, in terms of Kant's work on radical evil and Schelling's Freedom essay. 
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that would make any act into a true beginning may not be brought before consciousness. It 
may not be recalled, which right means as much as taking it back" (Schelling, 2000: 85). We 
have thus returned to the logic of unprethinkability that the previous chapter spent so much 
time elucidating. 
Given that Schelling's description of the unprethinkability of decision here is focused 
upon the ungraspable or unattainable character of this decision to thought, why would he 
choose to describe in terms that are, in some sense, ready to hand for humans? Why would 
Schelling, in this account of the emergence of being offer a description of emergence that 
relied upon such anthropomorphic language, when elsewhere-though much later-he 
would simply say, "being is the first, thinking is only the second or the consequence" (II/l, 
587)? It is here that the analysis of Nietzsche's passage from the beginning of this section 
becomes helpful. Is it merely a limitation of our grammar that we cannot think decision 
decides, or even better, just 'decision happens'? Or even better yet, being is (and this is the 
sense that I draw from Duque saying that the decision belongs to existence, if it has an 
owner at all)? Ifwe read Schelling's account of decision in a manner that takes his demand 
about the unprethinkability of decision seriously, we are left having to conclude with Duque 
that, "Nobody, Nie-mand: no human being and no God has decided" (Duque, 2007: 74). 
And, moreover, if we take Schelling's account of the eternal past-and the eternal 
beginning-seriously, we shall see that this decision has never happened precisely because it 
is always happening as long as being continues to unfold. Yet this seems to be a lot ofwork 
to 'save' Schelling from himself and his word choices-what other reasons would Schelling 
have had for offer such a torturous account of God's past? He has already told us in the 
Freedom essay, when he introduces Sehnsucht, the key to decision in his text: he wants to bring 
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this account to a level that is accessible to the human. He wants to make it simultaneous 
accessible to human thought, while also making a robust account of human freedom 
possible. 
Section III
 
The Ecstatic Emergence of the Human
 
Recall that immediately prior to introducing Sehnsucht, or longing, in the Freedom 
essay, Schelling writes, "Ifwe want to bring this being [Ground, or Nature-in God] nearer 
to humanity, we could say it would be the longing [Sehnsucht] that the eternal one feels to give 
birth to itself" (J-/7, 359). In German, he writes, "Wollen wir U1tS dieses Wesen menschlich naher 
bn'ngen," and then goes on to articulate this account of ground as longing. This is the third 
time in the last two chapters that I have brought up this quotation, and I would finally like to 
make good on it. I will explore Schelling's motivation for framing his introduction of 
Sehnsucht in these ways as a means to answer the questions with which I closed the last 
section-why these drives? Why God's decision? There are at least two reasons for 
Schelling's desire to make his account accessible to humans: first, he wishes to give an 
account of the origins of things that preserve the possibility of human freedom; and second, 
it enables him to give an account of why he thinks that our thinking must always be ecstatic 
and dialogical. I will explore these two motives in an attempt to lay the foundation for a new 
way of thinking about evil in Schelling's writings in the next chapter. I will follow the 
standard line that evil is the power of contraction take precedence over the power of 
expansion, but the manner in which I will do this is by attending to Schelling's demands 
about thinking movement and becoming. 
----._---------­
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Both of Schelling's motivations for his manner of discussing decision as the 
unprethinkable are broached by one central term in Schelling's text, the gravity of which we 
have not yet engaged: ecstasy. Schelling says, "every removal or displacement from a place is 
ecstasy" (Schelling, 1969: 41). Why does he begin to discuss ecstasy in this text? Largely 
because of his concern with the advice of those who he refers to as the "dimwits" who 
advise "beginners in philosophy" along the path of the question of self-knowledge-but not 
the question as such, but only when it is meant in a particular way. Schelling explains: 
there are so many dimwits who are always shouting at beginners in philosophy to go 
into themselves - into their deepest depths, as they say; but this only means so much 
as always going deeper and deeper into one's own limitations. The human need is 
not to be placed in oneself, but outside oneself. (Schelling, 1969: 40) 
What were humans originally supposed to be that has been lost? Schelling explains this 
immediately afterwards-eternalfreedom; yet we are supposed to be eternal freedom-thought 
of as the overflow of being-re-achieved. Schelling writes, "Humanity is permitted to be 
another beginning; humanity is thus the reconstructed beginning" (Schelling, 1969: 33). For 
Schelling, the destruction of freedom-or better; human existence which has n'ot yet re­
achieved this eternal freedom-takes place when we begin to think in terms of rigid 
distinctions between subjects and objects. Insofar as this is the case we rigidify, isolate, and 
freeze the world around us in such a way that it is no longer able to move. Schelling goes so 
far as to say that when we isolate the absolute subject as an object, it "vanishes" (Schelling, 
1969: 38). This would seem to be in complete accord with the manner in which the absolute 
was framed in the previous chapter, i.e., as pure possibility, pure movement and mobility. 
Freezing and isolating this movement is to make it disappear as what it is and thus to lose 
our ability to experience freedom's emergence. Furthermore, we hinder and isolate the 
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"external world" at the same time as we place limits on what we are-an isolated monadic 
subject. If the self that we are is defined exclusively as over and against a world of dead 
matter-and I take this to be Nietzsche's point when he asserts that 'things' only emergence 
when we give the I priority-than it is clear that we are back into a situation in which the old 
problems of free will and determinism will assert themselves. Ifwe are in isolation from 
nature, then we have to begin to ask about how we can possibly be said to act freely given 
the seemingly necessary structure of the unfolding of the laws of nature, which are bigger 
and larger than us, and within which we search for our free will. But, as has been said 
repeatedly throughout this project, these problems only emerge for us insofar as freedom is 
conceived of as the spontaneity of a subject. Schelling's solution to this problem of the 
limitations of subjectivity is ecstasy: "How else can humanity begin again, in order to again 
become what it once was-wisdom, namely the self-knowledge of eternal freedom-other 
than by displacing itself from this place, setting itself outside of itself (Schelling, 1969: 40)?" 
The question of self-knowledge is thus not to be despised as such, rather, what is 
needed is an entirely new way of thinking the self so as to reconfigure the object of the 
question of self-knowledge. What if the real thrust of the gnothi seauton of the Delphic oracle 
is that it is not about the self as such? Wirth explains Schelling's reconfiguration of the 
question of self-knowledge as follows: 
If philosophy has traditionally been construed as a conceptual grasp of first 
principles, then the Copernican Revolution for Schelling led concept-driven and self­
enclosed philosophy to its Other, to the thought and the sensation of the 
incomprehensibility of its origin-a thought and sensation that does not define the 
cogito but rather disrupts the finality of all boundaries. (Wirth, 2003: 120) 
Here, we should turn to an assertion that Schelling makes in 1806, in which he sounds 
surprising like Nietzsche. He writes, "The I think, I am, is since Descartes, the fundamental 
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error in all knowledge; thinking is not my thinking, and being not my being" (J-/7, 148). 
Perhaps here we are returning to the "related matters" pointed to in the title of the Freedom 
essay, the relations that I must have to be the human that I am. Here, Schelling's account of 
God's desire-the peculiar desire without an agent that we saw on the first half of this 
chapter-serves as a guide for our need to lower ourselves before the absolute. The irony of 
his account in Ages ifthe World is thus that his account, while making things more 
comprehensible to humans by anthropomorphizing God, gives such a strange account of the 
God that is created in our own image, that we may no longer be able to recognize ourselves 
anymore after tarrying with the dark night of the past. Ifwe come to ourselves by 
investigating this internally bifurcated God that is ecstatic and more than itself, how are we 
to think about ourselves? By bringing things nearer to the human, then, Schelling distances 
us from our common sense understanding of who and what we are. His text simultaneously 
plays on our common-sense understandings ofwho we are, and thus gives an account of 
God's emergence that resonates with our self-understanding. 
At this point it may be instructive to turn to Schelling's account of the emergence of 
the human in the Naturphilosophie more explicitly so as to get a handle on why Schelling 
thinks that humans-and all of nature-are fundamentally ecstatic. Joseph L. Esposito 
explains that given Schelling's emphasis upon the primacy of existence-in this case, the 
primacy of nature-before thought, "the first task of philosophy is not to chart the realm of 
the self's unconditioned, reflective experience, but to understand the nature of the original 
relation between the self and nature" (Esposito, 1977: 35). To get a handle on how Schelling 
conceives of this relation, let us begin with his First Prqjection if the System if the Philosopfy if 
Nature. Schelling writes: 
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Each organism is itself nothing other than the collective expression for a multiplicity 
of actants, which reciprocally limit themselves to a determinate sphere. This sphere 
is something perennially enduring-not something merely fading into the 
background as appearance-; for it is that which emerges in the conflict of actants, the 
monument as it were, of those activities grasping one another; it is the concept ofthat 
change itse!f, which is the only enduring thing in the change. (1/3,65) 
What is at stake for Schelling in this quotation is the organic as such-the sphere in which 
any particular entity gains its identity only insofar as it belongs to a whole that constitutes 
and is constituted by its parts. Schelling further determines the organic when he writes, "the 
organism is ... what it is, without an external effect." In other words, what it means to be 
organic is be one's own cause, i.e. "simultaneously cause and effect of itself, means and end." 
Thus, there has to be some sort of motor, a means of self-perpetuation of those things that 
fall into the organic in order for them to be what they are. 
What exactly is this means of self-perpetuation? In the First Prrjection this is 
described in terms of the process of what I will call the expansive and the inhibitive forces in 
nature. All things that are by nature come to be only via the interplay of these two forces 
within their actants, i.e. the composite parts ofwhich by which they are constituted. This is 
made most clear in Schelling's proclamation that we must understand nature as its own 
enactment, the process itself and not merely via a conceptual determination of action. To 
think of nature as a series of happenings as opposed to thinking the happening in its 
occurrence is to turn nature into a dead mechanism. 
That said, the movement of nature is not pure fluidity, without something providing 
an occasional blockage nothing would happen: light needs shadow, heat needs magnetism, 
lightness needs gravity insofar as the world is to become at all. Thus all parts of an organism 
must assert themselves as more then parts in order for them to exist at all, yet in the end 
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they must be made subordinate to the movement of the whole. This process makes up the 
definitive character of the unfolding of nature. This bivalent interchange between the part 
and the whole must take place at all levels of the natural in order for nature to be what it is. 
Thus, no individual part of nature, or it may be more appropriate to say no individual 
instantiation of nature is ever truly pure product. Nature is essentially active, and thus all 
organisms contained within it are pure activity as well. It is for this reason that Schelling 
writes, "In a word, one must simply detry all permanence in nature itself ... The key problem of 
the philosophy of nature is not to explain the active in nature ... but the resting,permanent' 
(1/3, 17). This is clearly not to say, however, that individuals do not assert themselves within 
nature, as Schelling posits it as a task for those of engaging in the philosophy of nature to 
think rest. But this is precisely because of the necessity of the tension between the 
expansive, or active, and inhibitive forces that make nature what it is. 
In the Naturphilosophie, Schelling describes the contractive force of nature as the 
"fluidizing force" of universality, which is described in terms of heat, by which all things will 
return to a formlessness "receptive to everyform." The image of such fluidity is clearly the image 
of homogeneity wherein all individuality is decimated, however, such an impulse is 
counteracted by the "individuality of all original actants." The desire of the individual to 
preserve itself as what it is in its engagement with the fluidizing force of the universal "gives 
the drama of a struggle between form andformless. That product that is always becoming will be 
conceived continually in the leap from the fluid to the solid, and conversely, in the return 
from solid to fluid" (1/3, 33). Here we get a picture of the pure unmotivated surging forth 
of existence. Life justifies itself in the Naturphilosophie; there is not a question ofwhere 
nature is going. 
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The abyss of the organic begs the question of the perspective from which we are 
engaging it. Insofar as we appreciate the movement of the organic to be something that is 
self-vindicating, self-completeing, self-causing, and self-effecting, who are we to ask about 
the meaning of nature's activity? Insofar as nature taken as a whole, meaning the entirety of 
the movement and surging of nature is appreciated as the movement of life and as an 
organism, we are merely an organ within the whole. However, just as disease within the 
human is encountered as the upsurge of one organ over all others, i.e., the attempt of one 
organ within an organism to assert itself as dominant, or the complete failure of one organ 
which thus leaves the whole process out of order, the human has an identical capacity within 
the whole of nature insofar as we understand the human as organ. And just like all other 
organs, humans must perish: Schelling writes, "neither vegetation nor life is anything other 
than the constant awakening of slumbering activities, a constant decombining of bound 
actants" (1/3,39). This awakening of slumbering activities is the returning to a partial 
fluidity of the solidity of matter which wants to "go to ground." Just as soil may want to stay 
as what it is, the plant will come along and return the solid matter to a means of a 
production of energy, which is in itself a type of fluidity qua movement. However, just as 
the sun awakens this process, all individual products are eventually subordinated. "The 
individual must appear as a means ifnature) the genus as the end-the individual expires [unte1;'gehen] 
and the genus remains-if it is true that individual products in nature must be seen as 
abortive attempts to exhibit the absolute" (1/3,51). All individual instantiations of the 
whole will perish by necessity insofar as it is impossible that any individual qua individual 
could ever suffice as a whole unto itself. From the perspective of the whole, all individuals 
must be subordinated, as "abortive attempts of nature" (1/3, 52) insofar as the division of 
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these two principles is necessary for them to maintain themselves as what they are. In the 
absolute, there is absolute indifference, absolute identity, such that these two principles and 
an infinity of other principles could exist without coming into an antagonistic relationship 
with one another. However, insofar as there is to be existence, nature, the antagonistic 
relationship of the separation of the expansive and inhibitive principles must hold sway. 
Insofar as things are to exist, it is impossible that such an indifference could be achieved, as 
this would mean the end of all movement. 
How are we thus to think the status of the human in the Natutphilosophie? It is clear 
that the question must be that of the human as a species and not explicidy about a particular 
humans perspective onto the whole, but let us not forget that "each sphere to which nature 
is limited must again contain an infinity in itself, within every sphere other spheres are again 
formed, and in these spheres again others, and so on to infinity" (1/3, 55). Thus the 
question of the status of the individual human in a sense carries as much weight as the 
species as a whole as all of us are constituted by an infinity of organic systems all the way 
down into the smallest cells in our bodies. The status of the whole of nature as an organism 
within which the human is part and parcel is made absolutely clear insofar as Schelling 
understands nature as an absolute organism which is not found in any single "product", but 
only in the congruence of all of the infinity of products of the development of nature. As 
Esposito quite provocatively explains, "A thing is actually a locus of activity resulting from 
the interaction of several or all other parts of the community" (Esposito, 1977: 62). Thus 
the human does not have a necessarily privileged relationship with which to engage the 
question of whole of nature, or the meaning of nature, but it does have as much of a 
position to do so as everything else. 
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Just as Spinoza struggles in his Ethics in writing it from what he calls the second type 
of knowing, reason, whereas the objective is something which resembles intellectual 
intuition, any attempt of Schelling to engage the question of meaning of nature, or merely to 
recapitulate the unfolding of nature will necessarily have a humanized tint to it. After all, 
what perspective can we speak from other than that of the human? However, just as in the 
end of Spinoza's Ethics wherein "intellectual love of God" collapses the particularity of the 
human perspective back into a more unified experience wherein the reciprocity and 
participation of all of the modalities of substance loses its temporal sequentiality and we can 
thus open up the whole to itself sub specie aeternitas, human understanding of nature which 
grasps it in its essence will recoil onto the perspective of human. Here to quote Merleau­
Ponty, "Not only must Nature become vision, but human being must also become Nature" 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 47). As humans we always begin where we find ourselves in our 
investigation, but in the unfolding of this investigation the place from which the inquiry is 
undertaken may disappear. It may be only through the human that nature is articulated, but 
in this process of articulation the human will realize itself to be what it is, part of a whole and 
nothing more. 
This instance of the recoil on the position of enunciation that is manifest in the 
human and the question of the meaning of nature is one which appears frequently 
throughout Schelling's texts. Discussing Schelling's Naturphilosophie, and with regards to the 
opening, as the possibility of the reconstruction of the beginning-which we have been 
discussing in this chapter as decision and in the previous chapter as the overflow of 
presence-that humans present in nature Merleau-Ponty writes, "Schelling presents the 
appearance of the human being as a species of the re-creation of the world, as the advent of 
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an opening" (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 47). For Merleau-Ponty the image of the human in 
Schelling's nature holds a central location, but it is one that must not be mistaken as being 
the center and culmination that is definitive of nature. It may be only through the human 
that nature becomes meaningful, but this is precisely because of the fact that the question of 
meaning is not one that exists outside of the perspective of the human. It does not make 
sense to categorize nature-in-itself, i.e, nature excluding the human as meaningful, as the 
question of meaning is a question that only arises once the human comes on to the scene. 
This is clearly one of the ways in which we can interpret Schelling's assertion from the 
Freedom essay wherein he asserts that he desires to bring the development of the world nearer 
to the human by discussing longing. However, this is not to say that the account that 
Schelling gives in his Naturphilosophie is somehow or other more physiocentric than the 
account we get in the Freedom essay; insofar as the human is part and parcel of nature this 
also does not imply that someone something "unnatural" has been done to nature when the 
human makes it meaningful. The question of meaning is as natural as anything else that 
emerges from nature, and it occurs only because of the unfolding of nature. Merleau-Ponty 
writes, ''We are the parents of Nature ofwhich we are also children. Itis in human being 
that things become conscious by themselves; but the relation is reciprocal: human being is 
also the becoming-conscious of things" (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 43). 
The final phrase in this quote from Merleau-Ponty is absolutely crucial to 
understanding why Schelling describes humans as the beginning reconstructed and freedom 
re-achieved. Given that Schelling's project in the Erlanger Lectures is to give an account of our 
knowing of the absolute, we must attend to precisely why Schelling would say, "OnlY in 
knowing is there still an open point where wisdom [which is another name Schelling uses for the 
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absolute] can still searchfor andfind itself' (Schelling, 1969: 28). Why Schelling would say this is 
a question that remains to be answered, however we have already answered how he thinks 
humans are able to know the absolute: we are ecstatic. Our belonging to the organic 
demonstrates that we, like all things-including God on the account given in Ages 0/the 
World-are only constituted as what we are only insofar as we participate in a system, a 
referential totality, that is much larger than our particularity. To explain what this means for 
Schelling and why this means that humans can serve as the 'becoming-conscious of things,' 
we must explain why Schelling would say that human consciousness is "a se!fknowledge 0/ 
eternalfreedom" (Schelling, 1969: 32). 
Section IV
 
Schelling's Philosophizing: The Experience of Freedom
 
Schelling quicldy tells us a number of things that saying humans are a self-knowledge 
of eternal freedom cannot mean: immediacy (Schelling, 1969: 36) and self-knowledge thought 
of as introspection (Schelling, 1969: 37). With regards to the Schelling says, "what counts in 
philosophy is the ability to elevate oneself above all knowing that merely begins with the se(f" 
Is this not an echo of the force of contraction that must debase itself so as to desire 
freedom? This, in turn, means that we must be willing to give up on all conceptions 
philosophy as a "demonstrative science which first goes out from one thing known in order 
to arrive at another thing known." For Schelling, philosophy is not such a demonstrative 
science, but rather a ''free act 0/spirit; its first step is not a knowing, but is better expressed as a 
not-knowing, agiving up 0/all human knowledge" (Schelling, 1969: 38). He then characterizes 
this act by which the human would know the absolute as, the act that "people have sought to 
express ... through the name intellectual intuition" (Schelling, 1969: 39). At this point, he offers 
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an astonishing account of intellectual intuition-an account that ought to have had far-
reaching effects on the way people read his earlier thinking on the absolute and intellectual 
intuition, though, with rare exception this does not seem to have taken place.34 Schelling 
writes: 
It was called intuition, because it was accepted that in intuiting or (as this word has 
become common) in seeing the subject loses itself, it placed outside oJitse!f. It was 
called intellectual intuition in order to express that the subject is not lost in a sensible 
intuition, in an actual object, but rather is lost in, or gives itself up in, something that 
cannot be an object. Simply because this expression is need of an explanation, it is 
better to wholly set it aside. Rather, the name ecsta.ry could be used for this relation. 
Namely, our I is placed outside of itself, i.e. out of its place. Its place is to be subject. 
But when confronted with the absolute subject it cannot be subject, because the 
absolute subject cannot comport itself as object. Thus it must abandon the place, it 
must be set outside itself, as something that is no longer existing. Only in this self­
abandonment can the absolute subject burst open to the subject in its self­
abandonment, and we thus behold it in wonder. This approximates the peaceful 
expression which the gentle Plato himself uses when he says: "Before all others, the 
primary affect of the philosopher is - wonder, to thaumazein," and he adds, "because 
there is no other beginning of philosophy than wonder" (Theaetetus, 155d). 
(Schelling, 1969: 39) 
Here we find Schelling laying all of his cards on the table, and giving us much to tarry with. 
Prior to offering a thorough account of the large-scale ramifications of this passage, let me 
recapitulate his assertions. Intellectual intuition must be rethought, or reconfigured, as 
ecstasy for two reasons: first, in intuiting, a thinker is always placed outside of themselves, 
34 Two exceptions are Jason Wirth's chapter on Direct Experience in his Conspirary ofLje, and Marcia Sa 
Cavalcante Schuback's The Work ofExperience: Schelling on Thinking Bryond Image and Concept. Most other 
prominent Schelling commentators do little work to engage Schelling's later reflections upon intellectual 
intuition when they discuss the function of intellectual intuition in his early writings. For example Dale Snow 
argues that "the possibility that Schelling borrowed [Fichte's arguments regarding the absolute and intellectual 
intuition] virtually unaltered from Fichte is not to be dismissed out of hand" (Snow, 1996: 48). While I have no 
intention of dismissing such a point out of hand, I do worry that her account does not do enough to attend to 
Schelling's untimeliness in relationship to his contemporaries. While he makes similar hermeneutic decisions, 
Alan White is a bit more attentive to Schelling's later reconfigurations of intellectual intuition. He explains, 
"according to Schelling's arguments, the Zen Buddhist who experiences satori after years of meditation and 
asceticism sees nothing different from what the philosopher who reflects on the nature of absoluteness sees: 
the absolute is beyond all distinctions" (White, 1983: 32). The problem with this account, though I appreciate 
White's extension of Schelling's thinking, is that he is still emphatic that this encounter with the absolute is 
reflective. He does very little work to explain what this means for Schelling, and thus risks leaving him open to 
the very critiques of reflection Schelling levels in the Erlanger Lectures. 
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for the experience of intuiting is always an experience of reception, reception of something 
that is by necessity external to the one who intuits;35 second, and much more importantly, 
what is attended to in ecstatic thinking is something that cannot be made an object-thus 
the disappearance, the vanishing of the absolute when we attempt to engage it as such. This 
is crucial in understanding Schelling's rethinking of intellectual intuition, as his suggestion is 
not that the object of intuition is noumenal, and thus evades-by necessity-any attempt to 
attend to it via our engagement with the sensible manifold, but rather, that what is attended 
to cannot, under any circumstances, be objectified and remain what it is. Of course, the 
same account could hold for the noumenal in Kant; the difference in Schelling is that this 
Sache to which he wants to attend to is not behind the back of experience; rather, it is 
precisely what we experience prior to our rigid conceptualization of experience into atoms. 
I argue that Schelling's desire, undertaken in this passage quoted, to rid himself of 
the phrase 'intellectual intuition,' comes from the philosophical baggage that this term carries 
with it. Even though, as Wirth points out, Schelling's employment of the phrase, intellectual 
intuition, has always been idiosyncratic, particularly as Schelling "is extending [intellectual 
intuition and the 1] to all of nature." And even more so, because what this intuition is, "is an 
intuition into the pure positing [reines Setzen], without why, of all things" (Wirth, 2003: 123), I 
believe Schelling rids himself of the term to avoid its larger connotations. This is why he 
introduces ecstasy as the new name for the manner in which we philosophize: what we 
encounter in this moment of ecstasy is of such a nature that it demands to be attended to as 
35 The obvious critical response to this assertion is to point to what Kant would call the internal form of 
intuition, i.e., time as the apriori form of intuition. Presumably one would point to this to say that not all 
intuition takes us out of ourselves, yet that seems to beg the question of what the self is. It is quite possible 
that in internal forms of intuition, we are intuiting ourselves, but at such a moment, in which the self is both 
intuiter and intuited, it seems as though we would to have two selves. In fact, this is precisely the critique of 
the cogito that Schelling gives in his Munich Lectun!s (1/10, 11). 
194 
subject, which in this instance we can hear more or less as meaning activity-a term that, as 
we have seen from our foray into the Naturphilosophie describes all things, including 
ourselves. Because what we engage in ecstatic thinking is active it demands that we do not 
bring to bear a pre-formed template of interpretation to it, and rather, let it unfold on its 
own terms, just as the force of contraction in God must debase itself before eternal freedom 
such that freedom can be what it is. This requires a self-emptying, an admittance of 
ignorance, or even weakness or insufficiency, in the face of the overflow of presencing that 
is the absolute; an overflow that is only possible insofar as the origin dissembles and 
withdraws. It is the experience that we have at this moment that Schelling describes as 
wonder-and I argue is the experience of freedom. 
How does this wonder play itself out in ecstasy? Schelling describes a process of 
moving from a desire for knowledge-which itself is a state of not-knowing-to a 
recognition of our lack of knowledge-which is a "knowing not-knowing" (Schelling, 1969: 
45). What is essential in this process is Schelling's playing with the word Erkennen, in its 
numerous forms. 36 Schelling describes the process of moving from ignorance to awareness 
of ignorance in the face of the absolute as a crisis; it is a crisis that begins with our attempts 
to know the absolute. Yet, for Schelling, "knowledge is bound" (Schelling, 1969: 52). Any 
attempt to make the absolute into an object that could be grasped in a propositional 
assertion, as if it were a noun-the kind of knowledge one has in Erkennen-betrays the 
ingraspable, immutable character of the absolute. In fact, in separating ourselves off from 
36 I have chosen to translate Erkennen throughout the Erlanger Lectures, as 'to know,' and its gerund form 
Erkennende, as 'knowing,' though it should be noted that these words are usually translated in some way that 
relates to our word, 'cognition,' or 'awareness.' My translations may be belabored at this juncture, but I worry 
that translating these terms as 'to cognize' and 'cognizing' would not only be more cumbersome, but would 
bring along more baggage (i.e., our sense of cognition as the term is used in cognitive science) that I do not 
believe is present in Schelling's text. 
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the absolute so as to make it an object for our knowledge, "the absolute subject ... 
announces itself as that which the other [consciousness] cannot know" (Schelling, 1969: 43). 
We can only come to know the absolute when we encounter it as something that is excessive 
to our attempts to make it our own, to appropriate it as if it were a simple object opposed to 
ourselves as subject. When we recognize the limit that conceptual determinations place 
upon our attempts to appropriate the absolute, it regains its status as subject, as what is 
essential, in our relationship of knowing, and thus we become aware of our ignorance. It is 
no longer a not-knowing that exists "externally as in the beginning, but rather internally" 
(Schelling, 1969: 45). However, this internalization of eternal freedom is not a way of 
making what was subject, what was essential, merely into something for us. Rather, in this 
instance, we recognize that we are what we are only insofar as we are excessive to ourselves. 
At this moment we are knowing ourselves as eternal freedom, i.e., we too are movement, we 
are ecstatic into the process of the unfolding of nature. It is for this reason that it is 
appropriate, on Heidegger's terms, to call Schelling's reconfiguration ofwonder and ecstasy 
a Grundstimmun~such ecstatic engagement discloses the whole. Thus our self-knowledge is 
only possible as a knowing of the whole, insofar as the whole is ecstatic and reciprocally 
determining, which, as we have seen, is a consequence of both Schelling'S account of the 
decision of the rotary motion of the drives and his thinking of the organic. 
This knowing of the whole that our thinking, insofar as it is based upon a knowing 
not-knowing, actualizes is one reason why Schelling wants to account for the origins of 
things as lying in duplicity, dissonance, and crisis. Our thinking is able to knowingly repeat 
the structure, that is, reconstruct the life of God, insofar as it accords itself to the ways in 
which things unfold. Our process of coming-to-knowledge is a repetition of the very 
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unfolding of existence, and is the coming-to-consciousness of this unfolding for the first 
time. This is why we can say that our pursuit of self-knowledge is the whole's pursuit of its 
own self-knowledge, but only insofar as we are willing to debase ourselves as the center. As 
Wirth says, "Human freedom demands that humanity repents its humanity as the very 
condition for the possibility of its humanity" (Wirth, 2004: 6). We, and the happening that is 
being, can only be given back to ourselves as what we are insofar as we attend to this 
whole-and accordingly to ourselves-in a particular manner. 
Schelling describes this manner of attention to the Sache, this kind of knowing, as 
Besinnung, or contemplation. This kind of knowing is a knowing that "changes along with 
movements of the absolute subject" (Schelling, 1969: 47), and it is the knowing that is 
proper to philosophy. Schelling writes, "In philosophy, nothing less than the pure, finished 
principle is sacrificed" (Schelling, 1969: 50). Consonant with his times, Schelling does say 
that "human consciousness is originally the internal, ground providing, support, or subject, 
of eternal freedom coming to itself." Yet, even though this grounding function of human 
consciousness is described as reflection [Reflexion], it is not, strictly speaking, the activity of a 
subject; for human consciousness, as this subject, "is this subject in silence" (Schelling, 1969: 
50). Rather, our very existence is the mirror that reflects the life of the absolute. Ifwe were 
to demand the appearance of the absolute, i.e., if we were to posit it actively as an object 
opposed to ourselves as subject, it would be cancelled by our wanting, our desire to possess 
it. Schelling explains, "insofar as he [any human] wants to attract this pure consciousness, he 
destroys it. Hence the contradiction: whatever humans wants it made to nothing through 
their wanting" (Schelling, 1969: 51), as in our wanting we reduce all things to ourselves, as if 
we actually knew what that selfwas. In our attempts to reduce the ingraspable character of 
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the overflow of presencing to ourselves, we make an egregious error: we mistake our selves 
as being constant and self-supporting, thereby ignoring duplicity that is what we are at 
bottom, a duplicity famously described in Ages ofthe World as follows: 
This cision, this doubling of ourselves, this secret circulation in which there are two 
beings, a questioning being and an answering being, an unknowing being that seeks 
knowledge and an unknowing being that does not know its knowledge, this silent 
dialogue, this inner art of conversation, is the authentic mystery of the philosopher. 
(Schelling, 2000: xxxvi) 
Yet again, we find an account of the emergence of self in, and as, crisis. This crisis in the 
Ages ofthe World is described as the result of the existence of the expansive and contractive 
principles in humanity, whereas in the Erlanger Lectures it is described as the crisis that 
emerges in the thinker's confrontation with the absolute; and these two crises reflect each 
other. When taken together, what can these two different accounts tell us about how 
Schelling understands the act of philosophizing? And again, what can this split tell us about 
why Schelling chooses to give the account of the decision in God that we see in the Ages of 
the World, particularly in light of the absence of such an account in the Erlanger Lectures? 
To some extent, Schelling begins to answer both of these questions immediately 
after this quote from Ages ofthe World, when he explains how the interplay of the expansive 
and contractive principles in humanity affect his understanding of what it means to know. 
Having famously asserted that the past is narrated in the first line of this (and all other extant 
versions of the Weitalter) text, he explains that, "everything known, in accord with its nature, 
is narrated." Yet again, we get a glimpse of Schelling's transcendental inclinations: only that 
which has already taken place, insofar as it serves as the ground for what we experience 
today, can truly be known. Yet, he offers us a peculiar account of what the "known" is-or 
better would be: "the known is not here something lying about finished and at hand since 
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the beginning. Rather it is that which is always first emerging out of the interior through a 
process entirely specific to itself" (Schelling, 2000: xxxvii). While this quote is certainly 
provocative, it does little to explain what this "known" is. His answer, I believe, is the past 
itself-the past that emerges out of its interiority in the rotary motion of the drives through 
cision, through a crisis that is repeated in the crisis of human knowing as described in the 
Erlanger Lectures. Note that in both instances-in the process of cision and decision in Ages 
0/the World and the process of the crisis of knowing in the Erlanger Lectures-this crisis is 
precisely the conflict between subject and object, i.e., the conflict for what is determinate 
and essential. Schelling's account in the Ages 0/the World of the cision within God leads him 
to assert that, "the light of knowledge must rise through an internal cision and liberation 
before it can illuminate. What we call knowledge is only the striving toward anamnesis 
[Wiederbewufitwerden] and hence more of a striving toward knowledge than knowledge itself" 
(Schelling, 2000: xxxvii). 
This striving towards becoming-conscious-again (for the first time, might I add) of 
the philosopher is only possible insofar as the very character of existence is determined by 
the same character of cision and crisis that defines human knowing-otherwise, Schelling 
would have no reason to describe the philosophical project as such as a project of self­
knowledge; much less a project of self-knowledge that proceeds by way of recollection. He 
describes this same occurrence in the Erlanger Lectures when describing our becoming aware 
of our own ignorance: "it has again recollected [etinneriJ eternal freedom-it now knows this 
eternal freedom, truly knows it immediately, namely as the interior of not-knowing. Thus 
the ancient teaching that all philosophy exists only as recollection" (Schelling, 2000: 45). We 
can then see Schelling's account in these two texts-and every other time he gives such an 
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account of origins that is 'accessible to humanity'-is moving in two directions at once: 
given his constantly re-stated commitment to the principle that like is known by like, he 
simultaneously gives us a transcendental, and thus descriptive, account of what must be 
assumed to have happened for our thinking to be as it is today, while at the same time he 
gives a prescriptive account of how we ought to think, given that our thinking must be in 
accord with what is to be attended to in our thinking. 
His commitment to the principle that like is known by like is most famously asserted 
in the Freedom essay when he writes: 
But whoever takes their departure from the theory of physics and knows, as the 
ancient teaching has it, that like is known by like, will understand that the 
philosopher maintains such (divine) knowledge because he alone, holding the 
intellect pure and unobscured by darkness, grasps the god outside himself with the 
god in himself. (1/7,338) 
As Warnek explains, what this means for Schelling is that "our capacity to know the divine 
system, and thus to be able to bring freedom to word, is already promised in the nature of 
human life as itself divine, as belonging to divine nature" (Warnek, 2005: 180). 'This means, 
that for Schelling, the self-revelation of God through the unfolding of existence-of which 
we are part-ensures our participation in God, and God's participation in us. In the 
language of Schelling's Naturphilosophie: because the human is able to recapitulate the whole 
of nature via its intellectual engagement with it, we may worry that Schelling turns the 
process of God's unfolding into a teleological project terminating in human consciousness, 
wherein the whole of nature is thus turned into consciousness, e.g., human consciousness is 
capable of bringing to light the status of the absolute consciousness which holds sway 
throughout the entirety of nature, but only insofar as it engages in an anthropomorphic 
projection. In lieu of such an assertion-and to reiterate-Merleau-Ponty explains: "Hence 
-- ----- --------- -------------
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the role of the perceived world as milieu of experience, where there is not the projection of 
consciousness on everything, but rather a participation of my own life in everything, and vice 
versa" (Merleau-Ponty, 2003: 40). It is easy to take the first portion of Merleau-Ponty's 
assertion to still fall into an anthropomorphic engagement, wherein we see ourselves in 
everything and can act on everything. Such an interpretation is faulty, insofar as it 
necessitates that one overlooks the all important addendum to this passage, the vice 
versa-the position of the texts recoil onto the place from which the human must speak. 
The human is capable of seeing itself in everything exclusively because everything is 
participating in the life of the human. In other words, the activity of the human is possible 
only because of an equal priority is attributed to the receptivity, or porosity, of the human in 
their relationship to the external world. A much younger Schelling describes this exactly 
when he writes, "of the necessary reciprocity ifreceptivity and activity in everything otganiC" in which 
humans participate (1/3, 6). Thus, it is true, Nietzsche's critique of emergence of the 
dominance of reason as being tied up with privileging a higher world, or a divine life, to 
which we humans once belonged can be applied to Schelling, but only insofar as we 
recognize that the anamnesis that Schelling believes describes the activity of philosophizing, is 
itself the first coming-to-consciousness of this allegedly higher life; and this higher life itself, 
is no living thing, but as Schuback has it, the "life of life," and emergence with no agent. If 
we accept this account of Schelling, he certainly sounds a lot more like Nietzsche then like 
those who Nietzsche critiques. 
The capacity for there to be an engagement between the human and nature insofar as 
there is this shared capacity to act and to be acted upon necessitates that any attempt to 
divide the world up into distinct systems of receptivity and pure activity would ignore the 
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fact that all things which fall under the rubric of the organic share and participate in these 
two powers. Accordingly, we must think of receptivity and activity, i.e., the participation of 
my life in everything and vice versa, as being guaranteed by the fact that there is a 
fundamental, ontological commonality between all things organic. In fact this participation 
is guaranteed to such a degree, that we continue the tension of the principles of contraction 
and expansion within ourselves, just as God did prior to decision. Thus, Schelling's account 
of the unfolding of divinity, and the reciprocity of activity and receptivity between all things 
organic, enables him to account for our ability to think God's decision-or eternal 
freedom-and thereby bring freedom to word, as ourselves-thought ecstatically-in our 
thinking. 
Since Schelling holds that only humans are able to be the reconstructed, coming-to­
consciousness of creation, the way in which we attend to the world must be measured in 
accordance with the manner in which the world presences-and this for Schelling is clearly, 
movement, as he makes clear in the Ages 0/the World: "Movement is what is essential to 
knowledge" (Schelling, 2000: 4).37 The remaining question is thus: how do we think this 
movement? How do we think what Schuback calls the "life of life"-an expression that she 
uses "in order to point out that what Schelling means by absolute is not a concept but an 
experience, the experience (or intellectual intuition) of the true life" (Schuback, 2005: 69)? 
But how are we to understand this experience? I have already given a number of hints as to 
37 This could certainly appear as a vicious circle, wherein Schelling gives an account of how things happened so 
as to vindicate his account ofwhat he thinks philosophy should be, however if one were to indict Schelling of 
this crime, it seems that nearly all other ontological projects could fall prey to the same critique, as any attempt 
to account for what the world is like is going to be influenced either wittingly or unwittingly by how the person 
who attends to the world understands what it means to think. If this were a crime, Schelling's commitment of 
it may only seem more dramatic than others because of his desire to reconcile truth and fable (Schelling, 2000: 
xxxv); because of this desire his account appears strange and foreign and thereby easier to banish from the 
realm of philosophy. 
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how I understand this moment, yet I would like to turn to Schelling's text, in particular to his 
critique of Hegel from his Munich Lectures, so as to get our textual feet under us in our 
analysis. Here, Schelling assaults Hegel for his employment of what Schelling feels are 
empty concepts and an empty concept of philosophy. With regards to Hegel's discussion of 
being, nothingness, and becoming in the Logic, Schelling writes: 
One cannot properly contradict these assertions, or explain them away as something 
false; for they are sayings that say nothing. It is as if one wished to carry water in 
cupped hands, from which again, nothing will come. Here, the mere work of 
holding onto something that does not let itself be held, because it is nothing, takes 
the place of philosophizing. (I/1 0, 135) 
Soon after this assertion, Schelling clarifies his charge against Hegel, presaging the whole 
existential and phenomenological movement, when he writes: 
Concepts as such exist nowhere, in fact, than in consciousness. They are thus 
objectively taken qternature, not bifore it. Hegel took concepts away from their 
natural place in that he posited them at the inception of philosophy. There he then 
places the most abstract concepts before all, becoming, existence, etc.; but 
abstractions can exist in no natural way, nor be held as actualities, without that from 
which they are abstracted: becoming [Werden] cannot be before something becoming 
[ein Werdendes], existence [Dasryn] not prior to something existing [ein Dasryendes]. 
(I/l0, 141) . 
Schelling's indictment of Hegel amounts to critiquing him for, as he says, thinking about 
thinking, rather than thinking about what the basis for thinking is. To do so is to tarry with 
what amounts to a rigidified abstraction of what is real matter of thinking, thus negating this 
matter in attempting to encapsulate it and turning it into nothing.38 Contrary to this, as 
38 I would like to note, even if only in a footnote, that this critique of Hegel is rather flat-footed. As Duque is 
quick to note, regarding Schelling's critique of Hegel, "they [both] acknowledge in nature as well the existence 
of a remainder actually irreducible. Against the vulgar interpretation of Hegel, he explicitly maintains such an 
irreducibility, both in the empirical plane of scientific investigation, as well as in the political plane" (Duque, 
2007: 64). He then goes on to give examples of each, but of particular interest is Hegel's assertion that, "It is 
an aberration of the philosophy of nature that it wishes to make all appearances simple" (Werke 9: 106). 
Nevertheless, Schelling's critique of Hegel is of interest, less for the force of the argument against Hegel, and 
more for what it actually does indict, i.e., philosophy that tarries exclusively with dead concepts-thinking 
about thinking without attending to what enables thinking in the first place. 
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Schuback says, "Schelling insists on a thinking that dares to recognize its nonpriority, that 
dares to return thought to its ground, namely to the life of life, to eternal freedom, a return 
to what Schelling even called the 'unprethinkability of being'" (Schuback, 2005: 69). 
Yet how is this perpetual prior, unprethinkable ground to be thought, how can one 
attend to the condition of "every conceptuality and nonconceptuality"? How is one to 
attempt to think this boundary of conceptuality? As Schuback points out, even a negative 
determination of our approach to this Sache "retains as its starting point the privilege of the 
concept as a means of articulating a concept of nonconceptuality" (Schuback, 2005: 70). Yet 
this fact does not hinder Schelling from moving forward in his account of what our thinking 
in the face of this unprethinkable basis should amount to. Describing our encounter with 
the absolute, insofar as this encounter is aware of its ignorance, he writes that humanity: 
becomes free through the setting-outside-of-itself, it is the first moment of 
contemplation [Jer ersten Augenbiick seiner Besinnungj, and for the first time savors the 
freedom and blessedness of not-knowing. It is now-in order to give a positive 
expression-that which we could call free thinking. To think is to abandon 
knowledge; knowledge is bound, thinking is in complete freedom, and the word 
itself implies that all free thinking is the result of a separation, a conflict, a crisis that 
has been overcome [aukehobenen]. (Schelling, 1969: 52) 
Schelling is here rejecting conceptuality, insofar as the concept is conceived of as an attempt 
to corner and isolate experience, in favor of a stance of thinking that is primarily 
receptive-an active receptivity that thinks along with the unfolding of the primacy of 
existence. We are able to think this primacy only insofar as we are part and parcel of the 
process of the unfolding of existence of nature, and insofar as we are ecstatic in our 
engagement with it. The movement from this thinking to knowledge is for Schelling always 
a process of arresting, immobilizing, and retarding the movement of existence in our 
reflection of it; as he says, "our knowledge is immobile in itself' (Schelling, 1969: 55). As 
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Wirth says, "Any thought, even the thought of the Whole, when left to stand alone, when 
endowed with the status of a completely articulate word, when left to the tyranny of the 
garrulous, clots, and inhibits the very Whole that it would honor and think" (Wirth, 2003: 6). 
Only insofar as we are receptive to the character of the movement of the world around us 
can we actually come to knowledge, but his knowledge must remain immobile if it ceases to 
be in conversation with the movement of the absolute, i.e., presencing. This conversation, 
which Schelling characterizes as the dialogue that is constitutive of philosophy in his famous 
footnote in the Freedom essay, when he writes that, "although it lacks the exterior form of a 
dialogue, all things within it emerged in a dialogical manner" (1/7, 410) must be kept alive, 
which requires our willingness to receive and respond, not merely to fix knowledge for all 
time. We are dependent upon the generosity of being for our ability to think, precisely 
because without this giving, we would have nothing to think-in fact, we would not be at all. 
We are thus able to be reconstructed freedom precisely because we belong to the 
unfolding of being. As Nancy explains, "No one begins to be free, but freedom is the 
beginning and endlessly remains the beginning" (Nancy, 1993: 77). For him, we can only 
speak of human freedom insofar as we can say that humans belong to "being-in-common, 
which is the sharing of being" (Nancy, 1993: 73). It only insofar as humans participate in the 
relations that are open and available to us in light of the free giving of being that they can 
become humans at all. As Nancy says, "In this relation, "human beings" are not given-but 
it is relation alone that can give them "humanity" ... It is then freedom that gives humanity" 
(Nancy, 1993: 73). Our freedom, human freedom, lies in our ability to encounter the 
groundless play of the contractive and expansive forces within ourselves because of our 
belonging to what Schelling calls the organic, or the overflow of the contractive and 
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expansive principles, or what Nancy calls being-in-common. Accordingly, Esposito would 
then have Schelling responding to Kant's table of categories by asserting that community qua 
reciprocal determination must be more originary then either substance or causality, 
otherwise we cannot explain our experience of multiple things at the same time (Esposito, 
1977: 62). From the recognition of the primacy of community, or reciprocal determination, 
the in-common, or the ecstatic character of all individuals, we can recognize that this same 
freedom is at play and plays in the eternal beginning-it plays in us. This, as Schelling made 
clear in his discussion of ecstasy, can inspire wonder. But it is a short step from this wonder 
to terror. As Schelling says-and here he exhibits that wonder as an attunement need not 
lead to principial thinking-, 
Most people are frightened precisely by this abyssal freedom in the same way that 
they are frightened by the necessity to be utterly one thing or another. And where 
they see a flash of freedom, they turn away from it as if from an utterly injurious flash 
of lightning and they feel prostrated by freedom as an appearance that comes from 
the ineffable, from eternal freedom, from where there is no ground whatsoever. 
(Schelling, 2000: 78) 
In this encounter with the unmotivated, unintentional surging forth of existence that we 
encounter at the end of the road for Schelling in the process of transcendental 
philosophy-whether by a turn inward or outward-we cannot help be inspired to either 
terror or wonder. It is clear that both responses are entirely appropriate to the matter of 
thinking for Schelling, but for him this matter of thinking can only be attended to so long as 
one thinks freely; i.e., so long as one is willing to think in accord with the movements of the 
unfolding of existence, and attending to the ingraspable character of the absolute as precisely 
that. Only so long as a thinker is willing to give up on supreme principles and is willing to 
attend with humility and self-denial to the presencing of things around them-a self denial 
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that Schelling characterizes as Gelassenheit (Schelling, 2000: 63), a Gelassenheit that can both 
characterize the matter of thinking, the letting of being that is eternal freedom and the 
manner of thinking-will the pure possibility of being be made available to the human. In 
order for this to take place, we must reorient how we think as such. 
Section V 
The Silence of Science and the Possibility for Evil 
Joseph Lawrence explains that philosophy emerges when it recognizes the Socratic 
insight that "reason completes itself in the knowledge of its own final ignorance" (Lawrence, 
2005: 14).39 In discussing this moment of realization he refers to Schelling's phrase, das 
Verstummen der Wissenschajt, the growing silent of science, which Wirth describes as "the 
collapse of warrant for any articulation of the Whole, any exoteric account ofwhat has 
begun as a whole." For Wirth, this "is the eternal beginning that is an eternal opening, a 
disequilibrium within thinking that does not allow thinking to orient itself to the nature of its 
own activity" (Wirth, 2003: 6). The moment in Schelling where this phrase occurs is in the 
1811 version of his Ages ifthe World. Discussing the obscurity of the ground as the 
"indomitable, appearing nature," Schelling explains that in order to attend to this ground, "I 
enter into this growing silent of science, which must commence insofar as we recognize that 
when everything infinite approaches us personally, that it is impossible to properly know any 
such thing" (WA I, 103). It is only in this growing silent that we can actually attend to the 
"nonconceptual origin of the conceptual" (Wirth, 2003: 123), and I have argued that at this 
39 Lawrence discusses this maiuetic moment as the beginning of a 'philosophical religion,' which for him nalJ1es 
the encounter with openness and possibility that lies in the realization of the underdetermined and contingent 
character of the eternal beginning. While Lawrence's essay is extraordinary, I am uncomfortable with his 
employment of the language of religion, and see no necessity to employ it in describing the human encounter 
with the Sache at issue in both his essay and this dissertation. 
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juncture we fInd and reconstruct eternal freedom by recognizing the unprethinkability of 
being and thereby preserving possibility. At this juncture we experience the freedom of 
possibility, the freedom of transgression: freedom at the limit. 
However, as his been made clear, there is no guarantee that this will happen. Things 
can go awry. When we cease "to lead all discourses beyond their self-contained 
provincialism back into dialogue with their irreducible remainder" (Wirth, 2003: 162), and 
instead, let philosophy collapse back into "the narcissism of the domain of the 
understanding, [in] its abiding monologue with itself' (Wirth, 2003: 123), we return to the 
land of knowledge, concepts, and philosophy-thus leaving behind knowing not-knowing, 
thinking, and philosophizing. 
As Wirth has it, "dialogue is not the study of a philosophy. It is the activity of 
philosophizing" (Wirth, 2004: 14). Schelling explains, "Philosophy does not persist in 
particular propositions which can be taken and communicated. It is not as easy as this. This 
method alone is good for nothing" (Schelling, 1969: 4). Soon after Schelling explains, "the 
distinction between philosophy and philosophizing is like the distinction between having 
gold and making gold. Whoever philosophizes, also has philosophy" (Schelling, 1969: 7). 
We have seen what understanding of the self is required in order for philosophizing to take 
place as the dialogue between human thinking and the unfolding of existence in a manner 
that takes freedom as both its manner and matter of thinking. Yet what happens when this 
dialogue turns into the narcissistic monologue of the understanding? What conception of 
the self is necessitated by this manner of philosophical undertaking? In the next and fInal 
chapter of this project, I would like to turn to the consequences of ignoring the dialogical 
character of our constitution in the face of the unmotivated, surging forth of existence. In 
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other words, what happens when we bring our templates to the world of experience and 
insist that the pure possibility of the unfolding of being accommodates itself to these 
templates? I will argue that both Schelling's discussion of evil in the Freedom essay can offer 
us insight into what happens when we cease attending to the world in a manner that accords 
with the phenomenological ethos that I have been describing for the last five chapters. 
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CHAPTER VI 
FREEDOM AND THE GREAT HEALTH 
In the previous chapter, I presented an articulation of how human thinking that 
attends to the movement of existence, is a reflection-or as it Schelling has it, a 
reconstruction-of the very character of being; we saw that the same movement of 
repetition occurs in Heidegger in Chapter II. For Schelling, we see this coincidence insofar 
as the movement of being requires the perpetual, mutual self-effacement of the potencies, or 
principles, in the face of eternal freedom, without which the organic, unfolding, character of 
existence could not be. Our thinking must mirror this, i.e., attend to the character of eternal 
freedom, the generosity of being in a manner that accords with this free giving, via self-
effacement in the face of existence. This self-effacement amounts to a moment of what 
Schelling alternately calls a knowing not-knowing, Socratic ignorance, or Gelassenheit. For 
Heidegger, we see this coincidence in his description of being as Lassen des Anwesens or lassen 
anwesen, which in turn, demands that we attend to it phenomenologically in a state of 
Gelassenheit (GAlS, 364-5). 
In light of this account of the letting, and the account of decision given in the 
previous chapter, we need to turn to another key moment in Schelling's thinking. Given that 
a decision is always a decision for good and evil-as Schelling famously puts it in his Freedom 
essay (1/7, 353), we must tarry with his account of evil. As Nancy has it: 
Thinking is not intellectuality, but the experience of its limits. This experience, as 
the experience of freedom ... is not ad libitum. It constitutes existence and must 
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therefore be grasped at this extremity of the negation of existence. Henceforth, 
there is an experience of evil that thought can no longer ignore. (Nancy, 1993: 122) 
I argue that this experience of evil-as the experience of the nihilation of the generosity of 
being-whether via environmental degradation, genocide, or even in the case of Schelling, 
the existence of the nation-state-can be explicitly brought to bear upon Schelling's 
rejection of conceptual categorization in lieu of a thinking that "accompanies and witnesses" 
the movement of being step-by-step. It is our ability to either embrace or deny this play that 
I will attend to in the first section of this chapter. 
Yet Schelling's characterization of evil, in light of the underdetermined character of 
being, raises two poignant philosophical concerns, concerns that are entirely applicable to 
Heidegger as well. First, if Schelling's account of being leads us to a place wherein the 
ascription of a persistent identity to any thing taken in isolation is no longer sustainable, 
then, as I have argued, we must conclude that the only adequate manner in which we can 
describe any particular entity is in terms of how it both participates in and is itse!fa referential 
totality-or as Schelling would say, it is organic. If I have made a compelling account that 
this manner of describing entities is the only sound manner to approach the actual way in 
which entities presence, we are left without any normative measure with which to adjudicate 
whether or not our engagements with things are good or evil as all identity would be 
decentered from the top down, i.e., there is no principle. 
The second concern that I must attend to in concluding this chapter is the larger 
epistemic consequence of the description of Gelassenheit that I have given in the preceding 
chapters. Even if I am able to respond in a sufficient manner to the concern that making the 
world referential totalities from the top down leaves us without any final normative basis 
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from which to judge the quality of our philosophical engagements, I must attend to how one 
is able to proceed beyond the mere act of letting-be to active, discursive engagement with 
entities in the face presencing. Does Nietzsche's concern, as detailed in the previous 
chapter, not resurface here again? How can I move from engaging the play of presence in all 
of its excess to actually saying something about that play without at the same time negating 
the play? It is clear that when Schelling distinguishes thinking and knowledge he has this 
exact problem in mind (Schelling, 1969: 52)-the question for us is whether or not we are 
content to leave this distinction stand in such a way that philosophical practice will always 
remain at odds with itself; either letting being presence and maintaining our 
phenomenological ethos, or, overstepping this ethos to tarry discursively with the entities we 
encounter, thus threatening to instantiate the kind of conceptual thinking that has been 
described in the first section of this chapter. 
I attend to both of these concerns throughout the second and third sections of this 
chapter, and given that the concerns are intimately related to one another, the reader can rest 
assured that there will be overlap. The fact that these two concerns overlap, however, will 
enable me to offer a response to both at once. The fourth section of this chapter will argue 
that the concerns, as described above, may in large part be put to rest if we take stock of 
what the impetus for philosophical activity is for both Heidegger and Schelling. Insofar as 
the objective of philosophy-or better, free thinking-is not the pursuit of true propositions 
for either of these thinkers, it is clear that we need not worry ourselves with an external, 
epistemic measure against which we could verify the truth or falsity of their philosophical 
activity. If we take the objective, the goal, of both of these thinkers' philosophical activities 
to be the cultivation of a way of life, which is, I argue, for Heidegger, the path of 
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questioning, and for Schelling, the activity of philosophizing, then both of these thinkers 
would make freedom the alpha and the omega of philosophy, precisely because 
freedom-not the true and maybe not even the good, understood in a certain way-is for 
both of these thinkers the primary goal of life. 
Section I
 
Human Freedom and Evil
 
Humans, like all beings, contain both the principles of contraction and an expansion 
(or as Schelling would have it in the Freedom essay, nature and God) within them. Yet unlike 
in all other beings, these principles become separable in humans, this separability of the 
principles in humans is why God is able to be fully revealed through human life, specifically 
because the separability generates the possibility of good and evil, a possibility in which 
enables us to repeat the decision of existence and thereby mirror God. How are we to 
understand this separability of the principles in humans? For Schelling, it is not decided in 
advance, for humans, which potency or principle is essential. We are the separable unity of 
the force of the ground and the force of spirit, wherein the latter is the force of expansion 
and the force of the ground is the force of contraction, which amounts to the force of 
selfbood (J./7, 364). This force of selfbood cannot assert itself as dominant in the rest of 
creation on Schelling's account, it is only when the spiritual force of expansion gets 
overdetermined and directed by the force of selfbood that we can see evil has emerged. 
For this reason, evil does not lie in the separation of forces, nor in their simple 
separability, rather it lies in an attempt to posit "a false unity of forces" (J./7, 371). The key 
to understanding the possibility of this false unity of forces lies in Schelling's belief that we 
can characterize the will of God as the universal will, i.e., the expansive force, as opposed to 
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the will of the ground, which is the particular will, the contractive force (1/7,363). These 
competing forces arrive at an inappropriate relationship to one another whenever the 
particular will attempts to assert itself over the universal will, or as could be said otherwise, 
whenever the particular attempts to assert itself as universal, i.e., whenever the particular 
attempts to assert itself as having the ability to determine the whole, rather than recognizing 
that the determination of the whole hinges upon reciprocally-determining relationship 
between part and whole. This explains, then, what Schelling means when he says that, "all 
evil strives to return to the state of chaos" (1/7,374). It is crucial to note, that for Schelling, 
this desire to return to chaos that he characterizes as self-will can only assert itself in a 
decisive manner insofar as the process of unfolding has begun, as only when this process of 
organic movement has begun to take place could we ever measure the propriety of any 
particular organ's activity in accord with the movement of the whole. This is why he says, 
"therefore, only with the decisive stepping-forth of the good can evil wholly and decisively 
step forth as what it is" (1/7, 380). Existing as a particular in manner that could either be 
described as good or evil must emerge simultaneously, and can only emerge insofar as the 
measure, the movement of life as such, has begun. This is why, for Schelling, the 
unprethinkable decision that lies as the basis of all existence cannot be described as good or 
evil, rather it is the decision that enables the possibility of describing any particular 
comportment towards the whole as such. 
It is for this reason that I believe we can account for Schelling's otherwise peculiar 
explanation of the unity of necessity and freedom in a manner that does not sound so 
strange to our ears. Before offering an explanation, let us look at Schelling's account: 
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Here lies the point at which necessity and freedom must be united, if they are united 
in general. If this essence [the essence of any particular human] were to be a dead 
being, and from the human perspective something merely given to us, it would be 
the case that action could only follow from it by necessity, then accountability and all 
freedom would be eliminated. But precisely this inner necessity is the same as 
freedom; the essence of the human is essentially ones own deed; necessity and freedom 
stand in one another as one being [Wesen], that only appears as one or the other 
when observed from different sides; in itself it is freedom, formally it is necessity. 
(I/7, 385) 
The standard manner of interpreting this assertion is that which is offered by Zizek: for 
Schelling, following Fichte, the subject makes a decision that is outside of all time in which 
they choose their own character. Zizek describes this as, "the primordial act by means of 
which choose I my eternal character" (Zizek, 1996: 69). This act is accounted for as being a 
repetition of the primordial decision that broke the deadlock of the drives in which God was 
'trapped' prior to the self-effacement of the potencies in the face of eternal freedom. Just as 
this act of God cannot be accounted for, i.e., we cannot give reasons for it, the decision that 
determines the essence of any particular human being is likewise inaccessible to humans, yet 
equally determinate of their character. This is why, as was discussed in the previous chapter, 
decision is to be understood as the moment in which a "symbolic universe" is set up such 
that choices that exhibit this character can be made (Zizek, 1996: 67). 
Schelling gives Zizek, and nearly all interpreters of his texts, good reason to endorse 
such an account, and I want to be clear that I am in no way asserting that this interpretation 
is wrong; such a claim would be pure folly, particularly as Schelling explains that "the act 
through which ones life is determined in time does not itself belong to time, rather it belongs 
to eternity" (I/7, 386). He also affirms Zizek's reading by explaining that this act must be 
before consciousness precisely because it "it makes consciousness." Schelling himself is all 
too aware of how peculiar this account sounds, pointing out that it must be 
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incomprehensible to common ways of thinking, yet he believes it is an account that can have 
purchase on our experience of being held, and holding ourselves, responsible for our 
actions. In an attempt to soften the apparent insanity of his assertion he offers the following 
explanation: when a person does something that is deemed morally reprehensible, we 
continue to hold such a person responsible for their actions even ifwe believe that such a 
person was merely acting out a character that was so deeply entrenched in themselves that 
they could not have done otherwise. As he says, it is never enough to attempt to excuse an 
action by saying, 'that is just the way I am;' even a person who makes such a claim, Schelling 
says, "is wholly conscious that he is who he is through his own fault [Schuldl, while at the 
same time having a right to assert that it would be impossible for him to have been or to 
have acted otherwise" (J./7, 387). 
However, this is not to say that this act by which ones character is generated is an act 
that is accomplished once and for all, rather, it is an act, the repercussions ofwhich, are felt 
throughout the whole of ones life. It is an act that, like all things eternal for Schelling, 
remains a "free and eternal beginning" (J./7, 386). Does this claim soften the blow of his 
account at all? I believe it does. As I said, I have no desire to accuse the reading of the 
primordial act that has just been described as being 'wrong,' however, I do think that in light 
of the discussion of decision that I offered in the last chapter, we may have to move more 
carefully in understanding what Schelling is up to here. If the human act of positing ones 
character outside of all time is in fact a repetition of the decision through which the deadlock 
of the drives is broken, and the decision that breaks the deadlock of the drives is a decision 
without a decider, why would we want to attempt to describe Schelling's account of the 
positing of human character as being made by oneself in an unconscious moment before 
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time? If this decision is, in fact, a free and eternal beginning that constantly plays itself out, 
would it not be more helpful to understand what Schelling is describing here is simply the 
cultivation of character that takes place during the life of any particular human? 
It is clearly that case that what Schelling is up to in the Freedom essay, when taken 
from the perspective of moral philosophy, is an attempt to explain how we hold people 
responsible for the roots of their actions and not simply the acts themselves. In other 
words, we hold people responsible for their character, their bearing, their comportment, 
which is only made manifest to us through a persons actions. However, as this character is 
one that is, presumably, cultivated in large part prior to any individual's awareness of its 
cultivation, it is fair to describe it as 'unconscious.' Yet this does not mean that we do not 
hold ourselves responsible for this character that we seem to possess by no fault of our own, 
precisely because we continue to instantiate and reinforce this character through acting it out 
when we carry out particular acts in the world. I would argue that this is why Aristotle says, 
"it makes no small difference, then, to be habituated in this way or in that straight from 
childhood, but an enormous difference, or rather all the difference" (Aristotle, 2003: 
1103b25). Just as for Aristotle, one cultivates a hex-is, an active condition, through being 
habituated in such a way that one acquires an ethos, or a character, that is discernible through 
how one responds to the particularity of any given situation; Schelling is pointing us beyond 
any particular action as the site of praise or blame, and rather, back to the actors character, a 
character which is determinate while at the same time being necessmify contingent. I take this to 
be, again, what Aristotle has in mind when he says, "the virtues come to be present in us 
neither by nature nor contrary to nature, but in us who are of such a nature as to take them 
on, and to be brought to completion in them by means of habit" (Aristotle, 2003: 1103a25). 
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For Schelling, this is possible precisely because of the manner in which he conceives of the 
role of the human in nature, "Due to the fact that humanity stands in the middle, between 
the nonbeing of nature and the absolute being = God, humanity is free from both. 
Humanity is free from God in that humans have an independent root in nature, free from 
nature in that the divine in them is awakened, in the midst of nature, yet beyond nature" 
(1/7,458). 
With this account in mind, then, how are we to read Schelling'S insistence about the 
unity of necessity and freedom? Schelling will go on to say that "true freedom is in harmony 
with holy necessity" as it is "to freely affirm what is necessary" (1/7,392). What necessity is 
he speaking of here that we must freely affirm to enter into true freedom? There are 
multiple ways in which this assertion could be interpreted, let me restrict myself to two for 
the moment: first, we could be speaking of, as Zizek says, '''freely assuming' one's imposed 
destiny," wherein destiny is heard another word for the necessary fate to which my character 
binds and obliges me (Zizek, 2000: 18). Second, we could be speaking of the need to affirm 
the contingent necessity that is the acquisition of an active condition as Aristotle describes it. 
On the surface, these two accounts may appear to conflict with another; however, I think 
taking these two claims as in conflict would be a mistake. I claim that the best way to make 
sense of Schelling's assertion is to understand that the destiny that is imposed upon us that 
we must affirm is precisely the fact that we must have a character: a character that exhibits 
how one has come to understand oneself as the separable unity of the forces of contraction 
and expansion that reign throughout all of existence. For an outside observer, the best way 
to gain access into a particular individual's character would then be by attending to how they 
understand the question of self-knowledge. Those "dimwits who advise beginners in 
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philosophy to turn inwards" (Schelling, 1969: 40) would then be guilty of privileging the 
force of contraction; only those who understand that the question of self-knowledge is 
actually about the way in which we are ecstatic into the whole of the organic would exhibit a 
proper relationship to the principles. We will have to wait to discuss exactly what the sense 
of propriety here is, and what kind of measure it entails. For the time being, let us turn to 
get a sense of how impropriety shows itself as a negative entry point into an account of 
propriety. 
As a manner of returning us to the discussion of the particular and the universal that 
began this section, let us look at an account of evil that Schelling gives in the Stuttgart Private 
Lectures; Schelling explains that: 
Evil is thus nothing other then when a relative nonbeing erects itself to being, thus 
displacing a true being. From one side it is a nothing, from the other, a most real 
being [ein hiichst reeiies Wesen]. - There is evil in nature too, poison, for example, 
sickness, and that which offers the highest proof of the actuality of such a collapse 
of the whole of nature and humanity in particular--death. (J/7, 459) 
On this account, evil emerges whenever the force of contraction, the force of selfhood as he 
calls it throughout the Freedom essay, attempts to assert itself as what is essential in any 
relationship. Thus, whenever any particular entity attempts to assert itself as that which is 
able to offer a determination of the whole, evil has come onto the scene. As I said a 
moment ago, another way to understand this by looking at any particular person who 
attempts to account for who they are by ignoring that they participate in a world, in a 
referential totality, as it were. In such a case, that person falls into error precisely because 
they ignore that what makes them able to be a self at all is what is excessive to their body, 
their brain, and their self-conception(s). Nevertheless, given that the principles are separable 
in humans, this is a live possibility: it is not at all necessary that we correctly understand what 
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makes us what we are since we can cultivate a character that insists on insistence, rather than 
on ecstasy. 
This should give us some sense, even if all-too-simple of a sense, ofwhat I have in 
mind when using the term propriety. To some extent, what is at stake here is whether or not 
one correctly recognizes what makes us what we are: our ecstatic character that we share 
with all things organic. On this account, then, good would be to recognize that to be a self is 
to be outside of oneself, and thus if one is invested in self-preservation what must be 
preserved is the whole to which one belongs. Zizek echoes this reading when he describes 
Schelling's thinking of good and evil in terms ofwhat he calls "today's ecological crisis": evil, 
as the inversion of the principles-privileging contraction over expansion-is to make 
oneself the center of nature in such a way so as to destroy the very means of ones own life. 
Whereas animals exhibit the force of contraction in their desire for self-preservation as well, 
only humans are able to make this desire for self-preservation, as manifest in domination, 
into an "end-in-itself." In other words, only humans could offer a normative ethical theory 
such as ethical egoism wherein we would advocate and esteem domination as an appropriate 
path to our goals to such an extent that this path becomes the goaL To put it bluntly, only 
humans are able to applaud ourselves for shitting where we eat (Zizek, 1996: 63). As Joseph 
Lawrence says, this is the "most vulgar and widely distributed form of evil, whereby the 
animal instinct for survival, a mere means and condition of life, detaches itself from the rest 
of nature and makes itself into an end." (Lawrence, 2004: 184). Presumably then, good 
would be exhibited insofar as we recognized that our self-preservation required caring for 
what surrounds us, but not because }JJhat surrounds is a means, rather because we are what 
surrounds, or environs, us. 
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A further example that Schelling gives that can illuminate the ways in which humans 
generate a false unity of the principles is his discussion of the state in the Stuttgart Private 
Lectures. Schelling explains that because the unity in indifference of the potencies breaks 
down in humanity-and all of existence for that matter insofar as there is not rest-we 
continue to seek out this unity on earth. However, as Schelling explains, this unity can only 
be found in the eternal past, prior to the unfolding of existence. Schelling thinks that 
humans attempt to return to this unity by attempting to create such a unity on earth-a unity 
which would only seem available to us in death-by creating the state. Schelling explains, 
"the natural unity, this second nature beyond the first, to which humanity must enforcedly 
take its unity is the state; and the state, in order to put it direcdy, is thereby a consequence of 
the curse that rests in humanity. Since the human cannot have God for unity, humanity 
must submit itself to a physical unity" (1/7,461). For Schelling this submission to the state 
is not ideal, as was already made clear in the Oldest System Program where it is asserted that 
"there is no idea of the state because the state is something mechanical ... every state must 
treat human being like mechanical cogs; and it should not do so; hence it should cease" (Krell, 
2005: 23). Here, he reiterates what is written in that document: "The state has a 
contradiction in itself. It is a natural unity, i.e., a unity that can only work through physical 
means," yet for Schelling such a physical unity will not actually bind people together, to do 
that, "a higher talisman is needed." The state in itself is for Schelling "precarious and 
temporary" (1/7, 461). Any attempt to bind individuals together into a state will either fail 
because it actually permits individual human flourishing, in which case, "the power of the 
state is deprived of the force that belonged to it, or it will be given this force, and then there 
is despotism." He then goes on to make his seemingly final proclamation regarding the 
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state, writing, "My opinion is that the state as such can never find true and absolute unity 
that all states are merely attempts to find; or, as such attempts to find and become an organic 
whole, without ever being able to actually attain it, they only find the fate of each organic 
being, to bloom, to ripen, to age finitely, and finally to die" (1/7,462). It is this "denial of 
the state as such" that leads Jiirgen Habermas to say, "Schelling alone, of all the great 
idealists, is brought to the very edge of idealism itself' (Habermas, 2004: 47). I would clearly 
agree, but want to push Habermas' claim even further: this rejection of the state is a 
symptom of Schelling's shattering of idealism insofar as idealism names an onto-theological 
enterprise wherein the theos is the absolute. 
In the examples of both the ecological crisis and the manifold failure of the state, we 
get a greater sense of what Schelling has in mind when he points to evil and why he would 
describe it as an attempt to invert the principles, positing selfhood as primary, as the center. 
In both cases, the force of selfhood is taken to be primary, asserting itself as the means by 
which the expansive force is directed and guided. In the ecological crisis, the force of 
selfhood, when taken as primary, brings us to a point wherein the way in which we extend 
ourselves out into the world is determined and framed by the perspective of a particular self, 
or even a particular species, such that the whole of existence gets framed as being means to 
at the disposal of the human. In the state, a particular voice attempts to gather all things 
together under its rule and in so doing, asserts itself as the universal. As Wirth explains, evil 
"is the propensity of the creaturely ... to shun the abyss of its origin and the abyss of its 
future and move towards itself and affirm the presence only of itself. Evil is the force of the 
conatus." This force of the conatus, the force of selfhood, shows itself insofar as, "things 
feverishly move away from their nonthingly center" (Wirth, 2003: 170). Thus to return to 
222 
the question of self-knowledge, for Schelling one who exhibits evil in the manner described 
above is one who does not recognize themselves as determined by that into which they are 
ecstatic. This inability to recognize oneself emerges, I argue, due to the cultivation of a 
character that understands the world to be a world of material objects at the disposal of the 
I, this character, however, may be most visible to us insofar as we look at how any particular 
person understands 'self.' As Nietzsche had told us in the previous chapter, it is only with 
the I that things first emerge, and at this juncture I turn to a more explicit investigation of 
how evil shows itself through a particular philosophical comportment; a comportment in 
which the relationship between the self and the world is one wherein we mistake ourselves 
for the center, for the lawgiver, for the being that brings pre-formed 
concepts-universals-to bear on particularities thereby negating the movement and flux of 
those particularities. My claim is: if evil is the particular raising itself to the level of the 
universal, then any conception of thinking that holds that we bring pre-formed universals to 
bear on the world of experience is an exhibition of a comportment that could only be 
characterized as evil. 
Section II
 
Evil, Error, and Conceptual Clotting
 
How does errancy, or error, manifest itself as evil in philosophical activity? 
Regarding error and evil, Schelling explains: 
Error is not mere privation of truth. It is something quite positive. It is not lack in 
spirit, but rather inverted spirit. Therefore, error can be rich in spirit and still be 
error. - Likewise, evil is no mere privation of the good, no simple negation of inner 
harmony, but a positive disharmony ... From a certain perspective, evil is the most 
purely spiritual, because it wages the most ferocious war against all being, it even 
desires to annul [aujbeben] the ground of all creation. (J-/7, 470) 
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Just as Schelling constantly describes disease and evil to be analogous to one another; he 
seems here to be drawing a comparable analogy between evil and error. Just as evil is not a 
lack of the good, but rather an active, or positive, disharmony where in a false unity of the 
principles is posited; error is described as something quite positive. What kind of positivity 
is he describing? In order to understand this, I believe we need to return to the Erlanger 
Lectures, so as to more clearly contrast what he is describing here with what he considers 
proper philosophical activity to be. 
In separating out knowledge and thinking Schelling enables himself to describe the 
objective of philosophy: "immediate knowing of eternal freedom" (Schelling, 1969: 58). Yet, 
due to the fact that this immediate knowledge is only possible insofar as we recognize the 
need to hold the forces of contraction and expansion within ourselves apart from one 
another so as to be able to debase ourselves into comportment of thinking that is proper to 
the absolute, the immediacy is always a kind of false immediacy. It is an immediacy that is 
possible only insofar as one has first recognized the need for conflict and tension. When 
this conflict and tension are not recognized, but rather actuated "in a more or less lucky 
crisis," philosophers generate errors. Regarding these errors, Schelling says: 
Error does not belong to indifference, nor is it mere lack; rather it is a perversion of 
knowledge (it belongs in the categories of evil and sickness). If all errors were 
simply false, divested of all truth, they would not be dangerous. Many assertions are 
clearly of such harmless kind, but it proves too honorable to explain them as errors. 
There is something venerable about errors; something of the truth lies in them. But 
precisely this distortion, this perversion of truth, these traits of the original truth that 
are still recognizable or at least dimly felt in these terrifying errors are what makes 
errors so horrifying. When inhibited, even the most gentle force - which is active in 
the cultivation of organic beings - generates the monstrous. This is not terrifying to 
us because of its dissimilarity, but precisely because of it similarity with the true 
image, as the human form is still always recognizable. (Schelling, 1969: 61-2) 
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What, precisely, is Schelling describing here? What kind of error does he have in mind? 
Given that he is emphatic in this quotation that errors terrify 'us' (presumably, we free 
thinkers) because of their similarity to the truth, we should be clear that he is not describing 
simple falsity; i.e., simply offering an incorrect account of how thing are in themselves. It is 
for this reason that the account I gave in the previous section regarding propriety and 
impropriety may be too simple: Schelling clearly is not simply applauding people for 'getting 
it right' and lambasting people for offering propositional claims about existence that do not 
correspond to what actually is. Rather, as he makes quite clear in his remarks that follow this 
quotation, error is a description of how one goes about philosophizing, and this again, 
necessitates an explicit return to the question of self-knowledge. 
In the closest thing we as readers get to an explanation ofwhat Schelling has in mind 
when he diagnoses error, he writes, "error emerges through merely wanting to know. One is 
safe from error only when one does not onlY want to know" (Schelling, 1969: 62). Ifwe 
restate the force of contraction and the force of expansion as making oneself subject and 
making oneself object respectively-which seems to be a valid reading insofar as the 
question of the inverted, or perverted, unity of the principles in the case of evil is really 
about what is made to be essential, or determinate, i.e., the subject in their relationship with 
each other-Schelling's text will be helpful. Schelling explains that humans, by nature, exist 
in a state of a "mixture of truth and falsity" in our knowing relationships insofar as we can 
only acquire our sense of subjectivity by taking the world around us, and even more so the 
absolute, to the be an object for us. Seemingly, this natural state remains only a simple 
"distortion of knowledge" so long as one does not attempt to "approach philosophy": it is 
only at the juncture wherein one attempts to pass from this natural condition to a place of 
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self-consciousness of this position that the danger of monstrous error arises: people who 
have not attended to the conditions of their state of wanting to know-this would be his 
"merely wanting to know"-will proceed to systematically, schematically, and categorically 
describe whatsoever confronts them as if it were an object. Thus Schelling says, "whatever 
they find in this knowledge they establish as general, valid, eternal truths" (Schelling, 1969: 
63). 
This development of general, valid, eternal truths is based upon what Schelling calls a 
"bias for the present" (Schelling, 1969: 63), a bias that is arguably only possible insofar as we 
do not reflect upon the conditions of the possibility of our wanting to know. If a 
philosopher, for Schelling, were to actually inquire into their desire to know, they would 
recognize that their desire and ability to know is based upon their belonging to that which 
they desire to know, and that this purported object of knowledge is in fact no simple object 
at all, rather it moves, it changes, and has a life of its own. Here we would interrogate our 
natural state of distortion and arrive at a more appropriate conception of selfhood. They 
would thereby gain their selfhood, and let the principle of contraction play its part, by 
recognizing how they were ecstatic and determined by what is excessive to them, thus 
bringing to life that which is encountered, overcoming the bias for the present, and engaging 
the life of the world. Only a philosopher who makes no attempt to understand the 
conception of the self or the I that undergirds their desirous engagement with the world 
around them is able to fall into the kind of error that Schelling is describing. Such a failure 
necessitates that one mistakes their self for the center of all creation, the lawgiver, the arbiter 
of true and false. Hence Schelling describes Kant's error: "he ... simply always assumes that 
something must be knowable through these forms [the forms of our finite understanding] if 
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it is to be knowable at all" (Schelling, 1969: 64). Since existence must precede our 
thinking-so long as we are to have something to think-any engagement with this 
existence that takes the engager to be the simple lawgiver would seem to mistake the natural 
priority of the relationship between the thinker and what is thought, or thinking and being. 
In his Natll1philosophie, Schelling makes this exact same point when discussing the 
experimental method. Expressing his concern with methods of engaging nature that do not 
interrogate the assumptions required to employ such a method, Schelling explains, "Every 
question contains an implicit apriori judgment; every experiment that is an experiment is 
prophesizing; experimentation itself is the production of appearances" (1/3,276). Thus 
experimentation necessitates, even if unknowingly, controlling appearances, and for 
Schelling, the true task of a philosophy of nature is to expose the apriori commitments of 
these experiments, and to thereby come to know our role, as inquirers, historically, in 
determining how the world shows itself to us; or, the task is to understand our contribution, 
our p~rticipationin the disclosure of any entity. 
To put these claims in other words: the proper relationship between subject and 
object, or what should be essential in the relationship between knower and known, is 
inverted, posited as a false unity wherein the force of selfhood, the I, takes itself to be 
primary and thus able to give laws to what, seemingly, should be the real provider of 
measure, the movement of eternal freedom insofar as it presences in the world around us. 
On this account, then, we could see why Schelling's characterization of philosophical error is 
not only analogous to his characterization of evil, but an actual instantiation of it. 
Rephrasing this point in the language of the particular and the universal, we could say that 
any manner of approaching thought that conceives of our cognitive activity as an act of 
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bringing to bear pre-formed concepts, i.e. universals, onto the particulars of the world of 
experience simultaneously requires that we conceive of ourselves as beings that have the 
ability to speak for the whole. In other words, to think that thinking is about bringing 
universal concepts onto the particularities of experience necessitates that I mistake my 
particularity for universality, just as the totalitarian dictator speaks with the voice of the 
people and the lumber baron is able to decide for all people about what the meaning of a 
tree is, i.e., lumber. 
At this point, it will be helpful to turn back to the discussion ofAristotle from the 
previous section of the chapter. If good and evil are ways to describe how we as particulars 
relate to the whole to which we belong, what we are actually diagnosing when we call 
something evil-be that the lumber baron, the totalitarian dictator, or a certain kind of 
thinking-is a hexis, a comportment, an active condition, a character. It seems to make little 
or no difference whether or not one wishes to buy or reject Schelling's account of the 
decision one makes about ones character outside of all time; the result-we hold people 
responsible for a character that they may not have actively cultivated for 
themselves-remains the same. The comportment with which I am most concerned at 
present is the philosophical comportment wherein "the thinking of 'freedom' or the 
generosity of being" is annihilated in lieu of a thinking that attempts to clot and close up the 
abyssal character of being by bringing things back to a firm and fast ground (Nancy, 1993: 
132). Any kind of overdetermining, conceptual thinking that has already decided, for 
example, that all things which we encounter are substances with predicates-substances the 
coherency of which is guaranteed by eternal essences contained in some other world-has 
closed up the abyss, has posited a solid idol in place of the dissembling subject of freedom. 
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This kind of comportment exhibits itself by conceiving of itself as completed, transparent, 
certain: as a giver of laws, an arbiter of identities, as one who is already decided and gets to 
decide for existence. Yet as Nancy says, this ethos is one that shows us that, "Evil is the hatred 
ofexistence as such" (Nancy, 1993: 128), insofar as it is, as Schelling said, a bias for the present, 
a bias for presence, that neglects such an instance of presence's belonging to an unfolding of 
presencing, that has a life, a life that is an excess to my decision about it. 
Opposed to this narcissism of monologue-as Wirth described it for us in the 
previous chapter-Nancy describes an "ethics of freedom"; this is an ethic that, "is the ethos 
itself as the opening of space, the spacious shelter of being in existence, deciding to remain 
what it is in the distancing from the self, in this distancing that delivers it to its retreat, to its 
existence, generously" (Nancy, 1993: 146). Here Nancy describes the ecstasy-Wirth would 
say, dialogue-that makes us what we are. We are given back to ourselves only by distancing 
ourselves from the force of selfhood that would drag us inwards. Or at least from any sense 
of selfhood that would ignore that "'Self' equals what ex-ists as such" (Nancy, 2000: 955). 
For Nancy and Wirth this is an act that would only take place as the exhibition of a 
particular kind of comportment, what Nancy has named for us an ethics of freedom, or an 
ethos of openness, which is clearly synonymous with Gelassenheit, with releasing ourselves to 
the world, not so as to debase ourselves as objects before subjects but to recognize that we 
are what we are only insofar as we participate in the infinite conversation between ourselves 
and existence. 
Thus for Schelling and Nancy, evil becomes a watchword for a comportment that 
engages the world as the negation, the closure of this generosity, or in other words, evil 
becomes a return to onto-theological impulses wherein the world is encountered as 
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determined. Yet in reading both Schelling and Nancy, anyone who has spent time with 
Nietzsche must be left wondering about the rhetorical force of the word evil. What can evil 
mean here if it is not a moral evaluation? Even more importantly, how can one make such a 
claim given the absolute lack of measure that we must find ourselves facing in Schelling's 
thinking of the absolute or Heidegger's account of Ereignis? In the next section I will 
endeavor to explain some of the ways in which evil can function rhetorically, explaining what 
I understand to be the Nietzschean critique of Schelling, a critique which Nietzsche himself 
never made, but certainly-at least on a superficial engagement with Schelling-could have. 
I will then try to show how and why I think that Schelling can be saved from these criticisms 
insofar as his account of good and evil has more to do with a very Nietzschean conception 
of health rather than any simple will to truth. 
Section III
 
Evil and the Force of Selfhood
 
Why would someone feel compelled to give an account of evil? What motives are 
present in using this word; a word that clearly brings with it as much emotional force as any 
in the English language? Historically, of course, pointing to evil is a way to 'rally the 
troops'-sometimes literally and other times figuratively. By setting up an opponent or an 
alternate position as evil, one makes the quick step from offering the distinction between 
good and bad, "Gut and Schlecht, the affIrmation of difference and the dismissal without 
prosecution" of those who exhibit capacities or tendencies other than oneself to prosecuting 
~ 
precisely this difference from a moral perspective (Wirth, 2003: 180). Nietzsche's most 
famous account of this transition occurs in Towards a Genealogy ifMorals, §13 (KGA, VI/II: 
292-295). Having already described the birth of the qualitative distinction between good and 
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bad earlier in the text, as having been born out of seemingly natural allocations of power and 
strength, here Nietzsche writes, "-Yet we come back to the problem of the other origin of 
the "good", as it devised by the man of ressentiment himself, which demands to be 
completed." Nietzsche then goes on to describe his famous account of lambs and the birds 
that prey upon them. There is nothing odd, he explains, in the fact that the lambs dislike the 
birds of prey ofwho carry them off for their supper-and so long as we abide by the first 
account of the opposition of the birth of 'good' as a descriptive term, we encounter no 
moralizing. It is only when the lambs play upon "the seduction of language (and the 
petrified, fundamental error of reason), which understands and mistakes all activity as 
conditioned through an actor, through a 'subject'" that evil, as a moral phenomenon, can be 
attributed as a predicate to a subject. 
Nietzsche's argument is as simple as it is profound. Ifwe engage the world of acts, 
or deeds [ThunJ, as expressions of themselves rather than as manifestations of the essential 
character of an actor, we can never point at a person and say, 'he is evil;' at most, we could 
describe the quality of the action itself. If this is the case, there is no subject to which the 
predicate evil, or good, could be attached. It is only when the lamb-the weak-is able to 
play upon our prejudice to attribute deeds to agents that the idea of an 'evil person' becomes 
comprehensible. Nietzsche claims that the lamb is thus able to exploit two separate 
prejudices in order to rigidly instantiate an oppositional relationship between two different 
kinds of moral beings, i.e., between good people and evil people: first, the prejudice to 
ascribe actors to acts, and second, the belief that self-preservation is the most basic drive of 
all beings. The first prejudice has already been explained, the latter, I think follows quite 
naturally from the first. Ifwe believe that our primary objective in life is to preserve 
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ourselves at all costs, than anything that threatens that ability to stay alive is clearly a threat. 
Ifwe simultaneous hold that we, as humans, are agents who have the ability to freely and 
indifferently choose who we are and what characteristics we will exhibit throughout lives, 
then those people who pose a threat to the continued maintenance of my se!!can be held 
responsible, morally responsible, for their choice to exhibit strength. From the perspective 
of the weak, the man of ressentiment, this person then becomes evil. 
A few things must be noted about Nietzsche's account so that we can go on and 
figure out how well it describes Schelling's discussion of evil: the attribution of the predicate 
evil to a person is clearly a description of an individual's character; it goes to the root, to the 
core, to the essence. An evil deed is only important insofar as it is the branch of a tree that 
can be followed so as to discover the roots. Second, the attribution of evil to an actor is 
fundamentally reactive: the category of the good is set up in advance: whatever aids in the 
preservation of self is good, whatever, and more importantly whoever, hinders that ability to 
preserve oneself is evil. It is here that the measure, the potentially eternal measure by which 
one could adjudicate between good and evil first shows itself. 
Holding these two points in mind, let us see how his description accords with how 
we have described evil in Schelling. The first characteristic, evil is something that is 
attributed to the character of a person whose deeds are merely consequences of said 
character, clearly holds. I spent a fair amount of time in the previous two sections of this 
chapter developing precisely this claim. What of the latter claim? Is Schelling's attribution 
of the term evil to an actor fundamentally reactive, i.e., is the good settled in advance for 
Schelling, and does he instantiate a measure for good and evil that would assume the place 
of an eternal principle of morality? The short, and potentially superficial, answer seems to 
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be yes. However, this is a much harder question to answer---due in large part to the fact that 
I have yet to give any account ofwhat the measure of evil and error really is for 
Schelling-and it will require that we spend some time elaborating on how and why 
Schelling's account of character does not seem to so easily be grouped together with the man 
of ressentiment as Nietzsche describes him. 
Let us turn to the first claim more explicitly: does Nietzsche's description of evil and 
the subject hold in Schelling? The answer is yes and no. On the one hand, it is clearly the 
case, as has been said, that the terms good and evil for Schelling are manners of describing 
how one comports oneself towards the whole. Thus the terms are predicates of a subject. 
On the other hand, the subject to whom one would predicate these terms is fundamentally 
ecstatic. This means I am myself only insofar as I am always engaging the world around me. 
Because Schelling so adamantly takes any simple opposition between subject and object 
away from us in his account of the organic, it is not clear that we could describe a 
Schellingian subject as either good or evil-or even as existing-outside of that subject's 
active relationships to the world around it. This would mean that there is no static subject to 
which we could ascribe such predicates with any permanence as if that subject existed 
outside of relation. However, this does not mean that there is no persistent being that is 
'me' that due to the inertia of my habits consistently exhibits a particular comportment 
towards the world around me. Thus, according to the logic of progressive predication as 
described in the Freedom essay, to say 'Adam is evil' is to say that I am the antecedent that is 
the ground, or the condition, of saying evil. I am a unity that is exhibited by the predicate, 
but a unity about which, nothing could be said insofar as I did not progress or unfold 
through my predicates, or my consequences. As Schelling puts it, "this is the sense of the 
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other ancient explanation, according to which the subject and predicate were opposed as the 
enveloped and unfolded [Eingewickelte und Entjaltete] (implicitum et explicitum)" (J/7, 342). 
Heidegger explains this concept of unfolding predication as Schelling's "higher concept of 
identity," where, "in truth, identity is no lifeless relating of indifferent and fruitless 
identicalness [Einerleiheit], but rather "unity" is immediately productive, progressing towards 
an other, and creative" (Heidegger, 1995: 95). 
Thus, for Schelling, the subject can be said to exist, but only in ek-sistence. The 
subject can thus be described with predicates, but these predicates do not describe an eternal 
essence of the subject. The character that we exhibit exists in a relationship of implication 
and explication with the self that one is. As we saw in the previous chapters, Schelling is not 
an emanationist. Contrary to emanation, where God shoots himself down the earth and the 
material form encountered there plays out the divine on a material level which is necessarily 
distinct from the divine, Schelling's understanding of the relationship between subject and 
predicate in human life, which is a replication of the same structure of predication in the life 
of the absolute, is quite similar to Spinoza's thought of expression. As Gilles Deleuze 
explains, Spinoza's thought of expression means, "it is now object that expresses itself, the 
thing itself that explicates itself" (Deleuze, 1990: 22). That is to say, there is no difference, at 
least in one sense, between the explication of Substance in attribute and mode and Substance 
qua Substance. Substance is nothing outside of its explicating itself in attribute and mode, 
and the implication of attribute and mode within it. There are no parts without a whole to 
which they belong and in which they are implicated, but there is also no whole without that 
whole's being expressed, or unfolded, through its parts. 
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Returning to Aristotle's language, we would say that the manner in which my active 
condition shows itself in my tarrying with any particular ethical situation explicates my 
character, but simultaneously reinforces and perpetuates that character. If I have an 
enveloped, or implicit, character it is one that can only be described in how it unfolds, in fact 
it is nothing more than the constancy of its unfolding. On the face of it, this may seem to be 
a radically unsatisfactory account of character, as it would seem to mean that we could not 
describe a person when they were not acting, i.e., when they were not exposing themselves. 
If that were in fact the case, I would completely agree. However, given the primacy of 
relation-I am what I am only insofar as I am always relating, even when I enter into 
solitude, I define myself by cutting myself off-it is fair to say that for Schelling we are never 
not acting, we are never not productive, and we are never not ek-sistent. This would then 
vindicate a reading of Schelling wherein what is really being described when we use the 
terms good and evil is exactly a bearing, a comportment, or an ethos that is, and is exhibited, 
only insofar as I am acting-which is something that I am always doing, and tend to do with 
some consistency due to the inertia of human life. Accordingly, the agent or actor that 
Schelling would describe as having either a good or evil character would be a subject of an 
entirely different kind than that which Nietzsche calls the man of ressentiment. 
It would seem, then, that the people who exhibit comportments that Schelling would 
describe as evil are, ironically, extraordinarily similar to the way in which the man of 
ressentiment understands the world. As I explained in the previous section, evil, for Schelling, 
would amount to taking oneself as the subject qua lawgiver, and I also gave examples of how 
this conception of self leads to a prioritizing of self-preservation, in which the self is treated 
as an isolated monad. As Wirth explains, "when Nietzsche exposes the tacit commitments 
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of the bifurcation of the world into good and evil, he flushed out the needy, identity-
demanding human soul," and it is precisely this identity-demanding human-so long as the 
identity demanded is autonomous-that I have argued Schelling characterizes as evil (Wirth, 
2003: 179). If this is true, then it may hold that the Schellingian philosopher is much closer 
to Nietzsche then we may have thought. However, before we could make such an assertion, 
we must return to the second question posed earlier: is Schelling's conception of evil 
fundamentally reactive? In other words, does the opposition between good and evil emerge 
as a way for someone to gain some control over his or her life by identifying themselves as 
other than what pushes on them, threateningly, from the outside? Given my account of how 
identity works in Schelling, it would seem that the short answer would have to be a 
categorical, 'no!': only a person who exhibited such a self-conception would be described as 
evil for Schelling. This would imply that the measure of good and evil would be prior to and 
beyond simple, human moralizing. Thus we must investigate what the measure for good 
and evil is for Schelling and in order to find that measure we must return to Schelling's 
account of philosophizing insofar as he opposes philosophizing to the possession of 
knowledge. Only when we have a sense of the purpose of such philosophizing for Schelling 
can we truly get a handle on what the measure of good and evil is for him. 
Section IV
 
The Experience of Freedom as the Great Health
 
In this final, full section of the final chapter of this project I must return to the 
question that I posed at the beginning of the previous section, but in slightly different form: 
why does Schelling bother to diagnose evil? I believe that if we can answer that question, we 
will be able to understand what the measure of good and evil are for Schelling. The title of 
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this section should, in large part, give way my answer: as Lawrence has it, "from beginning to 
end, Schelling's one thought remains that offreedoni" (Lawrence, 2004: 174), or as I have 
been putting it for numerous chapters, the objective, the purpose, the goal of philosophizing 
for Schelling and Heidegger is the experience of freedom. The novelty of this final section is 
that I will show that this experience of freedom is concomitant with the experience of health 
and activity 
Prior to giving this account of health, we must answer the question of measure for 
Schelling. As we have seen, he does not think that the task is of philosophy is to offer 
'correct' accounts ofwhat unfolds, even though it may same that way. Let me be more 
precise about this point: Schelling is clearly concerned with the truth or falsity, from the 
perspective of correspondence, as these show up in philosophical labors, otherwise he would 
have no reason to spend so much time differentiating between the dead, isolated, knowledge 
that is borne out of the comportment of a thinker who takes themselves to be a lawgiver and 
the free thinking of one who maintains a phenomenological stance towards the unfolding of 
the world. The account of evil I have given in this chapter would be largely moot if he did 
not care about this distinction. However, if his philosophical endeavor could be 
characterized as guided by a will to truth at all costs, it would make very little sense for him 
to describe the philosophical activity of the man of ressentiment as evil. It would make a lot 
more sense for him to simply say that such a philosopher generates falsehoods, and leave it 
at that. Yet he describes these falsehoods, these errors, as monstrous. Why? 
The easiest way for us understand why Schelling thinks that these errors are 
monstrous, that they are evil, is to address another robust philosophical-specifically 
epistemic-concern about the process of philosophizing I have described for the last four 
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chapters. Ifwe follow Heidegger and Schelling in their insistence that philosophizing 
amounts to letting beings be, i.e., it amounts to carrying oneself with a phenomenological 
ethos, could we ever move past that initial step of letting beings presence without 
simultaneously betraying the ethos that guided our initial engagement with entities? Does 
privileging Gelassenheit bring us to an apon'a wherein we must either engage in the willful 
errancy of the center, tinkering and tarrying with an entity on our own terms after the initial 
disclosure, or, stay in this stance of releasement thereby making ourselves incapable of saying 
anything about the entity that we are encountering? 
If Schelling and Heidegger's demand for a phenomenological ethos were, in fact, a 
demand for detached, objective, empirical observation in which the observer's task were to 
keep themselves at a distance from what they were engaging so as to collect information 
about how the entity was in itself, this aporia would clearly emerge. However, in order to 
understand my activity as a philosopher, or a scientist, in such terms would necessitate that I 
thought I was a distinct, discrete, individualized monad-a subject encountering objects that 
had a life of their own outside of my participation with them. Such a manner of engaging 
the presencing of entities would also, presumably, amount to what Schelling calls a "wanting 
to know" in which the observer did not attend to the conceptual expectations that they were 
bringing to bear on what they were encountering; this is precisely what Schelling has in mind 
when he calls all experimentation a form of prophesizing. If I have already decided that in 
my investigation of an eco-system, I want to see how the animal with the particular cellular 
structure and genetic make-up that I call 'thrush' interacts with the plant with the particular 
cellular structure and genetic make-up that I call 'jack pine', I have settled most of the big 
ontological questions in advance that attending phenomenologically to an environment is 
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supposed to help us answer. I have already decided what a thrush is, and I group this 
particular entity under a universal category that arguably determines what I will and will not 
see in the behavior of this animal; and the same could clearly be said of the jack pine. 
This approach to entities-an approach that holds entities to be identifiable, 
essentially, in isolation from one another, and that holds that I, as an observer, do not 
participate in the disclosure of an entity-is described quite clearly by Merleau-Ponty: 
Science manipulates things and gives up living in them. It makes its own limited 
models of things; operating upon these indices or variables to effect whatever 
transformation are permitted by their definition, it comes face to face with the real 
world only at rare intervals. Science is and always has been that admirably active, 
ingenious, and bold way of thinking whose fundamental bias is to treat everything as 
though it were and object-in-general-as though it meant nothing to us and yet was 
predestined for our own use. (Merleau-Ponty, 1964: 159) 
It is this view of knowledge that would lead us hopelessly in the aporia described above, but 
it is a view that is entirely foreign to Schelling and Heidegger. As has been repeated 
throughout this project, for Schelling and Heidegger the essence of any particular thing is 
what it is onlY insrifar as it relates to what it is not. If this is the case, and the identity-insofar as 
this is understood as something that one seeks in epistemic inquiry-of a particular bird is 
sought, the only way in which to come to know 'what' this bird is is to understand the web 
of relations in which it participates in a particular place at a particular time. In other words, 
to know the bird means to know the 'personality' of the bird insofar as it plays a part in a 
structure that is larger than the body of the bird itself. This then necessitates that one has an 
understanding of the causal nexus that the bird participates in to make the web of relations 
to which it belongs behave the way it does. Knowing the particular bird then would mean 
knowing what the bird eats, where it builds it nest, what its different songs can tell us about 
this particular place. But these things are only knowable insofar as we have an 
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understanding of the whole in which the bird participates. Here then, the universal-or the 
genus for example-is eschewed in lieu of knowledge of the network that this bird sustains 
and that, in turn, sustains the bird.4D This amounts to a breakdown of the distinction 
between the "what" and the "that" of the bird, as the fact of the bird will be synonymous 
with its whatness. Merleau-Ponty can again be helpful as, in the working notes to The Visible 
and the Invisible, he notes his enthusiasm in light of his "discovery of the (verbal) Wesen: first 
expression of the being that is neither being-object nor being-subject, neither essence nor 
existence: what west (the being-rose of the rose, the being-society of society, the being-history 
of history) answers to the question was as well as the question daJf' (Merleau-Ponty, 1968: 
174). 
What cannot be missed here is that for Heidegger, Schelling, and, presumably, 
Merleau-Ponty as well, we cannot neglect the role that we playas philosophers in attending 
thinkingly to this movement of an entity, this is the mistake that the critique given above 
makes. Rather, for all of these thinkers, Gelassenheit, releasement, amounts to releasing 
oneself into the world ofwhich one is part and parcel. Releasement would then amount to 
another way to think about the question of self-knowledge. Releasement is not a release from 
the structures of conceptuality that would overdetermine my engagement with the 
world-this would merely be an inverted form of the narcissism of monologue as described 
40 There are extraordinary similarities between this account and what one finds Vine Deloria,] r. advocating for 
throughout his writings. In fact, I am cribbing much of this account from his writings. Deloria is not alone 
amongst contemporary indigenous philosophers in presenting an account that accords with my presentation of 
Schelling and Heidegger (and potentially a particular kind of phenomenology as such). V.F. Cordova explains 
that while the Euro-American attempts to understand the world through universals that thereby enable humans 
to control and dominate the world, "the Native American... understands the world as a more complex place. 
There can be no universals in the face of an infinity of complexity" (Cordova, 2007: 70). Greg Cajete refers to 
the "self-organization or 'creativity' out of the field of chaos [that] occurs everywhere in nature," thus 
problematizing any attempt to identify any element ofwhat Cordova calls a matrix~or what Adorno would 
call a constellation~in isolation from that matrix (Cajete, 2004: 49). Thus are just two of a number of 
examples I could give. 
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above, where the world goes on a diatribe and I passively receive-rather it is a releasement 
to the world that ought to exhibit itself as a dialogue with the presencing of whatsoever is 
encountered. I can simultaneously maintain a stance, a comportment, of Gelassenheit and 
tarry discursively with an entity so long as that tarrying is actuallY dimmive, i.e., it must remain 
dialogical, a give and take, between the entity and myself. As Heidegger's tri-partite structure 
of phenomenology should have made clear, I must attend to the self-showing of an entity 
while attending to what I am bringing to bear on that entity in my engagement with it, but 
even in this engagement, I must be directed by some end, some larger objective. What this 
objective is will be addressed momentarily. 
First, let us continue exploring this claim about interaction: John McCumber 
describes Heidegger's understanding ofwhat makes an entity, an eco-system, a state, or even 
a human what it is as "diakenic unification," which he explains, has three characteristics: no 
part can be understand apart from the others, no part "is the ground of the others, i.e., 
explains them," and finally, "no yet more basic phenomenon can ground, i.e., explain, all of 
them together" (McCumber, 2000: 14). In this text, and others, McCumber wants to give an 
account of what makes an entity what it is that does not return to what he calls "ousiodic 
structures," which is another term he uses to describe the wayan entity is understood to be 
constituted in onto-theology and modern science. As opposed to having a solid center, 
things for Heidegger, McCumber writes, can be "captured in another way, in terms ofwhat I 
call the diakena, the gaps which grow and gather" (McCumber, 1999: 207). Thus for 
McCumber, any entity is what it is only insofar as the parts that make it up interact with one 
another in a manner that is both playful and unstable. Though he chooses to emphasize 
how this is a way that a particular thing is constituted and does not attend nearly as much to 
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how it could be used to describe a referential totality-which is a forgivable offense as all 
entities are themselves referential totalities-we can employ his account to help us 
understand how the activity of engaging any entity must by necessity alter it, even the activity 
of letting that entity be. 
Coming into relation with something changes us, and since we, as ecstatic, are 
perpetually in relation, we are perpetually being altered and transformed and altering and 
transforming the world that we are encountering. Awareness of this fact-a was that is 
coincident with its daft-amounts to the self-knowledge that is exhibited in maintaining a 
stance of Gelassenheit, or by debasing oneself into a partner in dialogue with the world. This 
is why it is appropriate to say that both Heidegger and Schelling are making a demand about 
how we ought to engage the presencing of things that is derived from an is; and thus, again, it 
is correct to say that Heidegger and Schelling are concerned with offering a 'true' account of 
the basic constitution of things, so that we can attempt to accord ourselves with this fact. 
However, a careful reader would take pause at this juncture: if the account that I have just 
given of 'diakenic unification' is true, would it not be the case that I could never have access 
to how things are as such, as any attending generates alterations, so as to establish whether or 
not I accord with them? 
My answer to this question is, as strange as it may sound, an emphatic, 'Yes!' Both 
Heidegger and Schelling's philosophical undertakings lead us to recognize that all of our 
engagements with the world are fundamentally creative, even the account of why this 
creativity, underdetermination, and playfulness lies at the basis of all things. The recognition 
of the abyssal bursting of sense that defines all things is, I believe, a recognition that is only 
attained insofar as one broaches the task of thinking with an ethos of openness, of possibility, 
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and of freedom. Openness discloses openness, possibility discloses possibility, and freedom 
discloses freedom. This is why Lawrence insists, "Schelling anticipates Nietzsche in 
providing an aesthetic rather than a moral justification of existence" (Lawrence, 2004: 176). 
So again, why evil? Or to ask the same question of Heidegger, why does "the 
essence of evil not consist in the mere badness of human acts, but rather rests in the 
maliciousness of ferocity [im Biisartigen des GnmmesJ"? Evil lies in closure, in the nihilation of 
the generosity of being in all of its playful arbitrariness, because both Schelling and 
Heidegger hold openness and creativity in the face of the lack of ground to be the great 
health, the entrance into "the realm of the upsurgence of healing" (GA9, 359). Insofar as 
the self as such exists only as it is ek-sistent, that is, insofar as it is ecstatic, the health of my 
self is the health of the whole and vice versa. Commenting on a passage that was discussed 
in Chapter I, wherein we sawJean-Luc Marion distinguish between Heidegger and Husserl 
on the "wonder of all wonders," Thomas Sheehan explains that Anwesung, "the process 
whereby entities become humanly engageable... does not happen in entities themselves apart 
from human beings, nor is it superveniently ordained from beyond the human world. 
Rather it occurs only with human beings and in the midst of their world." (Sheehan, 2002: 
285). Sheehan refers to this event as the reciprocal determination that I have previously 
described as Ereignis. Yet his account, in this essay at least, seems to privilege to firmly the 
human portion of this relationship in a manner that makes it sound as though Heidegger had 
little or no concern for the manner in which human beings disclosed the world. Sheehan 
provocatively argues that Heidegger had no concern for the character of technology, reading 
Heidegger's proclamation to let beings be, by saying, "the proper way to let entities be is to 
them bepresent, that is, to let them be endlessly engageable" (Sheehan, 2002: 286). While I 
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agree with Sheehan, who is a powerful reader of Heidegger, that we let beings be precisely be 
engaging them-I think it is clear, if no where other than in his tone, that Heidegger thinks 
that certain manners of engagement are significantly more problematic than others. 
Otherwise, I have no idea why he would bother to refer to the procession of technology as a 
danger; a danger in which the saving power lies. 
Contra Sheehan, I contend that a comportment is evil insofar as it poisons the 
whole, thereby not only closing off the possibility of experiencing freedom at the limits of 
conceptuality, but also killing oneself to live. Self-preservation as preservation of the whole 
is thus a goal of thinking for Schelling and Heidegger, but it is always subsidiary to the 
continued possibility of the experience of freedom. Schelling's measure for evil is thus not 
reactive, rather, evil itself is a sickly, egotistical reaction in the face of the overflow of activity 
that is the unfolding of the absolute, and unfolding in which we are implicit and which we 
explicate through our lives. Schelling and Heidegger's experience of freedom is thus entirely 
consonant with Spinoza's amor intellectualis dei, insofar as this love for Spinoza is an 
experience of the unfinished and unfinishable joy that is the task of thinking, insofar as 
thinking remains a thinking of relation and expression (ESp36). The desire for life, for joy, 
for possibility, for the experience of freedom that is ecstatic thinking, is thus the only 
measure that can be found by which Schelling and Heidegger could, at the end of the day, 
adjudicate between good and evil. 
This account, which holds the pursuit of the experience of freedom to be the alpha 
and omega of thinking for Schelling and Heidegger, surely rings of an extreme valuation of 
being, something with which Heidegger was indubitably uncomfortable, to say the least. 
Heidegger is quite clear that he views Nietzsche's project of the revaluation of all values to 
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be the task of a particular model of subjectivity, a model of subjectivity that is able to, and 
ought to, determine "the essence of all living things" (GAS, 226). This need to determine 
the meaning, the value of all life, emerges precisely because the nihilism that follows from 
the collapse of the supersensory leaves us incapable of answering the question, "why?" 
However, for Heidegger, this question "fails insofar as it is a questioning after the existent 
ground of beings, and thus fails to ask about being itself and its truth. The question has, as a 
question-and not only because it lacks an answer-failed" (GA6.2, 339). To ask why, from a 
simply human, subjective, perspective is already to say too much, it is to have decided in 
advance about the truth of being, not leaving this question open as a question. Rather, it is 
to instantiate a rigid distinction between subject and object, which is the basis of all willing as 
self-willing, i.e., autonomous willing (GA6.2, 342). As Heidegger says in the final sentence 
of his Nietzsche's Word.' "God is Dead", "Thinking only begins when we experience that reason 
[Vernunft] , which has reigned for centuries is the most stubborn countermatter of thinking" 
(GAS, 267). 
Contrary to this self-assertive valuation of all beings in their objectification, 
Heidegger advocates for a stance of questioning, which means that thinking is "holding open 
the question of being" such that "any discussion of 'being itself remains a questioning" 
(GA6.2, 304). For Heidegger, any thinking that abides in valuation cannot maintain such a 
questioning stance, as all attempts to appraise [schatzen] life are ways in which we "constitute 
and establish value" (GAS, 237). Heidegger's project would then, seem to be, an attempt to 
get beyond either actively constructing, or passively receiving values, so as to hold 
questioning open. The life of the thinker, the goal of the thinker, is thus to maintain an 
openness, a questioning stance towards being, never simply taking over meanings nor simply 
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projecting them, but tarrying with being as "what is given to be thought" (GA6.2, 336), as 
always being given anew at all moments. 
Given the work done in throughout this project, it ought to be clear that I agree with 
Heidegger's concerns regarding a mode of anthropomorphic valuation that maintains a 
distinction between subject and object wherein an individual understands themselves as the 
lawgiver of being. Yet, I worry that his uptake of Nietzsche falls into similar traps as his 
reading of Schelling. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger are emphatic that reason [VernU1gt] is a 
trap, an adversary, a prejudice for philosophy that disables a thinkers ability to engage the 
happening of things, insofar as this happening, when attended to phenomenologically, 
effaces our ability to attach a subject to the happening. Heidegger's critique of Nietzsche 
hinges upon his assumption that, for Nietzsche (and we should recall, for Schelling as well), 
all values are values generated by a willful subject. This assumption would overlook 
Nietzsche's constant rejection of attributing all deeds to doers. What ifwe were to say 'value 
happens'; we encounter being, even in openness, as already valued and we, as thinkers, 
creatively tarry with this value in all of our engagements? Heidegger may not be comfortable 
with this, but this is where I would like to conclude; Merleau-Ponty famously writes, 
"because we are in the world, we are condemned to meaning' (Merleau-Ponty, 2006: xxii), which 
means as much as to say we are condemned to value, but not necessarily values we choose or 
generate autonomously or monologically. The dialogical, ecstatic movement of philosophy 
is the creative inquiry into, and (re)generation of meaning beyond any such monological 
pronouncements of the subject. 
A brief excursus in Nancy's Being Singular Plural--to take Nancy both as the 
provocation for, and closure of, this project-will serve to illuminate this point more fully. 
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In this work, Nancy spends a significant portion of time parsing out the distinction between 
production and creation-a theme he returns to with some frequency in many other works, 
notably in Globalization, Or: the Creation 0/the World. Whereas the act of production, as Nancy 
sees it, requires a distinction between the producer, the product, and what is worked upon, 
all creation is fundamentally creation ex nihilo, and without a creator that precedes and 
produces out of this nothing (Nancy, 2000: 16). Yet this nihilo is precisely the lack of an 
origin outside of the "paradoxical 'first-person plural' which makes sense of the world as the 
spacing and intertwining of so many worlds" (Nancy, 2000: 5). This origin is "not an end, 
End, like Principle, is a form of the Other ... It is the plural singularity of the Being of 
being" (Nancy, 2000: 13). This plural singularity that is being means that any singularity 
gains its identity through its exposure, through differing and deferral, into the world that is 
both constituted by and constitutes every singularity as such. Regarding this, Nancy writes: 
If 'creation' is indeed this singular ex-position of being, then its real name is existence. 
Existence is creation, our creation; it is the beginning and end that we are. This is the 
thought that is the most necessary for us to think. Ifwe do not succeed in thinking 
it, then we will never gain access to who we are, we who are no more than us in a 
world, which is itself no more than the world-but we who have reached this point 
precisely because we have thought logos (the self-presentation of presence) as creation 
(as singular coming). (Nancy, 2000: 17) 
But maintaining this opening, not falling into the hatred of existence that Nancy elsewhere 
characterizes as evil, is, I have argued, our challenge. This constant, open, dialogical 
generation of meaning that is transformed and transforms us in our thinking is something 
that I find in Schelling, Nietzsche, Nancy and clearly in Heidegger as well, though Heidegger 
himself may never have clearly said as much due to his concerns regarding valuation. Maybe 
we could say that asking the question 'why?' in light of our awareness and solicitation of the 
abyssal character of being is precisely such process that does not and could not lapse into the 
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closure of evil, error, ressentiment, and onto-theology; rather it is a maintenance of possibility, 
which is only possible through the pursuit of the question worthy, the experience ofwhich is 
the experience of freedom. 
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APPENDIX 
CITATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS 
The majority of the citations in this dissertation are made in accordance with the 
Chicago Manual of Style, though there are a few notable exceptions. All of my citations of 
Schelling (with the exception of texts that have not made the collected works yet) are made 
according to the pagination of his collected works in German. All of my citations from 
Heidegger, insofar as possible, are made according to the number and page of the 
Gesamtausgabe edition in question. Below, I list the Gesamtausgabe editions that I cite, 
ordered by number with the German title. In the bibliography these texts are listed by date 
of publication. 
GA 4: Er/;iuterungen zu Holder/ins Dichtung 
GA 5: Holzwege 
GA 6.2: Nietzsche} Zweiter Band 
GA 7: Vortrage undAujsidze 
GA 8: Was Heisst Denken? 
GA 9: Wegmarken 
GA 10: Der Satz vom Grund. 
GA 12: Untenvegs zurSprache 
GA 15: Seminare 
GA 19: Platon: Sophistes 
GA 20: Prolegomena zur Geschichte des ZeitbegriJfs 
GA 24: Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie 
GA 29: Die Grundbegriffe der Metapf.ysik: Welt-Endlichkeit-Einsamkeit 
GA 45: Gruntifragen der Philosophie: Ausgewahlte 'Probleme l1 der "Logik l1 
GA 65. Beitrage zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis) 
GA 69. Die Geschichte des Seyns 
GA 70: Uber den Anjang 
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I have also followed standard citation conventions regarding references to Stephanus 
numbers in Greek texts, to book, proposition, demonstration, etc. in Spinoza's Ethics, and to 
references to the original German pagination of the A and B edition of Kant's Critique ifPure 
Reason. Hegel is cited according the Suhrkamp edition Werke; Nietzsche according to the 
Kn'tische Gesamtausgabe. 
It should also be noted that almost without exception all of the references to material 
that are originally in German are my own translations-though this was a laborious task, it 
was done for the sake of consistency and I think it has paid off. I owe a great debt to Peter 
Warnek,]effrey Librett,]ason Wirth, and Nick Reynolds for their repeated translation 
assistance throughout the course of this process. 
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